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PHILOSOPHY AND CHRISTOLOGY (Filozofia i chrystologia)

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EN
Assuming that the so called ontological proof is conclusive (at least in some of its versions) the article tries to justify the thesis that the idea of incarnation belongs to the idea of God, what in consequence implies that His incarnation was necessary. Even though God freely created the world incarnation was necessary in order to reconcile His infinite perfection with finite and imperfect relation (this idea was already presented by some medieval theologians and philosophers). From God's point of view incarnation is an atemporal 'event', but for human beings it had to be something temporally determinate. The aim of incarnation was to give humans a moral paradigm which would show them how to overcome egoism (conatus) belonging to the essence of every personal being. In this way we can say that we not only a priori know that God as a prefect being exists but that we also know that it was necessary for Him to participate in His creation. The second part of the article aims to show that the Christian belief that Jesus was (is) God incarnate can be grounded in a reasoning similar to that presented by Rene Descartes as a justification for our 32 Stanislaw Judycki conviction that the so called external world really exists: God cannot lie - which via ontological proof follows from His perfection - and from this we may conclude that He would not allow that what is believed by Christians as His incarnation has turned out something illusory.
EN
The aim of the article is to systematize fundamental concepts involved in the philosophical debate on realism and idealism. In the first (historical) part distinction between appearance and reality (which has its roots in ancient philosophy) is presented as one of the sources of the modern debate on realism and idealism. In this part different interpretations of realism and idealism (Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Heidegger, Moore, Carnap) are also analyzed. The second part is concerned with definitions of four fundamental oppositions: metaphysical idealism and epistemological idealism, metaphysical realism and epistemological realism. The third part discusses different forms of realism (naive realism, critical realism, scientific realism, transcendental realism and conceptual realism) and introduces the concept of antirealism. Fourth part deals with connections between realism and idealism debate and such philosophical standpoints as skepticism, agnosticism and solipsism.
EN
First sections of the article present the historical background of the twentieth century philosophy of the human body. Then the author analyzes main elements of Husserlian theory of the constitution of the body: constitution of visual, tactual and kinesthetic body, constitution of the body of the will (Willensleib) and intersubjective constitution of objective body. Husserl's theory of living body is then compared with Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of the body. In the last section the author presents analysis which aims to show how from the dualistic point of view conscious subject (soul) gets its most fundamental embodiment.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2009
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vol. 37
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issue 3
129-141
EN
The aim of the paper is to present an analysis of the relation between sensations and sense data. A discussion about the historical roots of both concepts (Descartes, Malebranche, Berkeley, Condillac, Reid) is followed by considerations concerning the similarities and differences between sensations and sense data: sense data were interpreted as having objective character, whereas sensations were treated either as being properties of things perceived or as subjective states of mind; sense data are objective and normally they are perceived, although they do not have to be objects of attention, whereas sensations are not perceived in normal circumstances of perception; sense data are neutral as far as dualistic solutions of the mind-body problem are concerned, whereas the subjectivity of sensations forces us to localize them in the non-physical subject. Next, the opposition between sensations and sense data is illustrated by an exposition of Husserl's considerations on sensations (Empfindung) and sense data (Abschattung) as belonging to noetic and noematic structures of consciousness. The end of the paper is devoted to an analysis of arguments for and against the existence of sense data (Ryle, Chisholm, Ayer).
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