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Świat jawności całkowitej, czyli o roli prywatności w życiu społecznym

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Diametros
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2013
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issue 36
62-80
PL
Tytułowy "świat jawności całkowitej" to eksperyment myślowy, który proponuję rozważyć w celu krytycznego namysłu nad rolą, jaką prywatność pełni w społeczeństwie. Eksperyment ten przedstawia świat ciągłego monitoringu. Wszystko jest w nim rejestrowane i archiwizowane, a każdy obywatel może te zapisy w każdej chwili obejrzeć. Przekonuję, że przeciwnie do stanowiska wyrażanego przez wielu badaczy, świat taki jest pojęciowo i empirycznie możliwy, i że zachowuje on wszystkie te wartości, które w świecie rzeczywistym zabezpieczone są przez prywatność.
EN
The title, "A world of total disclosure", refers to a thought experiment I propose to examine the role privacy plays in society. The experiment presents a society of complete surveillance. In it everything is recorded and archived for every citizen to view at any given moment. I argue that, contrary to the views held by many scholars, such a scenario is conceptually and empirically possible and retains all of the important values that are secured by privacy in the present world.
2
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Could Kripke Be a Phenomenologist?

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2003
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vol. 11
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issue 1
43-52
PL
In this article I am trying to compare the methods of phenomenology and analytic philosophy. Such a general comparison is of course impossible in a small article. In order to make it possible I am comparing selected authors. Phenomenology is thus represented by Husserl and Ingarden, analytic philosophy by Putnam and Kripke (they are chosen because of their realism and essentialism). I am trying to analyze the way the authors describe their methods. First I am analyzing analytic philosophy from the phenomeneological point of view, then phenomenology from the point of view of analytic philosopher. I'm. pointing out that Kripke and Putnam often say about intuition, and that they do not understand it as any kind of linguistic intuition. Then I'm. pointing out that phenomenologists often refer to the way w describe things, although they are convinced that their experience is always prior to any linguistic form. I am suggesting that even if we agree that the practice of both schools is similar, and that the description of methods could be translated, there is no chance of a real agreement between phenomenology and analytic philosophy. My thesis is that neither the practice nor the description of the way we obtain our philosophical goals is important. What really is important is all the philosophical background (ontology, philosophical assumptions and the like). In this particular situation considered in my article, the most important factor is the answer for the following question: Can we think without the language? Phenomenologist can not answer 'no' to this question. If he did he would admit that his philosophy isn't free of assumptions. Analytic philosopher can not answer 'yes' to this question. If he did he would admit that he is interested only in some kind of 'package for thought'. The answer itself depends on some kind of philosophical faith. Thus, the answer for the main question of my article depends only on Kripke's will of changing his declaration of faith.
3
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Thought Experiments in Essentialism's Service

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Filozofia Nauki
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2009
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vol. 17
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issue 1
23-29
PL
Thought experiments are often employed by philosophers who try to differentiate between essential and accidental properties. These experiments are said to stimulate the intuition of the reader (be it eidetic, linguistic or any other type of intuition). But sometimes they rather persuade the reader than test his intuition. How can we test the readers without revealing to them the role of test subjects they play? I suggest that some works of fiction can be treated as massive thought experiments because they are very similar to the stories philosophers use. The trouble is, that in the case of fiction our intuition is much more liberal and we accept things we would have certainly called impossible had they been presented to us in a philosophical article. I use some examples to show that our notion of impossibility depends on our naive, commonsense preconceptions of what objects and technologies exist in the world we are talking about. But this is exactly the type of knowledge philosophers ask us to suspend when they present their thought experiments.
4
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Between a Receptor and an Interpreter. The Role of a Concept of “Consumer” in the Theory of Model Consuming Mechanisms

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2017
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vol. 25
|
issue 3
69-79
PL
The paper discusses the role of the concept of “consumer” in the theory presented in Paweł Gładziejewski’s book Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych (Explaining with Mental Representations). The main claim Gładziejewski makes is that representational systems can be recognized as model consuming mechanisms. I argue that the way Gładziejewski characterizes models is insufficient (as it is still too liberal) and that it is hard to differentiate between the notion of “consumer” and that of “interpreter”. I propose an alternative way of defining consumers that is compatible with Gładziejewski’s theory and free of the issues of the original formulation.
5
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On a Non-arbitrary Criterion of Having a Computational Structure

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Filozofia Nauki
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2013
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vol. 21
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issue 4
31-50
PL
In the paper I defend the view that having a computational structure (which I understand as a property enabling the object to realize computations) is an empirically detectable feature of selected objects which is not observer relative. I start by presenting a naďve definition of realization of computation and show how it leads to pancomputationalism. Then I test existing strategies of dealing with this unwanted conclusion and show why they are not satisfactory for my aim. The main reason for this is that some of the notions these solutions use (for example notions of “mechanism” and “causality”) can be easily exploited by the skeptic. In the remaining part of the paper I present a candidate for a non-arbitrary criterion of having a computational structure and deal with some obvious objections to it. I propose to treat the mapping of physical states of a given object to an algorithm as a task of translating between two languages used for physical and formal descriptions respectively. The object can be said to contain a computational structure when it is possible to create a closed and effective translation manual between its physical states and states of any possible computation. The translation manual is closed when it either contains every expression of the translated language or rules for obtaining every expression of the translated language. It is effective when it is shorter than the sum of all expressions it helps to translate.
6

How “Meaning” became “Narrow Content”

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2016
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vol. 46
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issue 1
155-171
EN
The paper traces how disappointment with the notion of linguistic meaning has led to a shift towards the new, technical term of “narrow content”. In the first part of the paper I analyze the ways “narrow content” is understood in the literature. I show two important distinctions which have to be applied to the term in order to avoid confusion – the difference between context and functional theories of narrow content, and the difference between mental and linguistic narrow content. I argue that the most controversial combination of both distinctions is the idea of functional linguistic narrow content. In the second part of the paper I show that, contrary to the initial impression, this controversial, cut back notion of narrow content sheds some much needed light on several key semantic phenomena which we might otherwise be unable to explain – and because of this can be seen as a rightful descendant of the notion of meaning.
7
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What does the silent planet tell us? The analysis of selected philosophical themes found in Stanisław Lem’s Solaris

100%
Grabarczyk P.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Litteraria Polonica
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2020
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vol. 59
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issue 4
PL
Artykuł bada wybrane filozoficzne aspekty powieści Solaris Stanisława Lema. Twierdzę, że zachodzi interesujące podobieństwo pomiędzy historią „solarystyki” – fikcyjnej dyscypliny naukowej opisywanej przez Lema a historią kognitywistyki. Pokazuję, że obie dyscypliny przechodziły przez podobne etapy, starając się opisać swój przedmiot (odpowiednio, planetę Solaris oraz świadomość ludzką). W dalszej części artykułu skupiam się na dwóch problemach zidentyfikowanych w kognitywistyce, które można bezpośrednio odnieść do wątków obecnych w Solaris: problemie wykrywania istot myślących oraz problemie reprezentacji umysłowych. Kończę artykuł przyglądając się tajemniczym gościom, którzy prześladują bohaterów powieści i pokazuję, że mogą oni być zinterpretowani jako modele heurystyczne rozważane w teoriach uploadu.
EN
The paper analyses selected philosophical aspects of Stanisław Lem’s Solaris. I argue that there is an interesting similarity between the history of “Solarist studies” –the fictional scientific discipline depicted by Lem and cognitive science. I show that both disciplines go through similar stages as they try to describe their main subject (the planet Solaris and human consciousness respectively). In the further part of the paper, I focus on two problems identified in cognitive science that can be directly related to the themes found in Solaris: the problem of the detection of intelligence and the problem of the notion of mental representations. I finish the paper by looking at the mysterious guests that stalk the main protagonists and show that they can be understood as heuristic models that are taken into account in the theories of mind uploading.
8
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From the Issue Editors

63%
Ciecierski T., Grabarczyk P.
Studia Semiotyczne
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2019
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vol. 33
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issue 1
5-8
PL
In June 2018, the second Context, Cognition and Communication conference was held in Warsaw. Philosophers and linguists from over twenty countries presented more than eighty papers on the broadly understood philosophy of language and mind. After the conference, we announced the call for papers for the special issue of Semiotic Studies under the general title Meaning, Content and Reference. The call was addressed both to conference participants and the philosophical community in general. The current issue of Semiotic Studies contains the best articles submitted in response to that call.
9
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Perception of Affordances and Experience of Presence in Virtual Reality

63%
Grabarczyk P., Pokropski M.
Avant
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2016
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vol. 7
|
issue 2
EN
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is im- mersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications.
10
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Perception of Affordances and Experience of Presence in Virtual Reality

63%
Grabarczyk P., Pokropski M.
Avant
|
2016
|
vol. 7
|
issue 2
EN
Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is im- mersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications.
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