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1

FALZIFIKÁCIA A PARADOX INFERENCIE

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 8
593 – 602
EN
The paradox of inference is based on the thesis that inferences cannot be both deductively valid and useful because an inference, in order to be useful, must advance us to a new conclusion, but a deductively valid inference cannot, on principle, do that, since its conclusions are contained in its premises. Falsification is a deductively valid inference as well. Its adherents should therefore respond to the paradox of inference. The paper elaborates on the view that critical, deductively valid arguments, e.g. the falsifying mode of inference modus tollens, do not advance those who use them to new knowledge, yet are useful because they help them to eliminate criticized theories. This view is confronted with the traditional response, according to which deductively valid inferences advance us to subjectively new conclusions and thus extend our subjective knowledge.
2

ARGUMENTÁCIOU SA ZDÔVODNENIE NEDÁ OBJAVIŤ ANI VYTVORIŤ

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2018
|
vol. 73
|
issue 8
636 – 646
EN
Can argumentation discover that statements are justified? Or can justification of statements originate in argumentation? In the paper it is argued that as far as epistemic justification is concerned, both questions have to be answered in the negative. Because of the regress problem, argumentation cannot reveal justification. And because of the fallacy of begging the question, argumentation cannot produce justification. Consequently, it is utterly wrong to claim that the purpose of argumentation is to justify statements that are being argued for.
3

O DVOCH CHYBÁCH POPPEROVEJ TEÓRIE PRAVDEBLÍZKOSTI

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2007
|
vol. 62
|
issue 2
122-135
EN
The paper deals with two mistakes ascribed to the Popper's theory of the verisimilitude. The first is the well known critique of the Popper's qualitative definition of the verisimilitude produced independently by D. Miller and P. Tichy which argues that that definition is false. The second is the claim that due to the Popper's theory of verisimilitude and his theory of corroboration inductive and the justificatory elements enter his theory of science. This accusation was raised e.g. by I. Lakatos and J. Watkins. The paper tries to show that while the first critique is true, the second is false.
4

VEDECKÉ POZNÁVANIE A PRAGMA-DIALEKTIKA

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2023
|
vol. 78
|
issue 8
675 – 688
EN
Based on a critical analysis of a specific theory of knowledge course, Gábor Zemplén has identified several barriers frustrating efforts to support critical thinking in science education. He proposes three strategies of how to bolster up critical thinking skills in teaching science-oriented courses. One of them is to implement the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation in classes. The paper calls attention to three implicit assumptions behind the Zemplén’s proposal, subjects them to internal criticism, and argues that they cannot be reconciled with each other. By criticizing them externally, the paper aims to show that it is not apposite to explain or model scientific cognition by the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.
5

O KOGNITÍVNYCH PRIENIKOCH UMENIA A VEDY

63%
Šedík M., Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 7
631-642
EN
Cognitive overlap between art and science can be found in the processes of the learning through experience. What necessarily needs to be present in these processes are not good reasons in favour of what is known or learnt, but the following features: The first feature of art and science have in common the negativity of learning processes: What a cognizer C learns through experience is that his/her theories, expectations, attitudes, trials, etc. are wrong and should be abandoned in order to advance. This leads us to the second common feature of art and science: if C is to make mistake, and thus to learn through experience, he/she must create (produce, invent, etc.) something in advance. It is further argued that C learns through experience due to causal relations between the environment (including other cognizers as well as cultural context) and his/her sensations and beliefs. This cannot be accomplished, however, if C is not aware of the notion of objective truth. Empirical knowledge is social and public, yet its truth is not reducible to social agreement. More could be learnt about the learning through experience in art and science, if anyone showed that some of the features or relations proposed in this paper are not necessary for learning.
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