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Kryteria „logiczności” logiki w ujęciu Susan Haack

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2012
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issue 50
140-151
PL
In the philosophy of logic the following questions are discussed: What is logic? Which formal systems are systems of logic? What does make them systems of logic? The paper presents and analyses the answers to these questions given by Susan Haack. She adopted the strategy, called the “hospitable policy”, giving the criterion in which formalism is a logical one. In the article I discuss whether the validity of her solutions is correct.
2
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Praktyczny aspekt logiki (stanowisko Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza)

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Prakseologia
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2012
|
issue 152
223-235
EN
The aim of this article is to present and discuss the Ajdukiewicz’s concept of the practical aspect of logic. To begin, I describe his concept of the practical importance of science and especially his concept of logic – i.e., the definition and range of logic. The idea of “logical culture” is fundamental to his conceptualization. I also present Ajdukiewicz’s idea that making the course of logic more practical should be required. At the end of the article I discuss the importance of Ajdukiewicz’s view.
3
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Pogranicze logiki i prakseologii w pracach Ewy Żarneckiej-Biały

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Prakseologia
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2011
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issue 151
223-235
EN
Żarnecka-Biały presented her views on the nature of logic and praxiology, and the connections between them, in some of her papers. The aim of this article is to refer and discuss some main theses of Żarnecka-Biały’s concerning the logical aspect of praxiology.
4
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Uwagi o Alvina Plantingi rozumieniu konieczności

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce
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2010
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issue 47
109-133
PL
Alvin Plantinga’s understanding of necessity is discussed. The kinds of necessity, as seen by Plantinga, are indicated, and concepts are described which are sometimes identified with the concept of necessity. The distinction between de dicto necessity and de re necessity is the principal matter for Plantinga. After their short characteristic, the attempts of the de re necessity rejection, undertaken by some authors, are presented. In the final part of the paper Plantinga’s argumentation aiming at defense of the de re necessity is discussed. Critical remarks, concerning the presented material, are a part of the paper.
5
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CZYM JEST PLURALIZM LOGICZNY? (STANOWISKO J.C. BEALLA I GREGA RESTALLA)

100%
Czernecka-Rej B.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2013
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vol. 61
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issue 1
5-22
EN
C. Beall and Greg Restall are advocates of a comprehensive pluralist approach to logic, which they call Logical Pluralism (LP). According to LP, there is not one correct logic, but many equally acceptable logical systems. The authors share Tarski’s conviction and follow the mainstream in thinking about logic as the discipline that investigates the notion of logical consequence. LP is the pluralism about logical consequence – a pluralist maintains that there is more than one relation of logical consequence. According to LP, classical, intuitionistic and relevant logics are not rivals, but they all are equally correct, they all count as genuine logics. The purpose of this paper is to present some remarks concerning J.C. Beall’s and Greg Restall’s exposition of LP. At the beginning, the definition of the relation of logical consequence, which is central to their proposal, is shown. According to Beall and Restall, argument is valid if, and only if, in every case when the premisses are true, then the conclusion is, too. They argue that by considering different types of cases the logical pluralist obtains different logics. The paper — apart from presenting LP — also gives a critical discussion of this approach. It seems, that the thesis of LP is far from being clear. It is even unclear what exactly LP is and where is stops. It is unclear what “equally good”, “equally correct”, “equally true” mean. It is not clear, how to explain, in scope of logic, that the system of logic, is a model of real logical connections.
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