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EN
The nominalist attitude in medieval logic supported a fully extensional conception of the sense of the expressions. Many arguments against this approach were raised at that time. The authoress would like to show in this article (1) that there is a (hidden) extensional conception of notions in current logic, namely in the interpretation of formal theories and the creation models of them and (2) that, and how, the traditional arguments against the extensional conception are relevant also for logic today.
EN
Instead of the existential quantifier Bernard Bolzano uses his notion of 'Gegenständlichkeit einer Vorstellung an sich' (objectivity of a representation in itself). This approach makes it possible for him to solve the traditional problem of the predication of existence (i.e. whether it is possible to consider existence as a standard property of individuals) in accordance with an approach common today, namely to take existence to be primarily a property ('occupation') of a corresponding representation in itself, and not a characteristic of individuals. However, Bolzano considers a property of real existence to be attributable also to particular individuals, which is essentially different from the usual practice.
EN
Recent extensional logic considers a formula containing existential quantifier as an adequate way of rewriting a statement about the existence of something. Quine even claims that 'to be is to be the value of a variable'. That means that if we consider a theory to be true, we have to treat all members of an appropriate universe as existing. This article intends to point out a difficulty in this conception: The primary task of an existential quantifier is only to claim that something can be found in a universe, whatever the universe is.
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