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1

THEORY-LADEN OBSERVATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EQUIVALENCE OF THEORIES

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 7
562 – 570
EN
The paper examines Dickson’s (1999) question how it is possible to hold the theory-laden observation thesis and, at the same time, to uphold the thesis of the empirical equivalence of theories. After the elucidation of several semantic distinctions we propose the definitions of empirical equivalence of expressions and theories, respectively. In the next step, we scrutinize the theory-ladenness thesis more closely and propose three distinct, but related specifications of it. Finally, we reconsider the two theses in question order to show that they could be interpreted as fully compatible.
2

HOW TO ASSESS THEORIES OF MEANING? SOME NOTES ON THE METHODOLOGY OF SEMANTICS

100%
Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2012
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vol. 19
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issue 3
325 – 337
EN
The paper presents a two-level approach to an assessment of meaning theories. To begin with, language is distinguished from language-model and, analogously, meaning is discerned from a model of meaning. The first level of a theory assessment is presented as dealing with the relation of a model of meaning to intra-theoretical aims and assumptions of a theory with specific language-model. The second level of assessment concerns ontological, epistemological, logical and other assumptions underlying the respective language-model. Finally, several questions are set forth as methodological directives for elucidating hidden assumptions behind the theories of meaning.
3

TESTOVATEĽNOSŤ A VÝZNAM OBSERVAČNÝCH A TEORETICKÝCH TERMÍNOV

100%
Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
|
vol. 18
|
issue 3
384 – 397
EN
Carnap’s analysis of the language of science had presupposed too close a connection between the semantics and testability. The core problem of the logical empiricist tradition was to show how to provide interpretation of theoretical terms and hence the explanation of their application to observable entities by means of observation terms. It is argued that the utilization of a much more expressive semantic theory which identifies meanings with hyper-intension entities leads to a clarification of the competencies of semantics and methodology. It is claimed that the observability or unobservability of term’s referents does not determine the meaning of the term. Carnap’s reduction sentences are therefore conceived only as methodological devices for the determination of unobservables via the theory-presupposed observable aspects.
4

„NOVÁ ZÁHADA INDUKCIE“ A TESTOVANIE VLASTNOSTÍ

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
|
vol. 66
|
issue 8
746 – 754
EN
The paper deals with the “New Riddle of Induction” set forth by N. Goodman in his Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. The problem is introduced through the definition of grue predicate. The relation between the grue hypothesis and empirical evidence is examined. Goodman’s underlying thesis about the neutrality of empirical evidence is undermined. The intelligibility of the idea that disjunctive properties such as Grue can be observed and seen is questioned. A solution of Goodman’s riddle is outlined by means of the definition of the identity of empirical properties and further developed through postulating of the necessary condition of induction executability which prohibits the inference from “Some a, b, c, d emeralds are green” to the hypothesis “All emeralds are grue”.
5

MOŽNOSTI A LIMITY DEMARKÁCIE VEDY

100%
Bielik L.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
vol. 67
|
issue 7
530 – 544
EN
The demarcation of science is discussed in a wider context of differentiating the elements of scientific knowledge from non-scientific or pseudoscientific cognitive fields. The traditional epistéme/doxa approach fails in differentiating the scientific from non-scientific. To resolve the problem of demarcation the arguments of the demarcation relation have to be made explicit. The heuristics of the explication is seen in the concept of the theory of science. It is suggested that the pluralistic character of the contemporary science should not be conceived as a hindrance to solving the problem of demarcation. Further, the specification of the objects of demarcation on both sides of the demarcation relation makes the possibilities as well as limits of demarcation more visible.
6

PREČO LEN (NUTNÉ) PRAVDY AKO PREDPOKLADY DEDUKTÍVNYCH ÚSUDKOV?

63%
Gahér F., Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
75 – 97
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine Tichý’s understanding of the term “assumption”. We show that Tichý distinguishes two approaches to inference: the one-dimensional view that treats inferences as a sequences of logical rules or axioms as well as hypotheses and their logical consequences; and the two-dimensional view specifying inference as a derivation of one entailment from (the set of) another entailment(s). It is claimed that Tichý is right in his critique of Meinong’s concept of assumption as ‘assertion without conviction’. Nevertheless, Tichý – in addition to his logical concept of assumption – uses, though unreflectively, also the epistemic concept of assumption. Henceforth, we claim that accepting Tichý’s rejection of the epistemic hypothetical assumptions we couldn’t use logic as an instrument for empirical knowledge enhancement. We believe, to the contrary, that the epistemic assumptions may become a basis for derivations and knowledge enhancement, even though they do not represent necessary truths.
7

VYUŽITIE POJMU ZHODA V HYPERINTENZIONÁLNEJ DEDUKCII

63%
Bielik L., Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
98 – 111
EN
The paper deals with the usefulness of Pavel Tichý’s concept of match between two (or more) constructions for the deduction and inference considerations. Tichý’s preference of the two-dimensional view on inference instead of the one-dimensional view is criticized. The reasons for the implementation of the match concept are elucidated. The logical expressiveness of the match concept is demonstrated through its implementation to the Natural Deduction System explicated in the hyper-intensional framework of Transparent Intensional Logic.
8

MODEL METÓDY (4): APLIKÁCIA A KLASIFIKÁCIA

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 9
737 – 751
EN
The present article is the final part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. Building on the results of the previous part in which the model has been proposed, we start with two detailed case studies that are used to illustrate it. In particular, we deal with the method of explication and the sampling method. Next, we introduce the notion of a variant of method and that of the essential core of method. Since our model is extensional, it leads to certain drawbacks that are typical of all extensional models. These notions are used to cope with some of those shortcomings. Finally, certain kinds of method are distinguished.
9

MODEL METÓDY (1): METÓDA A PROBLÉM

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 2
105 – 118
EN
The present article is the first part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. The article both gives an informal presentation of the model and introduces conceptual tools required for a more rigorous presentation. To begin with, the character of goals and their connection to method is elucidated. Secondly, we describe instructions and some of their relations such as that of independence or (immediate) succession. Finally, since methods are often used in problem solving activities, we show what problems are and introduce certain related notions. Broadly speaking, scientific methods are conceived of as means of transforming cognitive problems into their solutions.
10

MODEL METÓDY (2): INŠTRUKCIA A IMPERATÍV

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 3
197 – 211
EN
The present article is the second part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. The article offers a detailed explication of the notion of instruction in terms of binary relations between certain kinds of states. Instructions are taken as imperatives and their role is associating input states with output ones. In particular, instruction ϕ! associates an input state in which it is not the case that ϕ with an output state in which it is the case that ϕ. An important distinction between instruction and its occurrence is introduced. It enables us to recognize certain kinds of transitions from input states to output states and vice versa, namely the derivate transition and the postulate transition, as well as to define certain kinds of relations between occurrences, such as their continuity or mutual independence. A classification of instructions by their logical forms (namely, categorical and hypothetical)
11

MODEL METÓDY (3): INŠTRUKCIA A METÓDA

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 8
637 – 652
EN
The present article is the third part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. Building on the results of the previous part concerning the notions of instruction and its occurrence, the present article specifies the ways of chaining the occurrences. The occurrences of instructions constitute linear chains if involving only the occurrences of categorical or simple hypothetical instructions; a chain is nonlinear provided there is at least one complex hypothetical instruction in it. Every chain of occurrences can be represented as a sequence of postulate and derivate transitions. The method is represented as an oriented graph consisting of the chains of occurrences of instructions. We specify various formal and informal constraints that are to be met by a graph if it is to be taken as a representation of a method. Finally, we describe a link between the model of method proposed in this part and our intuitive specification of method as a kind of problem solving activity given in the first part of our paper.
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