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Review: "Religia i prawda," by Piotr Moskal

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Piwowarczyk M.
Forum Philosophicum
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2009
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vol. 14
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issue 1
163-166
EN
The article reviews the book Religia i prawda [Religion and Truth], by Piotr Moskal.
2
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KŁOPOTY Z POJĘCIEM WIECZNEJ TERAŹNIEJSZOŚCI

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Piwowarczyk M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2012
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vol. 60
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issue 4
297-317
EN
The article is devoted to problems connected with a concept of eternal present. I analyze two such conceptions of maximally extended divine “now”: proposed by Stump and Kretzmann and proposed by Whitehead. Yet the article begins with the presentation Thomas Aquinas’ conception of eternity. On the ground of this theory “eternal now’ has only metaphorical meaning.
3

Formalna niesamoistność własności

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Piwowarczyk M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2011
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vol. 39
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issue 2
33-42
EN
Roman Ingarden believed that the ontological status of properties cannot be exhausted by the claim that properties are non-independent and fulfill the formal function of “belonging to” some object. To explain this he used the metaphor that “properties enter into the account of an object”, a version of the scholastic saying that “accidentia non sunt entia sed entis”. I argue that properties do not have their own qualitative content. For example, in the case of a bar of steel which has property of being hard, the quality of “hardness” does not inhere immediately in this property and then indirectly in the bar, but inheres directly in the bar. The property in question does not have hardness on its own. This seems trivial but it needs to be emphasized because some philosophers treat properties as objects, even if they claim that properties cannot exist without objects. The thesis of the formal heteronomy of properties consists just in this view: properties have no matter on their own. The second part of the article is devoted to the saying “accidentis esse est inesse”. I argue for a strict connection between the thesis that properties exist because of the object’s existence and the thesis of formal heteronomy, and I use the latter to argue against bundle theories of object.
4
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Platonism and the Problem of Universals: A Polemic with Paweł Rojek’s Tropy i Uniwersalia (Tropes and Universals)

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Piwowarczyk M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2020
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vol. 28
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issue 2
113-133
PL
This paper is a polemic with Paweł Rojek’s criticism of Platonism as one of the positions concerning universals. The problem of universals is taken to be about the basis of resemblance between things. Rojek maintains that Platonism is a hidden form of nominalism. Section 1 presents my understanding of the key terms concerning the controversy. Section 2 shows that Rojek’s argument begs the question: he simply presupposes that only a moderate realist has a correct concept of universal. In section 3, I argue that the Platonist argument for the transcendence of universals is valid, and I criticize Rojek’s responses to the separation argument against moderate realism. Finally, section 4 demonstrates that the transcendence of universals is compatible with their generality.
5
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A Critique of Immanent Realism - the Separation Argument

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Piwowarczyk M.
Filozofia Nauki
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2014
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vol. 22
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issue 4
109-130
PL
In the article I formulate a version of the separation argument against immanent realism. The argument has been known since Plato’s Parmenides. Its gist consists in the thesis that if universals were immanent (wholly present) in individuals, universals would be separated from themselves, which is absurd. The argument is underestimated nowadays, because separation is usually conceived in spatial terms. Immanent realists treat universals as properties of objects and point to the fact that properties exist in space in a different way than objects do. This peculiarity of properties is supposed to allow them to be separated from themselves. I try to show that separation should be regarded as a special form of ontological independence, and in that case the argument cannot be refuted. This kind of dependence is called “inseparability” and was introduced into ontological discourse by Roman Ingarden. An object x is inseparable from an object y iff it belongs to the essence of x that x exists with y within an absolute whole. I do not define the notion of absolute whole but try to explicate it by pointing to the difference between wholes such as subjects modified by their properties and wholes composed of interdependent subjects of properties. A subject and its properties make up an absolute whole, whereas ontologically interdependent subjects of properties make up only higher-order wholes. It seems very plausible that every object is inseparable from itself (inseparability is reflexive) - every object must make up an absolute whole with itself. But if a universal is immanent in different objects, then either it must be separated from itself, or these objects are inseparable. Both consequences are unacceptable. We cannot refute this version of the separation argument by appealing to a specific spatial 152 Abstracts status of properties, because no spatial concepts are involved in the theory of inseparability.
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Trudności nominalizmu tropowego – problem fundamentów podobieństwa i różnicy numerycznej

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Piwowarczyk M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2023
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vol. 71
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issue 3
45-61
EN
One of the objections against trope nominalism is that tropes, contrary to the declarations of the their proponents, must be complex, which opens the road to a regress that can only be stopped by accepting some universals. The complexity of tropes is supposed to arise from the fact that the relation of resemblance and the relation of numerical difference, which occur between perfectly resembling tropes, must have separate foundations which are components of tropes themselves. These foundations again stand in resemblance and difference relations, thus they are also complex, and so on. In this article, I discuss this problem and try to refute the arguments of the opponents of trope nominalism. As a point of reference I take Paweł Rojek’s paper „Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciw nominalizmowi tropowemu” [Resemblance regresses. A double argument against trope nominalism], which in an original way links together the various objections against trope nominalism. The structure of my article is as follows: first I briefly characterize trope nominalism and indicate what I have in common with this position. Then I characterize relations, in particular the resemblance relation, and then I present Rojek’s argument. Then I try to show that the argument for the complexity of tropes presupposes the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, which is rejected by nominalists. In the penultimate section, I point out that particularity is not a component of a trope, but a way in which a trope constitutes reality.
PL
Jeden z zarzutów wobec nominalizmu tropowego głosi, że tropy, wbrew deklaracjom ich zwolenników, muszą być złożone, co otwiera drogę do regresu, który da się zatrzymać, tylko przyjmując jakieś powszechniki. Złożoność tropów ma wynikać z tego, że relacja podobieństwa i relacja różnicy numerycznej, które zachodzą między doskonale podobnymi tropami, muszą mieć osobne fundamenty, stanowiące składniki tropów. Te fundamenty znów stoją w relacjach podobieństwa i różnicy, co generuje regres. W niniejszym artykule przyglądam się temu problemowi i próbuję odpierać argumentację przeciwników nominalizmu tropowego. Za punkt odniesienia czynię artykuł Pawła Rojka „Regresy podobieństwa. Podwójny relacyjny argument przeciw nominalizmowi tropowemu”, który w oryginalny sposób łączy ze sobą rożne zarzuty przeciw nominalizmowi tropowemu. Struktura mojego tekstu jest następująca: najpierw krótko charakteryzuję nominalizm tropowy i wskazuję, co mnie łączy z tym stanowiskiem (nie mogę bez zastrzeżeń określić siebie jako zwolennika nominalizmu tropowego). Następnie podaję charakterystykę relacji, w szczególności relacji podobieństwa, a potem przedstawiam argument Pawła Rojka. W kolejnym paragrafie staram się pokazać, że argument za złożonością tropów zakłada zasadę identyczności nieodróżnialnych, którą nominalista tropowy odrzuca. W przedostatniej sekcji wskazuję, że jednostkowość nie jest składnikiem tropu, lecz sposobem, w jaki trop konstytuuje rzeczywistość.
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