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EN
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the relation between phenomenology and philosophical anthropology by analyzing it in the selected, theoretical as well as historical contexts. The author focuses primarily on the problem of Edmund Husserl’s criticism of anthropologism and analyzes the practical meaning of the rejectionby him of anthropology as a true foundation of philosophy. The thesis of the paper is that already by rejecting anthropologism in the logic and theory of knowledge, Husserl presupposed some idea of philosophical anthropology in the “foundational” sense he criticized, and that this implicit idea was pursued by him not only from pure theoretical reason. In reference to Leszek Kołakowski and the methodology of the Warsaw School of the History of Ideas, which he applies in his interpretation of the idea of phenomenology, the author of the article attempts, unlike Kołakowski, to reveal not only the “religious” (in a vague sense), but also the specific political meaning of this idea. What is argued here is that the only possible reconciliation between anti-anthropologism on the one hand and the outspoken humanism of transcendental phenomenology on the other lies in the adoption by Husserl of Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s ideal of humanity as its practical, worldview framework. The practical, if not directly political, motif of Husserl’s radical criticism of anthropologism is, in author’s interpretation, Husserl’s attempt to answer, in the reference to this ideal, to the main political question of his times as consisting in the rising racist and anti-Semitic tendencies in the German naturalistic anthropology.
EN
This paper attempts to answer questions about, first, the historical motives which brought the “race” issue into the focus of phenomenological reflection, and, secondly, the theoretical grounding for calling such reflection “phenomenological.”1 The basis for this reconstruction will be the psychological race theory developed in the 1920s and 30s by Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss, a somewhat forgotten student of Edmund Husserl, and its rooting in the history of the phenomenological movement. Discussed will be both, the theory’s historical background—which, in keeping with the paper’s main thesis, is best-expressed by Max Scheler’s reflections on “European patriotism”—and its relation to Husserl’s concept of phenomenology as a “strictly scientific philosophy.”
EN
The main problem of the paper is to what extent the political can become a subject of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Its starting point is Ludwig Landgrebe's thesis that if phenomenology is to be a transcendental philosophy, it is - consistently thought out to an end - a transcendental theory of history. Referring to this thesis, the author poses the question: would the meaning of phenomenological transcendentalism not be consistently thought out to an end only if phenomenology proved its capacity as a transcendental theory of the political? In order to answer this critical question Landgrebe's thesis is interpreted from the perspective of Klaus Held's project of a 'phenomenology of the political world'. The author of this paper analyses the categorial relationship between both projects and poses two questions in this context: To what extent the problem of the political falls within the scope of phenomenology as a transcendental theory of history and how far the phenomenology of the political world can be understood as a transcendental theory of the political.
EN
The aim of this paper is to compare the approaches of Ernst Cassirer and Aurel Kolnai on the idea of the nation state in its most radical form, which consists of identifying national sovereignty with an unrestricted right of the nation to political, external, and internal self-determination. What the comparison attempted here focuses on, is the criticism on the conditions for the possibility of specific German nationalism, presented by Cassirer in his Myth of the State and by Kolnai in his War Against the West. According to the main thesis of this paper, insofar as both Cassirer and Kolnai recognized the role played in politics by emotions and considered political phenomena as being constituted by not only rational or at least calculable mechanisms, but also affective factors, like beliefs, religion, and myth, they tended to consider nationalism in terms of the politics of “regression,” understood, psychoanalytically, as a reversion of mental life, in some respects, to a former, or less developed, psychological state, characteristic of not only individual mental disorders, but also social psychosis. It will be argued, that Cassirer and Kolnai, not unlike the representatives of the Frankfurt School, considered the contemporary preponderance of mythical thought in political philosophy to be an expression of the dialectic, which consisted in “relapsing” of the Enlightenment into mythology. As a main motive for the comparison of their political philosophies, an assumption will be presented in the paper, that, while taking into account the contemporary tendency to oppose national sovereignty to the sovereignty of international law, the approach to the idea of nation state, as presented by Cassirer and Kolnai, seems to be by no means out of date.
EN
The article discusses some aspects of participation of workers in creation and improvement of technologies. After presentation of basic terms and concepts connected with the subject (inventiveness, rationalization) in the introductory part of the article, and of statistical data illustrating the employees’ inventive movement in Poland with a special emphasis laid on workers, in the following paragraphs there are analyzed such problems as: 1) Opportunities for creative inventiveness Of workers in conditions of modern technology, and its most important forms; 2) social (noneconomic) functions of inventiveness of workers in the work establishment; 3) some problems of managing technical creativeness of workers.
EN
The paper presents an analysis of the state of enforcement of the principle of self-financing of companies (one of the 3 basic principles of the economic reform in Poland) and of its connection with the undertaking initiative of industrial companies. The analysis was made on the basis of materials published in 4 periodicals over the period of 3 years: 1982-1984. By "entrepreneurship is meant an undertaking initiative in the sphere of economy, mainly in the field of production, with the prospect of profit and of non-routine (and thereby risky) character. The state of enforcement of the reform legislation in the field of self-financing is far from satisfactory. Among the most popular practices is the so called "soft financing" expressed mainly in subsidizing and conceding tax (and other) exemptions without objective justification. This has certain negative effects in the sphere of economic behavior of companies, especially with regard to their entrepreneurship. Most generally, instead of undertaking profitable initiatives which could establish their position on the market the companies concentrate their efforts on the "game" with agencies of the Government in view of gaining profits without carrying out their proper activity. Thus make-believe entrepreneurship supersedes real initiative.
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