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Duchowość bez Boga a życie „jakby Bóg był".

100%
Sobkowiak J.
Teologia i Moralność
|
2013
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vol. 8
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issue 1(13)
103-115
EN
There is no one-dimensional man. The desire inscribed into the nature of human being is stronger than broadcasted ideologies or reductive anthropological concepts. Even those who methodically try to exclude God from the sphere of human quest are aware of this. An example of this is A. Comte-Sponville's proposal to create spirituality without God. He is trying to show that concepts such as faith or spiritual bond could be replaced with their counterparts - faithfulness or vision of bond as sharing without dividing. In the present article the author tries to show the inconsequence of such an approach and to present the concept of living "as if God existed" as a thesis worth reflecting on. Spirituality, as understood by the author of the article, is the "life of living", a driving force that gives ultimate sense and purposefulness to human existence. Such an understanding of spirituality requires faith in the personal aspect - man needs such a point of adhesion to which he can refer entirely: with reason and will. A counterbalance to the proposal of spirituality without God is living "as if God existed". Such an approach is not about imitating the life of faith but about reminding oneself that excluding God from the horizon of quest is just man's arbitrary decision, and therefore has little to do with the rationality of being. The consequence of accepting this proposal is the necessity of re- defining concepts such as faith, freedom, or communication, and restoring a proper relation between faith and reason. A further consequence is the conviction that the only way to "disenchant" the world is to "enchant" it again with the hope coming from faith.
PL
Nie istnieje człowiek jednowymiarowy. Pragnienie wpisane w naturę ludzkiego bytu jest silniejsze od głoszonych ideologii czy redukcyjnych koncepcji antropologicznych. Zdają sobie z tego sprawę również ci, którzy metodycznie usiłują wykluczyć Boga ze sfery ludzkich poszukiwań. Przykładem tego jest propozycja A. Comte-Sponville’a stworzenia duchowości bez Boga. Próbuje w niej wykazać, że takie pojęcia jak wiara czy duchowa więź można zastąpić ich odpowiednikami: wiernością, czy wizją więzi jako dzielenia bez podziałów.W niniejszym artykule próbuje się wykazać niekonsekwencje takiego podejścia oraz postawić jako tezę godną rozważenia koncepcję życia „jakby Bóg był”. Duchowość bowiem w rozumieniu autora artykułu stanowi „życie życia”, siłę napędową nadającą ostateczny sens i celowość egzystencji. Takie rozumienie duchowości domaga się wiary w wymiarze osobowym – człowiek potrzebuje bowiem takiego punktu przylgnięcia, do którego może odnieść się całym sobą: rozumem i wolą. Przeciwwagą do propozycji duchowości bez Boga jest życie „jakby Bóg był”. W takim podejściu nie chodzi bynajmniej o udawanie życia wiary, lecz o przypomnienie, że wykluczanie Boga z horyzontu poszukiwań jest wyłącznie arbitralną decyzją człowieka, a co za tym idzie, ma niewiele wspólnego z racjonalnością bytu. Konsekwencją przyjęcia tej propozycji jest konieczność powtórnego zdefiniowania takich pojęć jak wiara, wolność, komunikacja oraz przywrócenie właściwej relacji pomiędzy wiarą a rozumem. Dalszą konsekwencją jest przeświadczenie, że jedynym sposobem „odczarowania” świata jest jego ponowne „oczarowanie” nadzieją płynącą z wiary.
2
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Trust as a Condition of Getting to Know the Truth: The Anthropological Aspect

100%
Sobkowiak J.
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
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2016
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vol. 54
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issue 2
195-208
EN
Man is a relational being. His development, both in the personal and social aspects, assumes a relation to truth. In such communal building the classical concept of truth as the congruence of intellect and the perceived reality is not enough. It is also necessary to refer to the world of persons (subjects of perception), as a person is the place of learning and communicating the truth, and its witness, for only on personal level can truth give rise to obligation. For it to happen, however, there must be an attitude of trust created between persons. The truth perceived by a subject is a partial one. Thus communicating it must assume its limited and incomplete nature. What is more, a subject communicates by means of words and images. And they acquire certain autonomy, eluding the subject. Therefore there is a need of trust which assumes that the subject communicates only a part of the truth, but it is accompanied by a willingness to get to know the whole truth. Truth requires a particular communicational horizon, which is love. Only by love and a willingness to be open to the full truth the learning subjects can get closer to it. The unity of seeking must be based on full trust in a person, and in such a sense trust is a condition of getting to know the Truth which is a Person.
3
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Global Or Universal Morality? The Importance Of Hermeneutics In The Era Of Transformations

100%
Sobkowiak J.
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
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2019
453-469
EN
Global Or Universal Morality?The Importance Of Hermeneutics In The Era Of Transformations
4
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The Concept of the Person as “Subject” and “Place” of Morality According to Paul Ricoeur

100%
Sobkowiak J.
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
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2019
427-451
EN
e concept of the subjectivity of a person presented in this article has shownthat man as a subject appears in constant references and relations in which hisexistence is embedded. On the one hand, it escapes the determinism of nature,on the other hand, it reveals a certain crack between its nature and action. isleads to the conclusion that even if a person is characterised by individuality, itis not a separate existence. It seems justified to return to the question of whatmakes a person, in spite of both external and internal variability; they remain thesame or otherwise what builds and what destroys the subjectivity of the person?e question thus posed reveals the first threat to human subjectivity whichis the fact of the existence of evil. For it is not only something external to manbut also something that makes man both the “place” of the appearance of evil and responsible for evilB8. While staying in Ricoeur’s philosophy characterisedby a dialectical movement one can already see in the language discussing evila threat to certain “deposits of hope” present in his thoughtB<. For the religiouslanguage to which Ricoeur ultimately reduces the problem of evil is the languageof hope and eschatology. Freedom also takes on a new meaning in this context.It is no longer just something that has been enslaved but above all somethingthat is a “desire for the possible.” A possible freedom is the Resurrection. In thisperspective, even evil and suffering can find their ultimate meaning, and thesubjective character of morality does not threaten to fall into subjectivism.Moreover, it is in the name of such subjectivism that morality demands for thesubject this “otherness,” the hope that comes from the Resurrection.
5
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Od Redakcji

38%
Sobkowiak J., Filipowicz K.
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
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2016
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vol. 54
|
issue 2
11-15
6
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Od Redakcji

38%
Filipowicz K., Sobkowiak J.
Studia Theologica Varsaviensia
|
2016
|
vol. 54
|
issue 1
11-18
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