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1

THE OBJECT OF THE AXIOLOGICAL FEELING IN N. HARTMANN'S ETHICS

100%
Kopciuch L.
Etyka (Ethics)
|
2007
|
issue 40
49-61
EN
It is typical for the material ethics of value to claim that values are recognized in an act of feeling. The question addressed in the paper is: What is the object of the axiological feeling in the ethic of N. Hartmann who distinguishes valuable character, content of value and duty? It would be too unspecific, to answer that the object of the axiological feeling is value. An analysis of Hartmann's views shows that the axiological feeling indicates all these elements of value but in a vague way. However, it is only this feeling that can help us recognize valuable character, duty, and value. This role of the axiological feeling is visible both in practice and in philosophical investigations.
2

DIFFERENCES IN THE STRUCTURE OF A WORK OF ART ACCORDING TO INGARDEN AND HARTMANN

100%
Kopciuch L.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 2
101-114
EN
On several occasions Roman Ingarden accused Hartmann of using his ideas concerning the stratified structure of a work of art. In this paper, thw aurhor shows that the dependence between the two concepts has no genetic character. First of all, Hartmann formulated general solutions about such objects before Ingarden published 'Das literarische Kunstwerk'. Already in the 'Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis', Hartmann spoke about the two-layer structure of works of art. Secondly, unlike Ingarden, Hartmann argued that the material layer belongs to a work of art. These two arguments show that Ingarden's accusations are unfounded.
3

CRITIQUE OF ETHICAL RELATIVISM IN NICOLAI HARTMANN

100%
Kopciuch L.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
|
2006
|
issue 41
157-170
EN
N. Hartmann is a representative of 20-th century absolutism in axiology. The author analyses his arguments against ethical realtivism. These are: emotional cognition of values, its apriorical nature, demarcation of values and their validity and a distniction between relativism and relationism. It turns out that a historical change of valuation is a change of validity and not of the value itself.
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