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EN
The paper discusses with critical intent Marek J. Siemek’s conception of transcen-dental philosophy. Firstly, theory of knowledge does not belong to the epistemic level of reflection (Siemek’s stance) but it is precisely the other way around; namely, it is due to transcendental philosophy (critique of cognitive faculties) that it was possible to distinguish metaphysical, ontological and epistemological questions. Secondly, tran-scendental philosophy enables us to discriminate between the ontological and epistemo-logical questions (Emil Lask, Edmund Husserl) and, as a result, to take up within its scope traditional epistemological questions such as adequacy of cognition. Thirdly, Siemek’s Fichtean interpretation of transcendental philosophy is untenable. It overesti-mates the role of spontaneity and practical moment in the constitution of the world and underestimates the receptive moment in cognition. It seems that more plausible way of understanding transcendental philosophy can be found in the writings of the Marburg School of neo-Kantianism where within the field of transcendental consciousness more objectified meanings and subject as such are being constituted.
EN
Półtawski, while criticizing the tradition of modern empiricism and Cartesian dualism, creates a realistic and dynamic interpretation of the human being. Experience, sense impression, is neither an inferior variant of cognition nor simply an operation of providing mere elements or building blocks, but a distinct mode of being in the world, of symbiotic contact with the surroundings, a form of life. He radically parts ways with a Brentanian-Husserlian approach to the consciousness as a set of acts, not as a body of content. Półtawski contrasts this model with his model of noematic phenomenology. We are unable to perceive how noemats (the content of consciousness) are created, since this is not the work of consciousness alone, neither at the level of sensory experience, where the world is already primordially “given” as if “from below”, nor at the higher plane of conscious functioning in the world, where the world (model of the world) is already given as if “from above”. The model of the world is not to be found in the currently present consciousness, but rather behind the scenes, making possible the human conscient being in the world. An ontology elaborated on the ground of the simplest mode of human existence, i.e. one which reduces being human to perception, is unable to truly grasp and understand the realness of the world in general, and the realness of values in particular. Only a holistic and dynamic conception of man can do justice to the crucial role of values, and it is sought by Półtawski in his confrontation with the views of Ingarden, Strasser and Wojtyła.
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