During “Euromaidan” – sometimes also called Eurorevolution – in Ukraine in late 2013 and early 2014, religious rhetoric was widely used. An attachment to the ideas and language of religion appeared in the expressions and slogans of protesters and their opponents, including representatives of the “old” regime, in statements, interviews, speeches of representatives of religious organizations, public figures, and intellectuals, in articles by columnists, and in the analytical evaluation of theologians and experts on religion. Religious interpretation of the events of the revolution and demands of demonstrators was often focused on religious justification for the feasibility of Ukrainians’ peaceful struggle to have a say in their country’s development, the rule of law, democracy and their rights and dignity.
The purpose of the paper is to highlight the activities of the representatives of the Republic of Poland in the UN Security Council in the status of a non-permanent member in 2018-2019, in particular regarding the resolving of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The method of content analysis of state program documents, Internet portals of the government of the Republic of Poland and the United Nations, and scientific literature was used in the implementation of the goal. The problem-chronological method made it possible to trace the history of the participation of the Republic of Poland in the UN. The methodology is based on the principles of historicism and objectivity. The scientific novelty of the research lies in the new understanding of the role of Polish diplomacy in the UN Security Council after the occupation of Crimea and the start of Russia's hybrid war in Donbas. The analysis made it possible to formulate the following conclusions. The Republic of Poland – one of the founding states of the UN – tried to be an active member of the organization, including by participating in the work of its main bodies. Poland was elected a non-permanent member of the Security Council six times. The main priorities of Polish diplomacy at the UN Security Council in 2018-2019 included: respect for international law, protection of civilians in armed conflicts, peace and security in Eastern Europe. Much attention was paid to the issue of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which, thanks to the Polish side, did not disappear from the body's agenda and was discussed in various contexts. The Polish delegates consistently reminded about the negative impact of the violation of international law and agreements by the Russian Federation, the situation in the occupied territories of Crimea and Donbas, and in the Black and Azov seas. They tried to present the consequences of the occupation of Crimea and the war in Donbas not only as a problem of regional security, but also as a global challenge to the international legal order. The Polish state made a significant contribution to the formation and strengthening of the international coalition in support of Ukraine in countering the aggression of the Russian Federation. An obstacle to an effective resolution of the Ukrainian issue was primarily the specificity and composition of the UN Security Council, where non-permanent members play only a limited role, and one of the permanent members is an aggressor country. The example of the debate surrounding the resolution of the Ukrainian issue once again proves the deficit of UN deep reform
The paper presents the reaction of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) to Euromaidan in the Ukraine at the turn of 2013 – 2014. The Church has not taken a clear univocal position, unlike some other religious groups, especially the so-called national Churches. Its official position was confined to general calls for preserving peace and public order, territorial integrity and unity of the people, condemnation of violence, calling for participants of the conflict to begin and continue the dialogue. The causes and consequences of the position taken by the Church are analyzed in detail.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje stanowisko Ukraińskiej Cerkwi Prawosławnej (Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego) wobec Euromajdanu na Ukrainie na przełomie 2013/2014 r. Kościół ten zajął pozycję neutralną, w odróżnieniu od niektórych innych związków wyznaniowych, zwłaszcza tak zwanych Kościołów narodowych, które poparły protestujących. Jego oficjalne stanowisko wyrażało się w apelach do zachowania pokoju, porządku społecznego, integralności terytorialnej i jedności narodu, potępienia przemocy, nawoływania stron konfliktu do rozpoczęcia i kontynuacji dialogu. W artykule szczegółowo przeanalizowano przyczyny i skutki stanowiska Cerkwi.
The problem of thorough and ultimate decommunisation in Ukraine got suddenly valid during Euromaidan on the turn of 2013/2014 and after its termination. It became a component of post–revolutionary reforms in the field of policy of memory. A year after Euromaidan Ukraine’s parliament adopted four “decommunisation laws” on 9 April 2015. One of them concerns the condemnation of the Communist regime and prohibition the propaganda of his symbols. The author analysed contents of the law and focused on the results of decommunisation, which included the cleansing the public space from Soviet–era legacy. Full implementation of the law was planned for the year. During this time the goal was almost fully implemented regarding the renaming of many locations and districts. The communist names of thousands streets, squares, urban districts were changed, although this process was delayed. The process of renaming of many institutions, industrial plants and press titles was very slow.
The article presents the role of the Ukrainian state in the process of creating the Orthodox Church of Ukraine and achieving autocephaly in the context of Ukraine’s national security challenges after the Revolution of Dignity. The research was carried out on the basis of scientific sources, materials of state and church provenance, as well as analytical and sociological data. The results of research indicate that the formation of an autocephalous Church at the turn of 2018/2019 was largely possible due to the determination of the post-revolutionary ruling camp and obtaining a political consensus of pro-Western forces. That consensus could be achieved owing to the threats to state security, which was recognized and supported by Ukrainian society. The development of the young Church and the consolidation of autocephaly requires further support from the authorities.
PL
Artykuł prezentuje rolę państwa ukraińskiego w procesie tworzenia Kościoła Prawosławnego Ukrainy i uzyskania przez niego autokefalii w kontekście wyzwań bezpieczeństwa narodowego Ukrainy po Rewolucji Godności. Badania zostały oparte na literaturze naukowej, materiałach proweniencji państwowej i kościelnej, oraz danych analitycznych i socjologicznych. Ich wyniki wskazują, że ukonstytuowanie się autokefalicznego Kościoła na przełomie 2018/2019 r. w dużej mierze było możliwe dzięki determinacji porewolucyjnego obozu władzy i uzyskaniu konsensusu politycznego sił prozachodnich ze względu na zagrożenia dla bezpieczeństwa państwa, co znalazło poparcie w społeczeństwie ukraińskim. Rozwój młodego Kościoła i utrwalenie autokefalii wymaga dalszego wsparcia ze strony organów władzy.
The difficult process of the Polish Ukrainian reconciliation is still continuing. The political transformations in and Ukraine in the years 1989-2012 had opened a research and public debate on the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the first half of the twentieth century. The two countries cooperate in the area of science, culture, economy, and politics more and more intensely. Mass social awareness, however, is changing slowly. The Catholic Church also indicated the need to accelerate the process of reconciliation. She has made in view of her peace mission and the need to improve mutual relations between the faithful of the Greek and Latin rites on both sides of the border. The superiors of the Roman-Catholic Church and the Greek-Catholic Church in Ukraine and in Poland have been engaged in the solution of the conflict concerning of the Lvov Eagles cemetery, have issued a series of appeals to both countries for reconciliation, have taken part in commemoration of the victims, and have performed symbolical acts of forgiveness. John Paul II supported the work of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. It was hoped that his pilgrimage to Ukraine in the June of 2001 would be a turning point. A sudden improvement of the situation, however, has not taken place, but in the following years many new initiatives of rapprochement appeared: common prayers, pilgrimages, meetings of the episcopate and the clergy of both countries. There are still problems, however, such as the disputes about temples, accusations of proselytism and depriving of national identity, discussions on the limitations of commitment in national and political life.
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