Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 5

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The Harmel Report constituted a genuine breakthrough in NATO’s strategic position on the Soviet Union and the author of the text presents its history as well as consequences.
EN
The Harmel Report constituted a genuine breakthrough in NATO’s strategic position on the Soviet Union and Prof. Robert Kupiecki presents its history as well as consequences.
EN
The current text of the European Security Strategy is 12 years old. Its record relates to a world, even if not completely non-existent, then certainly one that is described selectively. As such it urgently requires a fresh look. Avoiding the strategic debate per se does not remove the need for the EU to act strategically. Its aim is not mere participation in international relations based on the existing potential to effectively protect Community interests. The lack of an upto-date security strategy blurs the clarity of purpose, weakens domestic consensus, and does not facilitate communication with other international actors. Pursuing strategies by collective actors (with multiple centres of decision-making), which is the case with the European Union, by its very nature cannot be easy. Democracy as a common denominator for the EU and the Member States’ status as sovereign decision-makers on strategic matters do not provide for a single dominant model of a security strategy. Thus, inevitably, both short-term decisions and the common strategic culture are the result of a laborious and rather slow process. The main purpose of the EU strategy, however, is to be simply an instrument of good policy and an effective reference point in planning specific, collective actions, conscious of the clearly stated interests of the entire Community. It is not replaceable by ad hoc measures or sectoral approaches (resulting solely from external circumstances, opportunities as they arise, or simply viewed as ersatz strategy). Having a strategy promotes the strong members in the implementation of their plans and in the case of the weaker—brings hope that their security situation will improve. Thus, it is also an attribute of global leadership, to which the EU aspires.
EN
This article takes up the highly debated—yet significant for security studies— concept of strategic culture, applied to the multilateral players in international relations. It uses NATO as a case study. This attempt (based on existing research, most notably by Kerry Longhurst) starts from building the operational definition of an organisation’s strategic culture, and identifying its key structural elements (basic features, interpretative factors and regulatory practices). Based on these findings, it ponders the exemplary „strategic culture building blocks,” such as NATO bureaucracy, strategic concepts and internal debates. The purpose of this analysis is to better understand the Alliance’s strategic culture, not only for reason of theory-building, but also as an analytical and predictive tool. This article takes up the highly debated—yet significant for security studies— concept of strategic culture, applied to the multilateral players in international relations. It uses NATO as a case study. This attempt (based on existing research, most notably by Kerry Longhurst) starts from building the operational definition of an organisation’s strategic culture, and identifying its key structural elements (basic features, interpretative factors and regulatory practices). Based on these findings, it ponders the exemplary „strategic culture building blocks,” such as NATO bureaucracy, strategic concepts and internal debates. The purpose of this analysis is to better understand the Alliance’s strategic culture, not only for reason of theory-building, but also as an analytical and predictive tool.
EN
Ballistic missiles and ballistic missile defense have become over the recent decades not only a weapon bringing the certainty of achieving one’s military objectives at minimum costs and risks, but have also been an important political instrument, impacting both strategic relations among the superpowers, and the regional powers, too. The differences in approach to the issue resulted from uneven access to technology, the costs associated with developing appropriate military systems, and political factors (such as domestic policy, budget constraints, or membership in international alliances). These factors could respectively impede or facilitate the development of adequate defense and deterrence capabilities. The analysis of the BMD development process allows for several generalisations that should clarify the most common misconceptions accompanying the issue: the certainty that there exists, or can be quickly established, the actual capability of unlimited missile defense, both in terms of range of missile threats and defended targets, as well as the opinion that all of the existing problems can be solved by (the use of) modern technology, the development of which is constant and permanent. The development of the BMD capabilities always generates substantial costs necessary to build these capabilities, but the practical usefulness of the latter is often hard to be proven in light of relatively few cases when they are actually used in battlefield conditions. These problems, among others, raised in the essay, are of crucial importance for Poland in the process of developing its indigenous BMD capabilities.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.