Search results

1

Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimierz Twardowski o filozofii i nauce

100%

Brożek A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2010

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issue 46

3-31

PL

Kazimierz Twardowski is the father of the modern Polish analytical philosophy. One of the most important stamp of this philosophical style is referring - in philosophical investigations - to achievements and methods of natural sciences. The article analyses this plot in Kazimierz Twardowski's philosophical works. It contains, in particular, a reconstruction of Twardowski's views concerning the classification of sciences, the methodological status of philosophy and psychology and the mind-body problem. Some not commonly known facts concerning the sources of Twardowski's interests in philosophy and science are mentioned.

2

Pytania i odpowiedzi. Analiza krytyczna koncepcji Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza

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Brożek A.

Zagadnienia Filozoficzne w Nauce

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2008

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issue 42

137-168

PL

The aim of the paper is to present critical analysis of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz's theory of questions. Generally, the author concentrates on four elements of Ajdukiewicz's theory of questions: the structure of question, the classification of questions, the concept of presuppositions of questions and the concept of answer. Ajdukiewicz's contributions in the domain of logic of questions are unquestionable. However, there are still many 'gaps' in his conception of questions that need to be filled. He proposes some improvements to this conception. They include an explication of the concepts of 'query' and 'tenor', a classification of complementation questions by use of categorial grammar, enriching the concept of 'assumptions' by the concept of 'pragmatic assumptions', and an explication of the concept of 'answer' (in general).

3

Historia muzyki oczyma metodologa

100%

Brożek A.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2014

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vol. 50

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issue 4(202)

313-319

PL

Są co najmniej dwa powody, dla których historia muzyki jest dyscypliną szczególną: pierwszy natury ontologicznej, drugi – aksjologicznej. Po pierwsze, historia muzyki jest, w najistotniejszym sensie tego słowa, historią utworów muzycznych, a więc pewnych ustrukturyzowanych przedmiotów intencjonalnych. Historia muzyki, która skupia się wyłącznie na tych strukturach – to autonomiczna historia muzyki. Jednakże historycy mogą także skupiać się na pewnych innych przedmiotach, które należą do „sfery muzycznej” – na wydarzeniach muzycznych, życiu kompozytorów, zjawiskach społecznych, recepcji muzyki czy też muzycznych gatunkach. Historia muzyki wygląda różnie z tych różnych punktów widzenia. Po drugie, historia muzyki jest de facto historią muzycznego kanonu, tj. utworów wybranych ze względu na pewne wartości. Zazwyczaj kanon składa się z utworów muzycznych o szczególnej wartości estetycznej i artystycznej. Jednakże jeśli odmówimy pierwszeństwa tym wartościom – obraz historii muzyki zmieni się radykalnie.

EN

There are two reasons of the fact that history of music is a peculiar discipline: ontological and axiological reasons. Firstly, in the most genuine sense, history of music is the history of musical compositions, i.e. certain structured intentional objects. History of music which concentrates only on these structures is usually called “autonomic history of music”. However, the historian may also concentrate on some other objects which belong to the “musical area”: on musical events, on composers’ life, on social phenomena, on musical reception and on musical genres styles. History of music looks differently from all these points of view. Secondly, the history of music is de facto the history of musical canon, i.e. of the compositions chosen for the sake of various values. Typically, canon is composed of the musical works of the unique aesthetic and artistic values. However, by rejecting these values, the shape of the history of music changes dramatically.

4

On Essential and Inessential Occurrence of Expressions in Another Expressions

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Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2005

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vol. 13

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issue 2

5-25

PL

Let us assume that the expression A is a segment of the expression B. Now, let us assume that we try to transform the expression B into the expression B', removing A from B or replacing A with another expression, say A'. When shall we say that A is irremovable or occurs in B essentially? We shall do it, if we can neither remove A from B nor replace A with A', not influencing upon important properties of B. On the other hand, when shall we say that the occurrence A in B is essential? We shall do it, if we can transform B into B' changing no <> properties of B. Let us say it more precisely. Let us assume - as concerns expressions x, y, x' and y' - that: (a) x occurs in y; (b) the only structural difference between y and y' is that x does not occur in y', or x' occurs in y instead of x. Then: x occurs in y inessentially-with-respect-to-w of y, iff y' is the same as y with respect to p. Correspondingly: x occurs in y essentially-with-respect-to-w of y, iff y' is different as y with respect to p. The occurrence x in y may be essential or inessential with respect to syntactic, semantic or pragmatic properties of y. In my paper, I discuss a variety of detailed concepts of the (in)essential occurrence of expressions in another expressions with respect to semantic properties of these expressions, i.e. with respect to semantic category, logical value, denotation and connotation. I also discuss some philosophical and methodological implications of presented solutions of the problem.

5

The Lvov-Warsaw School and the Idea of Unification of Scientific Knowledge

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Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2016

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vol. 24

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issue 3

5-24

PL

The article is divided into three parts. The first section contains explications of the concept of unity of science, of the concept of reduction, and of their mutual relation. These conceptual investigations are presented against the background of the Vienna Circle’s programme. The second part presents the criticism of the idea of unity of science in the Lvov-Warsaw School, mostly in the works of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Maria Kokoszyńska. The third part concerns various proposals of reduction which appeared in the Lvov-Warsaw School.

6

Square, Eagle, and Trygław: A Comment on Jacek Jadacki's Conception of Semiotic Functions of Names

100%

Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 1

47-63

PL

The article contains the results of the analysis of concepts connected with semantic functions of names. The conception of Jacek Jadacki, exposed in his "Spór o granice jezyka" ("Controversy on the limits of language"), is the point of departure of this analysis. The following theses are formulated and argued for. (1) There are two basic semantic functions of names: the referential and the descriptive one. The first function consists in indicating some objects; the second one consists in ascribing properties to some objects. (2) The concepts of indicating and ascribing are primitive ones. (3) The referential function of denotation and the descriptive function of connotation are mutually independent. The term "connotation" can be defined without using the term "denotation" and vice versa. (4) Names perform not only the function of designating, i.e. referring to particular objects, but also the function of denominating, i.e. referring to universal (resp. postulated) objects. (5) The connotation of a given name is genetically or conventionally connected with the pragmatic function of ascribing properties to respective objects. (6) In sciences, such connotations of names are sought after, which are, at the same time, essences of designates of these names.

7

Contributions to the Theory of Definitions

100%

Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2018

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vol. 26

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issue 2

119-150

PL

Being the results of conceptual analysis, definitions play a crucial role in philosophy. On the one hand, providing a good definition is often counted as a significant philosophical result. On the other, the lack of a correct definition is sometimes the main reason for futile philosophical controversies. That is why the theory of definitions is among the central aims of the methodology of philosophy. The paper proposes some improvements of the traditional semiotic conception of definitions, especially as it is applied in philosophy. Classifications of definitions are analyzed and new kinds of definitions are distinguished (with respect to structure, genesis, type of sense indicated, etc.). The paper also describes various ways of establishing definitions and reconstructs the criteria of correctness that apply to definitions.

8

Analytic Description as a Philosophical Method

100%

Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2017

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vol. 25

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issue 2

57-87

PL

The aim of the paper is to reconstruct the procedure of analytic description, and to indicate the applications of these procedures in various disciplines. The point of departure is Tadeusz Czeżowski’s approach to the problem of analytic description. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, some conceptual distinctions and some definitions of different kinds of description are presented. The second part focuses on interpretations of Czeżowski’s conception of analytic description. In the last part, some applications of analytic description in philosophy as well as in natural sciences and humanities are discussed.

9

Kazimierz Twardowski's Viennese Years

100%

Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 3

133-164

PL

Kazimierz Twardowski was born in Vienna in 1866 and spent there almost thirty years - before removal to Lvov in 1895. However, the Viennese period of Twardowski's life is relatively poorly known. The article aims at throwing light on Twardowski's activities in Vienna. It is based on archival documents found in Viennese and Warsaw archives and libraries.

10

Filozofia nowej muzyki – rediviva

100%

Brożek A.

Semina Scientiarum

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2011

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vol. 10

EN

Problems of the philosophy of music may be divided into three domain: ontological, epistemological and axiological one. In the ontological domain, the ontological status of such objects as sounds and wholes composed of them, especially of musical compositions, is a leading problem. In the epistemological domain, the problem of how to obtain the adequate cognition of music plays a similar role. Finely, in the axiological domain, one finds the problem of what is the general value of musical composition which is based on partial values of different kinds as a crucial problem. In the paper, I analyze these problems from the point of view of traditional music and describe how the perspective changes if we take new music into considerations.

11

Myślenie a mówienie. Na marginesie uwag Kazimierza Twardowskiego

100%

Brożek A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2015

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vol. 29

45-60

EN

Kazimierz Twardowski’s article „On clear and unclear philosophical style” (O jasnym niejasnym stylu filozoficznym) is considered as one of his manifests of the Lvov-Warsaw School: clarity of expressing thoughts was one of methodological determinants of this school. Because of some passages in this article, Twardowski is often considered as a philosopher who believed that we may only think in words. In the article, Twardowski’s views on the relation between language and speech are analyzed through the prism of the less known Twardowski’s writings with application of some theoretical distinctions.

12

Uogólnione pojęcie rozumowania

63%

Jadacki J., Brożek A.

Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia

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2012

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vol. 7

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issue 1

105-119

EN

The article proposes some extension of the concept of reasoning that includes also operations on interrogative sentences (interrogatives) and imperative sentences (imperatives), or rather on their contents — interrogations (issues) and prescriptions.

13

Sylwetka intelektualna Profesora Mariana Przełęckiego

63%

Brożek A., Jadacki J. J.

Zagadnienia Naukoznawstwa

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2013

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vol. 49

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issue 3(197)

263-270

14

Substantial and Verbal Disputes

63%

Andrzejewski A., Brożek A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 4

31-44

PL

The main subject of the paper is to present the criteria which help us to establish whether a given ontological controversy (or even a whole dispute) is substantial or merely verbal. Metaphysics is often perceived as a discipline composed of endless disputes with no glimpse of hope for solution. This fact makes many philosophers claim that ontology is nothing more than matter of linguistic choice. In this paper, we argue that there exist certain methodological tools which enable us to establish whether particular ontological disagreement is substantial or merely verbal. However, as we emphasize, the scope of application of these tools is limited to strictly defined cases. At first, we clarify the general background for an occurrence of ontological controversy. Assume that a controversy occurs between the person A and the person B iff: (a) A uses language LA, and B uses language LB (we do not decide what is the relation between those two languages and especially - if they are identical, or not); (b) in both languages there is a sentence ‘S’ (c) A accepts the sentence ‘S’ and person B rejects the sentence ‘S’ (d) A aims at making person B accept the sentence ‘S’ and person B aims at making person A reject the sentence ‘S’. Having defined the above, we formulate and justify following definitions: [SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is substantial, then: there are two different sentences S1 and S2 of the language L, such that a translation of S from the language LA into L is S1 and the translation S from LB into L is S2. [VERBAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)-(d) occurred. If the controversy between A and B is verbal, then: there is a sentence S3 of the language L that both the translation of S from the language LA as well as the translation of S from the language LB into L is S3. [SEEMINGLY SUBSTANTIAL CONTROVERSY] Suppose the conditions (a)- (d) occurred. A controversy between A and B is seemingly substantial when A and B are sure that the controversy between them is substantial but it is merely verbal. In the above definitions, the concept of language L occurs. We assume that it is a quasi-universal language to which every sentence of LA and every sentence of LB may be translated. We focus on how to recognize the language L, scil., how to establish the rules of translation of an ontological term of LA to another ontological term in LB. The proposed idea is that such a quasi-universal language L may be (re-)constructed only if A and B share the same pragmatic and/or cognitive attitudes (they want to solve a considerably similar set of problems within theirs ontologies). Then, it is highlighted how the presented conception of types of ontological controversies may be applied to the analysis of some ontological controversies, in particular, the debate between endurantism and perdurantism. The goal is achieved in two steps. Firstly, we use the required presuppositions of the language L in order to compare endurantism and perdurantism. Then, the following ontological concepts from these ontologies are discussed: „a thing of a common experience”, „part” and „ontological sum”. In consequence of the analysis, the serious affinity between endurantism and perdurantism is revealed. That is, the main differences between those ontologies are revealed as merely verbal. This fact is elicited by conceptual analysis which may be - to some extent - useful in process of defining whether (or not) some ontological disagreement is genuine or not.

15

Thought Experiments in Science

63%

Brożek A., Jadacki J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 1

5-32

PL

Our conception of thought experiment may be summarized as follows. Let us suppose that we want to know what is entailed by the occurrence of a given state of affairs αk. Let us call the state of affairs entailed by it ‘βk’. If αk is «ready», it is sufficient to conduct respective observation: thanks to it we shall «see» βk. Otherwise, we have to bring out the occurrence of αk. This is what real experiment consists in. We have called αk “the basis of experiment”, and we call βk - “the result of experiment”. If establishing that the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk is the first step to put the hypothesis - let us call it ‘γ’ - stating that the occurrence of the phenomenon α entails the occurrence of the phenomenon β, the experiment is heuristic (α is here a type of states of affairs exemplified by αk, and β - is a type of states of affairs exemplified by βk). Other experiments are of testing character. If we already had put γ, then establishing that the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk confirms this hypothesis, and if the occurrence of αk does not entail the occurrence of βk - the hypothesis is falsified. If we are not able or we do not want to bring out the occurrence of αk, we may make use of a thought experiment: we suppose or imagine that αk occurs. Imagining or assuming only that αk occurs does not suffice, of course, for establishing what state of affairs occurs as an effect of the occurrence of αk (for instance, that βk is such one). At our disposal, we have to have a hypothesis - let us call it ‘δ’ - different from γ, such that δ and the sentence stating the occurrence of αk entails the occurrence of βk. We have called γ “the horizon of experiment”. Sometimes it happens that we realize that we accept γ by carrying out the thought experiment - when we ask ourselves why we presuppose or imagine that the presented basis has this, rather than some other, effect. The result of thought experiment follows from its horizon; thus presenting the basis of the experiment is - from the theoretical point of view - superfluous. A thought experiment is nothing but the inference of the result from the horizon and basis. However, experiments fulfill some practical functions: they help us to realize the elements of the horizon and to illustrate or to exemplify important dependencies. Let us ask ourselves why physicists use counterfactual thought experiments. Firstly, the differences in alternative descriptions of a certain part of reality come out in boundary situations and such situations are difficult to bring out (it is usually at least technically difficult) - they may be only thought (presented). All observable bodies move in accordance with both Newtonian and Einstein’s theories - the differences come out by enormous velocities. Secondly, one uses thought experiments because in our thoughts one may «arrange» idealized conditions which cannot be «created» in reality. Thirdly, the exemplifications presented as thought experiments appeal illustriously to imagination what simplifies the reception of new, unintuitive ideas among scientists.

16

Thought Experiments in Philosophy

63%

Brożek A., Jadacki J.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 2

5-27

PL

It is not surprising for us that thought experiments are so popular among philosophers and among readers of some philosophical journals. As we showed in our paper - they are either would-be real experiments or stimulators of revealing convictions and opinions of people on which experiments are prosecuted. Besides the fact that thought experiments fulfill an illustrative and a fortiori persuasive function, they do not play any important theoretical role. They are simply exemplifications - usually inventive and funny ones - of some «pure» processes of reasoning. Their popularity has its source in the fact that since their childhood people like reading books with… illustrations. There would be nothing wrong with making use of such illustrations if texts in which they are described contained clearly expressed theses and transparently presented argumentation. Unfortunately - texts illustrated by thought experiments are lacking of such clarity and transparency. This is probably the reason for the fact that texts containing thought experiments are so widely commented. It is a very known truth that the less clear and transparent the text is, the more interpretative comments it needs. And in comments, there appear - instead of clearly formulated theses and transparently presented argumentation - new thought experiments…

17

On Performatives and Generating

63%

Brożek A., Kasprzyk Z.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 2

115-130

PL

The conception of performative utterances proposed by John Langshaw Austin is unclear and provokes many fundamental questions. We compare this proposal with Jacek Juliusz Jadacki's conception of performatives, being much more precise one. We develop Jadacki's intuitions and propose to characterize performatives as expressions fulfilling a specific semantic function: A type-expression W is a performative generating an intentional state of affairs S iff there is a convention K and circumstances C such that the convention K says: if somebody utters a token-expression W in circumstances C, so the state of affairs S will take place. Subsequently, we analyze the problem of correctness of performative utterances and relations between different criteria of correctness of performative acts. On the basis of these analyses, the paradox of annulled marriage is formulated and the problem of perfomatives in law is sketched.

Refine search results

Ne sutor ultra crepidam. Kazimierz Twardowski o filozofii i nauce

Pytania i odpowiedzi. Analiza krytyczna koncepcji Kazimierza Ajdukiewicza

Historia muzyki oczyma metodologa

On Essential and Inessential Occurrence of Expressions in Another Expressions

The Lvov-Warsaw School and the Idea of Unification of Scientific Knowledge

Square, Eagle, and Trygław: A Comment on Jacek Jadacki's Conception of Semiotic Functions of Names

Contributions to the Theory of Definitions

Analytic Description as a Philosophical Method

Kazimierz Twardowski's Viennese Years

Filozofia nowej muzyki – rediviva

Myślenie a mówienie. Na marginesie uwag Kazimierza Twardowskiego

Uogólnione pojęcie rozumowania

Sylwetka intelektualna Profesora Mariana Przełęckiego

Substantial and Verbal Disputes

Thought Experiments in Science

Thought Experiments in Philosophy

On Performatives and Generating