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1
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Prawomocność czy integracja? Studia porównawcze działalności politycznej na uchodźstwie

100%
Goddeeris I.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2010
|
issue 1(15)
171-186
EN
Exiles, defined as refugees or immigrants engaging themselves in opposition politics against their homeland, have been studied quite thoroughly. This research, however, does rarely exceed the frameworks of national history, treating exiles only as the trailblazers of the nation’s current political system. Only a few scholars have approached exile politics in a more systematic and comparative way. Their research, though, concentrates on exiles claiming legitimacy (governments in exile, national committees), while the political activities of other exiles seem to have been more influential.
2
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Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych „Solidarności”. Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ „Solidarność”, 1982–1989, część 2

100%
Goddeeris I.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2007
|
issue 1(11)
309-334
EN
The proclamation of the Martial Law in Poland on 13 December 1981 caused a storm of protest in the West. Although some West European governments did not completely condemn Jaruzelski’s attempt to end the Polish crisis in an internal and ‘peaceful’ way, most Western societies reacted fi ercely on the delegalization of Solidarność, the arrest of thousands of its militants, and the return of repression. Dozens of committees were founded at both sides of the Atlantic Ocean by Western sympathizers, Polish migrants and even Solidarność members who were coincidentally kept abroad by the Martial Law. All these organizations tried to support the underground trade union in Poland by informing the public opinion of their country, lobbying at local and national authorities, and raising money to assist Polish victims and their families. In order to coordinate these actions, several umbrella organizations were set up. In many countries, Western trade unions created special forums on a national level. Polish migrants from their side, met in Zurich in December 1981 and in Brussels in January 1982, and decided that each country should have one coordinating offi ce. In some countries, this ambition of unifi cation was realized, but in other countries, ideological differences and personal tensions between local leaders were too big. Moreover, these committees could not be integrated by a Group of Delegates to the National Convention of the ISTU ‘Solidarity’ Currently Abroad, that was founded in Paris in February 1982 by delegates to the First (and only) National Congress of the NSZZ Solidarność (September 1981). However, when some leaders of the Polish underground created the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) on 22 April 1982, and ordered their compatriots abroad to make a single representation in the West, a Coordinating Office Abroad of NSZZ Solidarność (Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ Solidarność Za Granicą) was founded in Oslo in July 1982. At first sight, the position of this Coordinating Office looks very favorable. As it was created with the official support of the TKK and was allowed to act as the offi cial intermediary between the leadership of Solidarność in Poland and foreign governments and institutions, it had an enormous advantage on most other exile organizations, that usually deal with problems of legitimacy, such as internal divisions and external recognition. Moreover, it could profi t from a very opportune climate: the events in Poland were followed in the West with a lot of attention and sympathy. However, the question presents itself whether these apparent trump cards were so permanent and useful as they seem to be on the face of things. Could the Coordinating Offi ce indeed narrow the gaps between all the different groups within the Polish emigration? Was the Western support really that widely spread and that continuous? Were there differences between countries, ideological groups and types of partners the Coordinating Office collaborated with (e.g. trade unions, human rights organizations, national governments, international organizations…). Finally, was the Coordinating Offi ce able to profi t from the support and to convert it in real influence? And if so, on which fi elds, at which moments and to what extent could it get a grip on events? These are the main questions that will be dealt with in this article.
3
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Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych „Solidarności”. Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ „Solidarność”, 1982–1989, część 1

100%
Goddeeris I., Błaszczyk K.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2006
|
issue 2(10)
315-347
EN
The proclamation of the Martial Law in Poland on 13 December 1981 caused a storm of protest in the West. Although some West European governments did not completely condemn Jaruzelski’s attempt to end the Polish crisis in an internal and ‘peaceful’ way, most Western societies reacted fi ercely on the delegalization of Solidarność, the arrest of thousands of its militants, and the return of repression. Dozens of committees were founded at both sides of the Atlantic Ocean by Western sympathizers, Polish migrants and even Solidarność members who were coincidentally kept abroad by the Martial Law. All these organizations tried to support the underground trade union in Poland by informing the public opinion of their country, lobbying at local and national authorities, and raising money to assist Polish victims and their families. In order to coordinate these actions, several umbrella organizations were set up. In many countries, Western trade unions created special forums on a national level. Polish migrants from their side, met in Zurich in December 1981 and in Brussels in January 1982, and decided that each country should have one coordinating offi ce. In some countries, this ambition of unifi cation was realized, but in other countries, ideological differences and personal tensions between local leaders were too big. Moreover, these committees could not be integrated by a Group of Delegates to the National Convention of the ISTU ‘Solidarity’ Currently Abroad, that was founded in Paris in February 1982 by delegates to the First (and only) National Congress of the NSZZ Solidarność (September 1981). However, when some leaders of the Polish underground created the Temporary Coordinating Commission (TKK) on 22 April 1982, and ordered their compatriots abroad to make a single representation in the West, a Coordinating Offi ce Abroad of NSZZ Solidarność (Biuro Koordynacyjne NSZZ Solidarność Za Granicą) was founded in Oslo in July 1982. At fi rst sight, the position of this Coordinating Offi ce looks very favorable. As it was created with the offi cial support of the TKK and was allowed to act as the offi cial intermediary between the leadership of Solidarność in Poland and foreign governments and institutions, it had an enormous advantage on most other exile organizations, that usually deal with problems of legitimacy, such as internal divisions and external recognition. Moreover, it could profi t from a very opportune climate: the events in Poland were followed in the West with a lot of attention and sympathy. However, the question presents itself whether these apparent trump cards were so permanent and useful as they seem to be on the face of things. Could the Coordinating Offi ce indeed narrow the gaps between all the different groups within the Polish emigration? Was the Western support really that widely spread and that continuous? Were there differences between countries, ideological groups and types of partners the Coordinating Office collaborated with (e.g. trade unions, human rights organizations, national governments, international organizations…). Finally, was the Coordinating Offi ce able to profi t from the support and to convert it in real influence? And if so, on which fields, at which moments and to what extent could it get a grip on events? These are the main questions that will be dealt with in this article.
4
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Solidarność a Trzeci Świat. Część I. Chrześcijańsko-demokratyczna droga do Ameryki Łacińskiej

63%
Christiaens K., Goddeeris I.
Dzieje Najnowsze
|
2018
|
vol. 50
|
issue 1
PL
Od samego początku Solidarność rozwijała obiecującą politykę wobec Ameryki Łacińskiej. Odwiedziły ten kontynent różne oficjalne delegacje oraz stały przedstawiciel Solidarności. Jednak od 1983 r. okazało się, że partnerzy w samej Ameryce Łacińskiej wykorzystywali sprawę polską do własnych celów i posiadali inne poglądy na stosunki międzynarodowe, Stany Zjednoczone i komunizm. From the very beginning, Solidarność developed a promising policy towards Latin America. Several official delegations and a permanent Solidarność representative stayed on the continent. From 1983 onwards, however, it appeared that the local partners were making use of the Polish case for their own purposes and that had different views on international politics, the US, and communism.
5
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Solidarność i Trzeci Świat. Część II. Taktyczne sojusze z kluczowymi ruchami lat osiemdziesiątych XX wieku

63%
Christiaens K., Goddeeris I.
Dzieje Najnowsze
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2018
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vol. 50
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issue 2
PL
Kontakty Solidarności z ruchami społecznymi lub politycznymi w Trzecim Świecie miały raczej ograniczony charakter oraz były bardzo wybiórcze. Solidarność zaakceptowała tylko te sprawy, które posiadały instrumentalną wartość dla jej pozycji międzynarodowej. Niechętnie uczestniczyła w walce przeciwko apartheidowi. Unikała wyraźnie antykomunistycznych ugrupowań. Było to widać nie tylko w jej niechęci do sprzymierzania się z opozycją antysandinistyczną w Nikaragui, ale także we współpracy z lewicową opozycją z Chile. W ten sposób Solidarność mogła uniwersalizować swoją sprawę, przeciwstawiając się polaryzacji ładu zimnowojennego oraz pokazać, że była częścią ogólnej walki antytotalitarnej. Solidarność’s contacts established with social and political movements in the Third World were rather limited and highly selective. Solidarność only embraced causes that were instrumental to its international profile. It reluctantly sided with the anti-apartheid struggle. It also avoided explicitly anti-communist groups. This became not only clear in its reluctance to side with the anti-Sandinista opposition in Nicaragua, but also in its collaboration with the left-wing opposition from Chile. In this way, Solidarność could universalise its cause, defy the Cold War bipolarity, and demonstrate that it was part of a general anti-totalitarian struggle.
6
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Spór o emigrację Polską w XIX w. – odpowiedź autora

63%
Goddeeris I.
Kwartalnik Historyczny
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2016
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vol. 123
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issue 2
7
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Polskie zakupy broni w Liège podczas powstania styczniowego

45%
Goddeeris I., Ranson H.
Teka Komisji Historycznej
|
2013
|
vol. X
8
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[Ankieta] Czym była „Solidarność”? / Jaką rolę odegrała „Solidarność” w najnowszej historii?

27%
Kamiński Ł., Blažek P., Dudek A., Friszke A., Goddeeris I., Kemp-Welch A., Kowalczuk I.-S., Kramer M., Opriş P., Paraskevov V., Polak W., Stykalin A.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2010
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issue 2(16)
13-49
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