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EN
The article reviews the jurisprudence of Lithuanian courts on private enforcement of competition law and identifies the main obstacles for the development of this practice. The analysis of the jurisprudence makes it possible to summarise that: most rulings of the Lithuanian courts relate to cases on the abuse of dominance; usually, dominant undertakings were allegedly applying discriminatory conditions towards the injured party and; most of the claims were presented as follow-on actions after a decision of the Competition Council. The courts held that damages caused by a breach of competition law have to be recovered in accordance with Lithuania’s main principles of civil responsibility. At the same time, the courts made it clear that their jurisprudence is based on the rulings of European Courts and the main principles of EU competition law. The main obstacles for the successful development of antitrust damages claims in Lithuania are, inter alia: complexity of competition cases; difficulty in obtaining substantive evidence; proving a consequential relationship and; high legal costs. The article also analyses substantial and procedural provisions of Lithuanian legislation that regulate the submission of antitrust damage claims.
EN
The article focuses on the novelties introduced by the Damages Directive in the field of consensual settlements of disputes concerning private enforcement. The Damages Directive obliges Member States to ensure that the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process. The Directive also establishes the main principles that govern the effect of consensual settlements on subsequent actions for damages. Since the EU framework for consensual dispute resolution of private enforcement disputes is quite new, many issues must still be solved in Member States’ practice. While analysing consensual dispute resolution in private enforcement cases, particular interest should be paid to mediation and arbitration as a form of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). Mediation is often used in competition law litigation. In a mediation process, parties are subject to fewer legal costs than in litigation and arbitration. It may thus be concluded that consensual dispute resolution is usually a faster way to receive compensation. However, voluntary arrangements and ADR in competition law still raise many problems concerning both procedural and substantial legal acts.
EN
The Book entitled ‘Implementation of the EU Damages Directive in Central and Eastern European Countries’, edited by Professor Anna Piszcz, was published in Warsaw, Poland in 2017. The publication date of this book was perfectly chosen, bearing in mind that Directive 2014/104/EU on antitrust damages actions (hereinafter, the Damages Directive) was signed into law on 26 November 2014 and published in the Official Journal of the European Union on 5 December 2014. All Member States were obliged to implement the Directive by 27 December 2016. However, this was not an easy task since it involved a whole package of new legal provisions aimed at increasing the amount of private enforcement.
EN
The article focuses on the concept of passing-on of overcharges and the peculiarities of its regulation by the Damages Directive. The Damages Directive obliges Member States to ensure that the defendant in an action for damages may invoke the passing-on defence. Moreover, the Directive establishes the new framework and the main principles that govern the application of the passing-on defence. The national case law on passing-on is very insignificant in Central and Eastern European countries and many questions are expected to be raised in the courts of the CEE Member States. While discussing the concept of passing-on in the Damages Directive, a lot of emphasis should be paid to the issue of causation. Causation will definitely be the subject of most of the questions in cases when an indirect purchaser will bring a claim for damages. Causation may be tricky when an indirect purchaser claims it suffered an ‘overcharge harm’ because of passing-on. In most cases, the issue of causation will be decided mainly by national courts based on national procedural rules. Depending on the situation, passing-on may be used as a basis for the claim (as a ‘sword’) or as a defence (as a ‘shield’). It could be used as a basis for the claim by an indirect purchaser, in case s/he has suffered any harm because of the illegal actions of a cartelist or a dominant company. At the same time, it could be used as a defence by the infringer against a claim for damages. The article also analyses the specifics of the implementation of the Directive into the national laws of CEE Member States.
EN
The article explores the problems related to the determination of a single economic unit under competition law. The first part of the article addresses the concept of a single economic entity. It is presumed that companies belonging to a group are separate undertakings, but under certain circumstances the group might constitute a single economic entity. The second part refers to the analysis of the concept of ‘control’, which is the main criterion describing the relationship inside a group of companies. The third part refers to the analysis of the cases when de jure separate undertakings are recognized as a single economic entity. When a company exercises decisive influence over another company, they form a single economic entity and, hence, are part of the same undertaking. Decisive influence is the most important criterion for recognizing that de jure separate undertakings constitute a single economic unit. Finally, the fourth part refers to problems concerning the presumption of the decisive influence. It is presumed that a parent company exercises a decisive influence over a subsidiary where it holds 100 percent of capital. Thus, separate companies are recognized as a single economic unit, if 100 percent of a company’s capital is owned by the controlling entity.
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