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Rationality--Human Individual--Action

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Aleksandrowicz D.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2004

vol. 13

issue 1(49)

257-270

The rational choice theory pretends to explain human behaviour. It is not clear, however, that the theory can accomplish this task without first justifying a broader conception of rationality. Is it rational to maximise profits or to minimise risks? It seems that the theory must adopt some such limiting assumptions, by replacing, for instance, 'expected payoffs' by 'subjectively perceived advantages', before it can begin to make any recommendations. The subjective approach involves individual preferences based on memory of past events. If someone wants to beat the record of the latter day Simon Stylite, he must first consult the Guinness Book of Records to learn who recently remained longest on the top of a pillar. Then, in one sense, it is rational for the challenger to stay on the pillar for a longer time than the most recent record breaker did, but at the same time it is not entirely rational for him to undertake this task at all. It seems that all individuals are capable of seeing both sides of the coin. If so, the dichotomy of objective versus subjective characterisation of rationality can be replaced by a holistic versus aspect approach.

Rationality, Ignorance and Stupidity

100%

Aleksandrowicz D.

Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2004

vol. 13

issue 2(50)

125-139

Different types of action imply different types of knowledge. In natural sciences the link between actions and their effects is explicitly given. But in public sphere the knowledge that pretends to explain the connection between behaviour and its alleged purposes is semi-theoretical at best. This difference in competence and in causal concepts employed in the two different fields leads the author to claim that that mistakes in natural sciences can be considered honest acts of ignorance while in the humanities they are often manifestations of ungrounded projections, or--as the author calls them--act of stupidity. Then he points out that honest ignorance is not very dangerous, as it can be cured by supplying appropriate evidence to those who lack knowledge. Stupidity, on the other hand, is more pernicious and harmful, because it is something more complicated. It is ignorance of one's ignorance, a state that cannot be easily cured. As a consequence of the widespread inability to recognise stupidity for what it is, the public nurtures a 'culture of stupidity' that gains social legitimacy easily and without much protest.

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2 Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria

2 2004

2 Aleksandrowicz D.

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Rationality--Human Individual--Action

Rationality, Ignorance and Stupidity