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"Logika i język" pół wieku później

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Szubka T.
Studia Semiotyczne
|
2019
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vol. 33
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issue 2
EN
An extensive Polish anthology Logic and Language, for which Jerzy Pelc selected and translated a number of papers, has been for many years an invaluable resource in teaching and research. It has provided a helpful and instructive picture of some essential debates within analytic philosophy. However, in addition to several crucial essays, which firmly belong to the core texts of this tradition, the anthology includes also marginal and insignificant papers. And what is even more surprising, Pelc has passed over contributions of a few hugely influential philosophers (G. E. Moore, L. Wittgenstein, W. V. Quine, J. L. Austin, and H. P. Grice), and the justification of his selection given in the preface to the collection is incomplete and far from convincing.
PL
Obszerna antologia Logika i język z analitycznej filozofii języka, do której J. Pelc wybrał i przełożył teksty, była przez wiele lat wykorzystywana w nauczaniu i badaniach w Polsce. W udany sposób przedstawia niektóre dyskusje toczone w ramach filozofii analitycznej. Jednakże obok tekstów kluczowych, które weszły do kanonu tej tradycji, zawiera także prace marginalne i mało znaczące. Zaskakujące jest pominięcie przez Pelca kilku bardzo ważnych filozofów i ich dorobku (G. E. Moore’a, L. Wittgensteina, W. V. Quine’a, J. L. Austina i H. P. Grice’a), a podane we wstępie do antologii uzasadnienie tych braków jest niekompletne i mało przekonujące.
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Więcej (scjentystycznego) dymu niż (filozoficznego) ognia

100%
Szubka T.
Diametros
|
2005
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issue 3
182-188
PL
Głos w debacie: Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?
EN
A voice in the debate: What the mind is and how it exists?
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Richard Rorty and the analytic tradition: radical break or partial continuity?

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Szubka T.
Diametros
|
2010
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issue 25
146-158
EN
It is quite widely assumed that at the beginning of his career Richard Rorty was an orthodox analytic philosopher, working in its then current mainstream, and especially fascinated by the linguistic turn taken by this tradition. Subsequently he supposedly radically and dramatically changed his views, turning himself from a staunch analytic philosophers into a vigorous critic of the analytic tradition and ultimately paradigmatically postmodern and continental thinker. It is argued in the paper that this common picture exaggerates changes in Rorty’s philosophical views. He certainly has never become fully postmodern and continental philosopher, whatever it means. And what seems more important, he always had a lot of reservations about analytic philosophy and had less hopes of it than one or two passages from his early writings suggest.
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Pojęcie filozofii analitycznej, indywidualności filozoficzne i kilka innych spraw. W odpowiedzi niektórym dyskutantom

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Szubka T.
Diametros
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2005
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issue 6
209-213
PL
Głos w debacie: Czy zmierzch filozofii analitycznej?
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Czy zmierzch filozofii analitycznej?

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Szubka T.
Diametros
|
2005
|
issue 6
94-104
PL
Filozofia analityczna należy do najbardziej zróżnicowanych nurtów czy kierunków filozofii XX w. W jej rozwoju można wyróżnić trzy fazy: wczesną, centralną i późną. Nawiązując do uwag Bernarda Williamsa, staram się podać racje przemawiające za tym, że często przejawiający się w niej scjentyzm, naturalizm i ahistoryzm prowadzi do kryzysu czy wręcz powolnego zmierzchu tego nurtu filozoficznego. Filozofia analityczna, przynajmniej na obecnym etapie rozwoju, powinna pozbyć się scjentystycznych złudzeń i przestać imitować nauki przyrodnicze lub wręcz zachowywać się jak ich przedłużenie (chyba, że jest to faktycznie ich przedłużenie, takie jak filozofia mechaniki kwantowej czy filozofia biologii). Filozofia, cytując Williamsa, “powinna traktować siebie jako część szerszego przedsięwzięcia humanistycznego, polegającego na rozumieniu nas samych i naszych aktywności”, i aby odpowiedzieć na wiele kwestii rodzących się w trakcie tego rozumienia powinna “zajmować się innymi częściami tego przedsięwzięcia, a w szczególności historią”. Jeżeli tak się stanie, to dokona się albo radykalna transformacja filozofii analitycznej, albo zostanie ona zastąpiona jakąś odmianą filozofii postanalitycznej.
EN
Analytic philosophy is one of the most varied currents of philosophy in the 20th century. Its development can be seen to include three phases: early, central, and late. Making use of the remarks of Bernard Williams, I argue that the scientism, naturalism, and ahistoricism that it often espouses are leading to a crisis and even to a gradual decline of this philosophical current. Analytic philosophy, at least in the present phase of its development, ought to rid itself of scientistic illusions and stop imitating the natural sciences or even behaving as if it were their extension (unless it indeed is such an extension, like the philosophy of quantum mechanics or the philosophy of biology). Philosophy, Williams claims, ought to regard itself as part of a broader humanistic enterprise whose aim is to understand ourselves and our activity. In order to answer the many questions that arise in the course of its investigations, it ought to turn its attention to other parts of this enterprise, in particular with history. Once this happens, we will witness a radical transformation of analytic philosophy, or even its replacement by some form of post-analytic philosophy.
6
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Why One Should Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth?

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Szubka T.
Filozofia Nauki
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2006
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vol. 14
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issue 2
59-73
PL
It is often assumed that any attempt to undermine the so-called correspondence theory of truth is motivated by the conviction that truth is an idea which should be more or less forgotten in our postmodernist period. However, this is not always the case. One can believe that truth is one of our indispensable concepts but at the same time argue that the correspondence theory of truth is not a proper and illuminating theory of that concept. This position is reasonable, since - as it has been shown (e.g. by Huw Price and Michael Dummett) - without the notion of truth one would not be able to provide a coherent and satisfactory account of our discursive practice and linguistic meaning. Moreover, as it has been recently argued by David Lewis, the correspondence theory is not a stable account of that concept, and it faces the following dilemma: either (putting aside some minor and irrelevant differences) it turns into a minimalist or redundancy theory of some sort, or it becomes a (mostly) metaphysical theory about various kinds of things which make our statements true. Defenders of the correspondence theory have made some efforts to meet the challenge posed by Lewis, but those efforts do not seem successful. Hence we should perhaps not longer consider the correspondence theory as a major and clearly specifiable contender in the debate about truth, and thus significantly reshape it.
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Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum’s Letter to George Edward Moore

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Szubka T.
Filozofia Nauki
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2018
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vol. 26
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issue 1
129-141
PL
At the beginning of 1940, Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum wrote a letter to G. E. Moore, whom she came to know quite well during her research visit to Cambridge in the 1929-1930 academic year. In this paper, I offer a Polish translation of the document (the original version can be found in the Appendix). The translation is followed by a biographical commentary. Hosiasson describes her dramatic escape from Warsaw to Vilnius and claims that after saving her life “with so many troubles”her “desire of scientific work is more passionate than ever”. At the time of writing her letter Hosiasson was applying for support from the Council for Assisting Refugee Philosophers set up in 1939 in Great Britain, and was asking Moore for a reference. Unfortunately, Hosiasson did not receive effective support that would enable her to find refuge abroad. She was arrested in September 1941 and killed by Germans, or Lithuanians collaborating with them, presumably in April 1942.
8
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Metaphilosophical Dilemmas of Analytic Pragmatism

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Szubka T.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2017
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vol. 25
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issue 4
129-145
PL
The paper begins with some remarks about the pedigree of the term “analytic pragmatism” and its two main senses: (a) an account of pragmatism as a philosophical movement from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy (a conspicuous proponent of such an account is currently Cheryl Misak), and (b) a way of transforming the analytic tradition from within by drawing on pragmatic ideas (here the most notable figures are Robert B. Brandom, Huw Price, and Michael Williams). Although it is Brandom who is a self-avowed analytic pragmatist in the latter sense, Price’s philosophical standpoint is also original and inspiring. His overarching idea is global expressivism, construed as a generalized version of local expressivism, such as the ethical projectivism and quasi-realism of Simon Blackburn. Global expressivism is supposed to be a non-representational account of our thought and language, capable of overcoming metaphysics in its various forms. Nevertheless, as it is argued, this ambitious attempt to sidestep metaphysical debates and embrace comfortable quietism has for the most part failed.
9
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Epistemic Conceptions of Truth and Relativism

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Szubka T.
Filozofia Nauki
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2003
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vol. 11
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issue 3-4
79-89
PL
Epistemic conceptions of truth, for which truth is defined in terms of justifiability or assertibility in properly idealized conditions, are very often considered as unavoidably linked with relativism. The paper argues that such a link is not unavoidable. The reason is that there are accounts of justification that do not have relativistic consequences, and therefore one may propose an epistemic conception of truth that does not have those consequences either.
10
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Główne typy metafizyki analitycznej

100%
Szubka T.
Filo-Sofija
|
2011
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vol. 11
|
issue 4(15)
849-864
EN
In a widespread general view about analytic philosophy it is often emphasized the supposed animosity or mistrust of that movement towards metaphysics. That opinion is in many respects one-sided and incorrect. First, one cannot find that animosity towards metaphysics in the works of G.E. Moore and B. Russell, the founders of modern analytic philosophy. Of course, they criticized the speculative, Hegelian metaphysics of their idealistic predecessors, but they did it in order to defend metaphysics of a different kind, more careful, empirical, and realist one. Moreover, even if it is to some extent true that over a few decades analytic philosophy was dominated by the attitude of mistrust towards more theoretical and comprehensive metaphysical investigations, it should be stressed that that attitude has almost completely disappeared in the last fifty years. Metaphysics has again regained the status of central and vigorously pursued philosophical discipline. One of the main originators of that metaphysical turn in contemporary analytic philosophy was Sir P.F. Strawson, the Oxford philosopher, who in 1959 forcefully articulated the idea of descriptive metaphysics. A somewhat similar way of doing metaphysics was later developed in the writings of D. Davidson, M. Dummett, and – in certain respects – H. Putnam. One may say that all those thinkers have attempted to identify the basic structure of reality by describing and elucidating the basic structural features of our thought and talk. Since in such a method of doing metaphysics one can discern some characteristic marks of Kantian transcendental arguments, there is a point to call it analytic-transcendental metaphysics. In a completely different way metaphysics has been pursued by those analytic thinkers who are under heavy influence of the conception of philosophy put forward by W.V. Quine. For Quine philosophy, including metaphysics, is continuous with science, and, to be more precise, constitutes the theoretical end of science. Among many followers of that kind of metaphysics, that may be called analytic-naturalistic one, there are D.M. Armstrong and D. Lewis. The paper presents those two varieties of analytic metaphysics, and succinctly discusses their main difficulties. Subsequently, it mentions those examples of contemporary analytic metaphysics that, for one reason or another, do not belong to either of those two varieties. The paper ends with a brief appendix discussing the most recent revival of metaphysics within the analytic movement and a critical response toit from the deflationary point of view.
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Patologie nauki polskiej

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Szubka T.
Diametros
|
2008
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issue 16
118-121
PL
Głos w dyskusji o polskiej nauce.
EN
A contribution to the discussion about Polish science.
12
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Odnowa filozofii według Hilarego Putnama

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Szubka T.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
|
issue 15
45 - 58
EN
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
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Odnowa filozofii według Hilarego Putnama

100%
Szubka T.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 15
45-58
EN
Hilary Putnam is widely considered as one of the most distinguished and important philosophers in the analytic tradition of the last fifty years. However, in his most recent publications he has started to emphasize various shortcomings and limitations of that powerful tradition, connected especially with its scientism and naturalism. He has also insisted that what we really need is a serious renewal and transformation of philosophy, drawing upon other philosophical traditions, including pragmatism. We should realize that although philosophy overlaps in some parts with science, it cannot be turned into a science. It is a humanistic enterprise having two dimensions, theoretical and moral, and it is unfortunate when we tend to forget about either of them.
14
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Uwagi o genezie i koncepcjach metafilozofii

100%
Szubka T.
Człowiek i Społeczeństwo
|
2022
|
vol. 53
33-47
EN
Although reflection on the nature of philosophy has constituted an integral part of this discipline from its beginnings, the term „metaphilosophy” referring to such a reflection only made its first appearance in the middle of the twentieth century. In the course of discussions concerning the book by C.J. Ducasse about the subject-matter and method of philosophy, the term was introduced in the United States by C.G. Hempel and M. Lazerowitz, and in Poland by M. Choynowski. Subsequently, two different metaphilosophical programs, which disseminated this category, were put forward by Lazerowitz and J. Kalinowski. They had dissimilar objectives and assumptions, though for both of them a crucial problem was the diversity of philosophical conceptions and persistent disagreements in philosophy.
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Ontologia, pluralizm pojęciowy, deflacjonizm

100%
Szubka T.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2011
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vol. 39
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issue 2
15-32
EN
Despite the recent revival of ontology, Hilary Putnam has argued that conceptual relativity and conceptual pluralism in general undermine the prospects of ontology as a viable philosophical discipline. He has even proclaimed in his book Ethics Without Ontology that ontology is dead and has pronounced its „obituary”. It might seem, however, that this pronouncement is premature. Not only is the doctrine of conceptual relativity and pluralism problematic, but also the versions of ontology considered by Putnam are far from being exhaustive. For instance, there is a view known as ontological deflationism which fits very well with the main thrust of Putnam’s own pragmatic pluralism. Nevertheless, after a close examination of two examples of such an ontological deflationism (proposed by Paul Horwich and Huw Price), it may be concluded that this strategy tends to lead to metaphilosophical quietism and the abandonment of ontology or metaphysics as a legitimate enterprise. So perhaps the recent revival of ontology is much ado about nothing after all.
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