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Jedinec v běhu světa : Zamyšlení nad Hegelovým pojetím

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Parusniková Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2011
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vol. 59
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issue 3
325-350
EN
The author considers the place of the individual in the course of history which unfolds on the ground of the self-realisation of the absolute. The focus is on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, particularly on the chapter „Rational self-consciousness which is self-realising“ in which Hegel explores the relation between substantiality and subjectivity in the phase of the emergence of modern society. In this phase of history man shows his self-consciousness and free individuality, but at the same time suffers the loss of his substantial grounding. Hegel’s philosophy presents a grand attempt at uniting these two perspectives according to which the full development of peculiarity and uniqueness is in harmony with and a condition of the fulfillment of an impersonal, dynamically-realising, absolute principle. The author argues that Hegel’s metaphysical framework does not provide sufficient space for the recognition of the authenticity of man, emphasised in modern discussion, since subjectivity itself is, to a certain extent, the manifestation of the absolute. But, if we adopt Hegel’s metaphysical standpoint, another interesting prospect opens up: the individual satisfies his essential need of a sense of belonging to a whole, and gradually understands that he is part of a grand process and that he shares in the common work of mankind.
2
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Je „zdravý rozum“ zdravý – a je to rozum?

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Parusniková Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2008
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vol. 56
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issue 2
199-223
EN
The relation between the sceptical and the natural capacities, constituting the human condition, is the most fundamental problem of Hume’s epistemology. The author claims that there is a permanent dichotomy and incompatibility between these two capacities, with natural inclinations of our mind being the only constructive epistemological force. Hume’s sceptical arguments are – following Richard Popkin – analyzed in the context of the revival of the Pyrrhonian scepticism in 17th century. In this perspective, Hume develops a strategy of alternatively hiding and exposing one of these aspects, sceptical and natural, without providing any grounds for unifying them: theoretical scepticism remains wholly unmitigated and natural instincts remain totally unaffected by doubts. Hume’s sceptic is a split, schizophrenic personality, living in two distinct worlds. In this way, Hume evokes some postmodern views, especially by undermining the universal authority and the liberating mission of reason, the privileged status of philosophy, and the credibility of Grand meta-narratives.
3
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Kuhn versus Popper

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Parusniková Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2005
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vol. 53
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issue 2
219-241
EN
The paper discusses the main themes of the Kuhn Popper controversy. Popper defends the possibility of a rational reconstruction of science, objective truth and normative methodology. Kuhn emphasizes the historical and sociological aspects of the development of science, the relativity of truth, and the incommensurability of paradigms. The author confronts these two opposing conceptions of the philosophy of science and applies them to the historical case of Ignaz Semmelweis who proposed a revolutionary theory of childbed fever, anticipating the germ theory officially ascribed to Pasteur and Lister. Kuhn’s view on the resistance of scientific communities to a paradigm threat may explain why Semmelweis’ discovery was rejected. However, the sociological and psychological explanation is accompanied by the loss of the normative function of the philosophy of science. In opposition to Kuhn, Popper formulates a critical imperative as the rational core of science and the guarantee of open, creative thinking. According to Popper, the philosophy of science must not only explain Semmelweis’ failure with external reasons, but must also prescribe the methodological norms that eliminate dogmatism from rationality.
4
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Pierre-Daniel Huet a jeho přínos novověkému skepticismu

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Parusniková Z.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2021
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vol. 69
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issue 4
677-694
EN
Pierre-Daniel Huet (Huetius, 1630–1721), a scholar of immense erudition, died 300 years ago. Huet wrote many works on philosophy, theology, history and literature. At his time Huet was best known for his fierce criticism of Cartesianism. From an empiricist and sceptical standpoints, he attacked the position of the arrogance of reason in epistemology and the credibility of rational proofs of God in theology. But it was Huet’s scepticism, developing the arguments of the ancient sceptics and insisting on the principal weakness of human mind to achieve true and certain knowledge, that had the biggest impact on the development of early-modern philosophy. I analyze Huet’s scepticism in the context of the revival of the ancient sceptical tradition in Western Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries and promote a relatively new interpretation of the formation of early-modern philosophy, in which scepticism is supposed to play a constitutive role.
CS
Pierre-Daniel Huet, významný učenec, který se zabýval filosofií, teologií, historií i literaturou, zemřel právě před 300 lety. Své současníky Huet nejvíce zaujal ostrou kritikou kartezianismu. Ze stanoviska empirismu a skepticismu odmítl pozici arogance rozumu v epistemologii a důvěryhodnost racionálních důkazů Boha v teologii. Největší vliv na vývoj novověké filosofie měl však jeho skepticismus, ve kterém Huet rozvíjel myšlenky antických skeptiků především s důrazem na nemohoucnost lidské mysli dospět k pravdivému či jistému poznání. V článku rozvíjím analýzu Huetova skepticismu v širším kontextu znovuoživení antické skeptické tradice v západní Evropě v 16. a 17. století a propaguji relativně novou interpretaci formování novověké filosofie, v níž hraje tato tradice klíčovou roli.
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