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PL
Od samego początku PZPR była główną strukturą zorganizowania ludu pracującego miast i wsi jako suwerena w PRL, acz ta sprawa była tylko implicite uregulowana przez prawo konstytucyjne. Expressis verbis stało się to dopiero w 1976 r. na gruncie wspólnej ordynacji do Sejmu PRL i rad narodowych z 17 stycznia oraz przepisu art. 3 Konstytucji PRL po nowelizacji z 10 lutego. Można uznać, że regulacja prawnokonstytucyjnego po-łożenia PZPR po ponad ćwierć wieku od momentu uchwalenia Konstytucji PRL znala-zła wreszcie swój pełny wyraz. Dzięki rozwiązaniu prawnemu zawartemu w tych dwóch aktach prawnych PZPR, kontrolując proces wyborczy, jednocześnie decydowała o treści stanowionego w Sejmie prawa, co odbywałoby się zgodnie z zasadą suwerenności ludu pracującego miast i wsi. Właśnie do tego sprowadzał się proces wyrażania woli suwere-na w państwie socjalistycznym, jakim był PRL, i podnoszenia tej woli do godności usta-wy. Ale ze względu na ustrojowopolityczną anachroniczność, istnienie zbyt dużego rozdźwięku z realiami PRL pod koniec lat 70. ubiegłego wieku, niedługo potem zacznie się odwrót od tej regulacji prawnej. Na gruncie rozwiązań prawnych z 6 maja 1987 r., usta-nawiających instytucje referendum ogólnokrajowego, mieliśmy do czynienia w sensie prawnokonstytucyjnym z początkiem ustanawiania nowego suwerena w miejsce ludu pracującego. W efekcie na znaczeniu musiały tracić struktury zorganizowania ludu pra-cującego z instancjami PZPR na czele. Proces ten znakomicie pogłębił się po uchwaleniu ordynacji wyborczych do Sejmu PRL i Senatu PRL z 7 kwietnia 1989 r.
EN
From the very beginning, the PZPR was the main structure for organizing working peo-ple of cities and villages as a sovereign in the PRL, but this matter was only implicitly reg-ulated by constitutional law. Expressis verbis, it happened in 1976 on the basis of joint or-dinance of Polish People’s Republic Seym and national councils dated January 17th and the provision of Article 3 of Polish Constitution after the amendment dated 10th Feb-ruary.It can be concluded that the regulation of the PZPR legal and constitutional po-sition after more than a quarter of a century, since the Constitution of the Polish Peo-ple’s Republic was adopted, has finally found its full expression. With the legal solution contained in those two legal acts, the PZPR, while controlling the electoral process, at the same time it determined the content of the law constituted in Seym, which would be done in accordance with the principle of the sovereignty of the working people of towns and villages. That is exactly what the process of expressing the will of a sovereign in a so-cialist state like the Polish People’s Republic was, and raising that will to the dignity of a statute. But due to the systemic and political anachronism, the existence of too much dissonance with the realities of the Polish People’s Republic in the late 70s of the last cen-tury, a retreat from this legal regulation will begin soon afterwards. On the basis of le-gal solutions of 6th May, 1987, establishing the institutions of a nationwide referendum, we were dealing in the legal and constitutional sense with the beginning of the estab-lishment of a new sovereign in place of working people class. As a result, the structures of organizing the working people along with the PZPR instances had to lose their signif-icance. This process deepened greatly after the adoption of the electoral regulations for the PRL Sejm and the PRL Senate on 7th April 1989.
EN
Undoubtedly, the materials contained in the presented volume of Andrzej Walicki’s works constitute a good basis for further research into totalitarianism and the process of detotalitarianisation, especially in relation to the history of the People’s Republic of Poland. However, only the analysis of both the period of Sanation authoritarianism (1926–1939) and post-war left-wing authoritarianism (1944–1948) can provide a more complete picture of totalitarianism and detotalitarianism in the People’s Republic of Poland.
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EN
Much had been written on presidency in the first years of the Third Republic of Poland, both from the legal-constitutional and political science perspectives. This time, it is about establishing a connection between the manner of exercising the competences of the President of the People’s Republic of Poland and the President of the Republic of Poland in the first years of the systemic transformation by persons exercising this function on the one hand and the policy they represented after obtaining the office. Presidential competences are an important instrument in realizing the policy of a person holding the office of the head of state. In the analyzed period this aspect had been subject to multisided examination as regards the presidency of both general Wojciech Jaruzelski and Lech Wałęsa.
EN
From the Jarosław Kaczyński’s address to the constitutional convention of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, and from the constitutional proposals put forward by PIS, it is clear that they are not in any way intended to rationalize the current model of governance, nor to specify what would be the role of the President of the Republic of Poland in shaping the foreign and defense policy of the State, but are aimed at general strengthening of President’s position among State authorities. But is it possible without a transition to the presidential system? The authors of the proposal seem to think so. According to them, a remedy for the problems with Polish political system would be a shift towards a semi-presidential regime, without establishing a government’s formal political responsibility before the president, but with the granting of his/her new powers, making the President of the Republic the pivot of the new system of government. However, this is the wrong way of thinking, as the author attempts to prove.
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EN
It was only in 1815–1830 that the Kingdom of Poland had a limited international personality, but it is hard not to treat it as a state. The situation of the Polish state in the years 1815–1874, in the sense of its rise and fall, is not rare in the history of states. The Kingdom of Poland was created out of the Duchy of Warsaw in May 1815 upon the decision of tsar Alexander I and recognized international law status of statehood under the Final Act of the Vienna Congress. Fifteen years later a Polish-Russian war was initiated to acquire the full sovereignty of the Kingdom and to incorporate the Lithuanian-Russian provinces. In 1863, an insurrection broke out inspired by similar goals. After the fall of the January Uprising, tsar Alexander II, wishing to avoid such problems in the future, decided to abolish a separate Polish statehood. The decision was implemented within a few years. With the appearance at the Royal Castle of the Warsaw Governor-General, the history of the Kingdom of Poland finally came to an end, although it really happened a little earlier when, on 12 March 1868, the status of viceroy (namiestnik) of the Kingdom of Poland was equated with that of the Russian governor general. In the legal sense, the fall of the state came to effect with the disappearance of a separate supreme authority in the Kingdom (even if it was exercised by non-Polish actors), the last element of which was the institution of the viceroy. Actually, it was decided by the insurgent attempt of 1863 and the accompanying diplomatic intervention of the Western states, which almost caused the outbreak of pan-European war.
EN
The thesis of the reviewed book that the model of voting for the Sejm of the Polish People’s Republic was imitative in relation to the Soviet law and the electoral practice shaped in the USSR seems to be well proven by Michał Siedziako. The voting for the Sejm of the Polish People’s Republic in 1985 was slightly different, and the election of 1989 was an entirely different matter. As long as the author conducts historical or political considerations, it is difficult to object to his arguments. It is worse when he deals with legal and constitutional issues. Hence, the reviewed monograph can only be considered partially successful, which does not mean that it does not constitute a valuable contribution to further research.
EN
The argument on the Constitutional Tribunal, which lasted from mid-2015 to the end of 2016, concerned three dimensions. First, it was about ascertaining the inadmissibility of electing judges in advance, as provided for by Article 137 of the Constitutional Tribunal Act of 25 June 2015; second, it was about pluralising the composition of the Constitutional Tribunal, and third — about an attempt at establishing a new model of the functioning of a constitutional court by the Law and Justice party. The third issue seemed the most important and is still the object of an ongoing systemic argument transgressing the events from the years 2015–2016, which has so far not been satisfactorily solved. The problem of electing judges was resolved by two rulings of the Constitutional Tribunal: judgment of 3 December 2015 (K 34/15) and the decision of 7 January 2016 (U 8/15). The effect of the Tribunal’s decision was in fact giving the Sejm carte blanche as regards electing judges on 8 October 2015.
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