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Czy empiryczne świadectwa na rzecz „ucieleśnienia” poznania są anomaliami w świetle klasycznych koncepcji procesów poznawczych? Na przykładzie problemu natury pojęć

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Gładziejewski P.
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny
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2010
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vol. 4
PL
Are Empirical Proofs of Embodied Cognition Anomalies in the Context of Classical Models of Cognition? The article disuccusses the role played by anomalies in Kuhn’s sense in the transition from the „classical model of cognition” to the „embodied paradigm” which can recently be observed in the field of the cognitive sciences. An example of the aforementioned problem is analysed in detail: the role of empirical evidence in the dispute about the nature of conceptual representation. It is shown that evidence in favour of the „embodied” theories of concepts are not entirely conclusive and are not at all inconsistent with more „classical” theories. This example shows that empirical anomalies seem to play a lesser role than one might think in at least some of the quasi-paradigmatic and paradigmatic changes in cognitive science.
2
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Symulacja mentalna jako podstawa kontaktu poznawczego z fikcyjnymi narracjami

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Gładziejewski P.
Rocznik Kognitywistyczny
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2011
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vol. 5
57-63
EN
The aim of the article is to employ results from philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences in order to answer certain questions from the field of philosophy of art. What is specifically at issue is the problem of the cognitive underpinnings of subject’s relation to narrative fictions presented in novels and movies. A proposal according to which this relation is mediated by mental simulation is critically assessed. The author discusses two theses that are based on this general simulationist idea, namely theses that (1) a person engaged in reading a novel or watching a movie simulates mental states of the protagonists (empathizes with them); (2) the simulation mechanism underlies the ability to imagine fictional events presented in narratives.
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William Ramsey o psychologii potocznej, racjonalności i pojęciu reprezentacji w naukach kognitywnych

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Gładziejewski P.
Diametros
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2012
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issue 31
33-55
PL
W książce Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argumentuje przeciwko tezie, że naukowe (tj. kognitywistyczne) pojęcie reprezentacji mentalnych powinno zostać oparte na pojęciu reprezentacji zaczerpniętym z psychologii potocznej (tj. pojęciu reprezentacji mentalnych jako postaw propozycjonalnych, takich jak przekonania i pragnienia). Przedstawiony wywód ma za zadanie wykazać, że – wbrew temu, co twierdzi sam Ramsey – nawet jeśli potoczne pojęcie reprezentacji najprawdopodobniej nie stanie się częścią repozytorium pojęciowego kognitywistyki, to nie implikuje to, że przekonania, pragnienia czy racjonalność ludzkiego myślenia mogą zostać wyeliminowane z naturalistycznego rozumienia umysłu (systemu poznawczego) i procesów poznawczych. Kluczem do zrozumienia tego faktu jest ujęcie systemów poznawczych jako hierarchicznych, wielopoziomowych mechanizmów.
EN
In his book Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey argues against the view that the concept of mental representation employed by cognitive scientists should be based on the folk-psychological concept of mental representation as propositional attitudes. The author of the present article will attempt to show that, contrary to what Ramsey himself claims, the fact that the folk concept of mental representation will most likely not be a part of the conceptual repository of cognitive science does not imply that beliefs, desires or the rationality of human cognition should be eliminated from the naturalistic outlook on the nature of mind (construed as a cognitive system) and cognitive processes. The key to see that this is the case lies in understanding cognitive systems as multi-level, hierarchically organized mechanisms.
4
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Czy empatia jest symulacją mentalną? Dyskusja z podejściem reprezentacyjnym ugruntowanym w koncepcji neuronów lustrzanych

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Gładziejewski P.
Diametros
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2011
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issue 27
108-129
PL
Artykuł wykorzystuje osiągnięcia teoretyczne analitycznej filozofii umysłu (symulacyjna teoria poznawania innych umysłów) oraz wyniki empiryczne z zakresu psychologii oraz neuronauki poznawczej (odkrycie neuronów i systemów lustrzanych) w celu udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie o naturę empatii oraz subpersonalnych mechanizmów stojących u jej podłoża. Wyróżnione zostają przy tym dwa rodzaje empatii, które w literaturze przedmiotu często nie są od siebie wystarczająco wyraźnie odróżniane: są to odpowiednio empatia rozumiana jako pewien rodzaj percepcji społecznej oraz empatia jako współodczuwanie. Przeprowadzony wywód zmierza do uzasadnienia tezy, że żaden z tych rodzajów empatii nie może zostać utożsamiony z procesem symulacji mentalnej, o ile tę rozumie się jako proces o charakterze subpersonalnym. Mimo to symulacja mentalna może względem obydwu wyróżnionych rodzajów empatii pełnić pewną, lecz ograniczoną rolę eksplanacyjną.
EN
This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind (simulation theory of knowing other minds) and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience (the discovery of mirror neurons and mirror systems) in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind of social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy.
5
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Mechanical Representations and a Non-mechanistic Folk Psychology? An Answer to the Critics of „Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna”

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Gładziejewski P.
Filozofia Nauki
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2017
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vol. 25
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issue 3
119-135
PL
In this paper, I address critical assessments of my book Wyjaśnianie za pomocą reprezentacji mentalnych. Perspektywa mechanistyczna (Explaining with Mental Representations. A Mechanistic Perspective). Against Marcin Miłkowski’s critique, I defend the legitimacy of the online/off-line distinction and argue that S-representations constitute the only type of a purely subpersonal representation that unambiguously meets Ramsey’s job description challenge. To answer Paweł Grabarczyk’s remarks, I clarify the distinction between interpreting and consuming representations, as well as explain the role played by this distinction in the argument present in the book. In addressing Witold Hensel’s comments, I argue that my position on folk psychological states (like beliefs and desires) does not boil down to simple instrumentalism, as well as clarify my position about the role that folk psychology plays in cognitive science. To answer the issues raised by Robert Poczobut, I discuss the distinction between factors that are constitutive of folk psychological states and the ones that are causally relevant to them; I use this distinction to clarify my claim that folk psychology lacks significant commitments regarding the mechanistic architecture of the mind.
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Representationalism and Mechanistic Explanation in Cognitive Science

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Gładziejewski P.
Filozofia Nauki
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2013
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vol. 21
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issue 4
51-77
PL
There is a growing consensus that explanation in cognitive science is a form of mechanistic explanation. According to this view, explaining a cognitive capacity of a system consists in describing a mechanism responsible for it, where a mechanism is understood as a collection of appropriately organized, functionally specified, interacting components. The article employs a mechanistic view on cognitive scientific explanation in order to discuss the problem of the status of mental representations as explanatory posits invoked by cognitive scientists. The article argues that mechanistic outlook on the problem of mental representations enables one to formulate explicit conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a given explanation to be legitimately representational. Furthermore, the article develops the thesis that there is (at least) one notion of mental representation that meets these conditions. This notion is based on understanding mental representations as internal models or simulations, where representing is based on structural resemblance relation holding between the vehicle of representation and what is represented.
7

Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective

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Gładziejewski P.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
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2015
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vol. 40
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issue 1
63-90
EN
Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.
8
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Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

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Gładziejewski P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
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issue 16
5 - 25
EN
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.
9
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Świadomość fenomenalna a problem intencjonalności. O intencjonalności fenomenalnej

100%
Gładziejewski P.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2011
|
issue 16
5-25
EN
The article concerns the problem of how to understand the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality or mental content – an issue that, until recently, has been neglected by many analytic philosophers of mind. I distinguish two ways of theoretically establishing the phenomenal-intentional relation: reductive one, which I equate with so called phenomenal externalism and non-reductive one, which is based on the idea that there is a kind of intentionality – i.e. phenomenal intentionality – that is phenomenally constituted. I argue for the second of these options. Following the work of philosophers such as G. Graham, T. Horgan, U. Kriegel, J. Tienson and B. Loar, I try to show that (1) phenomenal intentionality actually exists, (2) that content of phenomenally intentional states is narrow and (3) that both previous theses are compatible with moderate externalism about mental content.
10
Content available remote

Neurofenomenologia: zaproszenie do dyskusji

100%
Gładziejewski P.
Avant
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2010
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vol. 1
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issue 1
169-177 (en: 179–189)
EN
No more than a few years ago could open an article concerning neurophenomenology with a statement describing recent rediscovery of the problem of consciousness by the cognitive sciences and pointing to the fact that right now, explaining conscious experience in neuroscientific or computational terms poses the greatest challenge for those sciences. Today however, constatations of this sort start to sound like trivial descriptions of a universally recognized state of affairs. The question of “how the water of the physical brain is turned into a wine of consciousness” is now among the mainstream problems of cognitive science.
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