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O odpowiedzialności materialnej u Arystotelesa

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Smolak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2018
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vol. 41
43-57
EN
It may seem that Aristotle considers the problem of responsibility from perspective of formal responsibility. It should, however, to bear in mind that practical philosophy of Aristotle has teleological dimension. The human being has the task to do which consist of fulfill the proper function of the man. Thus, he is responsible for entrusted role. In this sense, material responsibility is also present in ethical considerations of Aristotle. The article is devoted to demonstrating that talking about material responsibility in Aristotle is not unfounded.
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Good, Pleasure and Types of Friendships in Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics

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Smolak M.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
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2016
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vol. 7
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issue 1
183-204
EN
In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friend­ships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friend­ship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity.
PL
In EE H 2 Aristotle presents a typology of friendship starting from the puzzle whether the good or the pleasure is the object of love. But after indicating the reasons for loving and identifying three types of friendships he raises three important questions (1237a19–21): (1) whether there is any friendship without pleasure; (2) how the hedonical friendship differs from the ethically friendship; (3) on which of the two things the loving depends: do we love somebody because he is good, even if he is not pleasant, at any rate not for his pleasantness? The present article attempts to give answers to questions 1–3 and show that despite the coincidence of good and pleasure and the important role of pleasure in the hedonical and ethical friendship the typology does not lose its validity
3
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Pierwszy paragraf siódmej księgi Etyki eudemejskiej (EE 7.1, 1234b18-1235b12) – wprowadzenie, przekład i komentarz

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Smolak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2015
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vol. 31
37-63
PL
The Introduction is devoted to the survey of the relation between The Eudemian Ethics and The Nicomachean Ethics from the point of the consideration on the friendship. The analysis is undertaken on the background of the study focused on the elaboration typology of the friendship, and the solution of the problem of intrapersonal friendship. The Introduction also contains the short presentation of the Aristotle’s research method, described by him as the natural way of the study, the aim of which is to know the first principles. The Commentary includes comments which do not relate to The Nicomachean Ethics, and refers mainly to the content of the other parts of the Eudemian Ethics.
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O sprawcy działania i odpowiedzialnym działaniu u Arystotelesa

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Smolak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2017
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vol. 38
67-88
EN
At EN III.1 1109b31-32 Aristotle says we praise and censure voluntary actions and we feel sympathy for involuntary actions, and sometimes even pity. Next he examines which actions are voluntary and involuntary. This examination is connected with determination of the conditions under which the person is auctor agendi and thus can respond for the action. But it is not right to say, when somebody is auctor agendi his action is responsible. Hence, to answer to the question which action is responsible action in Aristotle, the author considers the issue in two stages. The first stage is devoted to clarification what does it mean to be the agent of action. The second stage gives the explanation of what does it mean “to decide for the action accordance with virtue because of it”. As the result, the author demonstrates that the responsible action is taken on the basis of decision and for the sake of fine. He shows such action is fine because: a) the realized end is fine; b) it is choiceworthy in itself; c) the motive of the agent is the fine.
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Czy przyjaźń etyczna nie jest przyjaźnią pozorną? - rozważania wokół drugiego rozdziału siódmej księgi "Etyki eudemejskiej"

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Smolak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2016
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vol. 34
111-133
EN
In The Eudemian Ethics 1237B6–7 Aristotle seems to suggest that if the ethical friend has an unpleasant odour, he is left by his friend. The article is devoted to demonstrating that the ethical friendship is not the apparent friendship. For this purpose author presents the characteristics of the true friend and distinguishes two types of the ethical friendship, the first between good men, i.e. men with a typical mixture of good and bad traits of character, the second between noble men, i.e. the best men who are heroes of intellect and character – intellect because prudent, character because noble. On this basis author shows three interpretations which neutralize controversial statement. According to the first interpretation – called “superhuman stink” – unpleasant odour is impossible to endure for the men, even good or noble. Therefore ethical friend must leave his friend in such circumstances. According to the second interpretation – called “one-dimensional courage” – ethical friend, who has an unpleasant odour is left by ethical friend, since one, who leaves can not endure stinking friend. The reason is that he has one-dimensional courage and apart from direct hostilities he does not cope with own weakness. According to the third interpretation– called “heroic solitude” – ethical friend, who has an unpleasant odour does not want to grieve his friend. Therefore decides to heroic solitude – heroic, since a human being is a civic being and one whose nature is to live with others– and leaves his friend.
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Arystotelesa charakterystyka zniszczalnych substancji

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Smolak M.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2011
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issue 13
28 - 52
EN
The present article attempts to explain what Aristotle’s sensible and destructible substance is from the viewpoint of their separability (to chōriston) and individuality (to tode ti). On the basis of the analysis several parts chosen from Metaphysics, Physics, On the Generation of Animals and On the Soul the author makes characterization of two parameters of the substance on the background of three equations: i. Subject = substance = combination of the matter and the form; ii. Subject = substance = form; iii. Subject = substance = matter. The author comes to the conclusion that the sensible and destructible substance can be recognized from the four perspectives: i. as the concrete and the individual thing that is the combination of the matter and the form; ii. as the hylemorfic essence of the thing with the moment which fulfills the function of co-called principium individuationis; iii. as the form which fulfills the function of the internal principle of the thing and is identical with the formal cause of that thing; iv. as the ultimate matter which is the thing or it’s essence in the state of the development.
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Kształtowanie umiejętności wnioskowania sylogistycznego

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Smolak M.
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
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2015
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vol. 4
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issue 1
102-130
EN
The article consists of two parts. In the first part the author presents the characteristics of syllogistic reasoning, in the second part describes a set of exercises that are useful in teaching and developing the skill of syllogistic reasoning. The exercises belong to the teaching tools called interactive teaching methods and are of varying level of difficulty.
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Materia pierwsza substancji materialnych

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Smolak M.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2011
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vol. 39
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issue 2
57-81
EN
The present article attempts to explain what Aristotle’s prime matter of the material substances is. On the basis of the analysis several parts chosen from Metaphysics, Physics, On the Generation of Animals and On the Generation and Corruption the author comes to the conclusion that the prime matter in the sense of the universal material is the abstract. However, the analogue of the prime matter in ontological order is the proper (oikeia) matter of the particular material substance that is the proximate (engytaton) material cause of such substance. An example of such a matter is the bronze. But not any bronze is the analogue of the prime matter, but only that which actually manifests potentiality as potentiality that is the bronze which participates in the process of casting and forming of the particular bronze substance, e.g. the statue of the Discobolus. Therefore, in the first place among the material principles Aristotle does not mention the prime matter in the sense of the universal material opened to the generation of any body falling under the senses, but the body falling under the senses in the mode of the potentiality.
9
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Aristotle on the Real Object of Philia and Aretē

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Smolak M.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2024
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vol. 72
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issue 1
115-151
PL
W uwadze otwierającej Etykę nikomachejską VIII 1 Arystoteles stwierdza, że „philia jest określoną aretē lub jest nierozłączna z aretē” (EN VIII 1 1155a 1–2). Celem artykułu jest interpretacja tego stwierdzenia, z podziałem na dwie części. W pierwszej autor przeprowadza badanie dotyczące aretē i jej różnych typów, w szczególności aretē ludzkiej. W drugiej bada pojęcie philia, czyli przyjaźń i jej poszczególne typy. Autor wykazuje, że związek pomiędzy philia i aretē można rozumieć na dwa sposoby: a) jeśli philia oraz aretē są rozpatrywane z punktu widzenia możliwości prowadzenia eudaimonicznego życia, to philia oznacza przyjaźń aretologiczną, a aretē - aretē ludzką; b) jeśli philia jest rozpatrywana jako termin wielorako orzekany (pleonachōs legetai), a aretē jako termin względny, czyli „bycie dobrym w czymś”, to philia oznacza każdy typ przyjaźni, czyli przyjaźń aretologiczną, hedonistyczną i utylitarną, a aretē - konkretną umiejętność lub skuteczność w działaniu charakterystycznym dla każdej z wymienionych przyjaźni. Zgodnie z a) związek pomiędzy philia i aretē ogranicza się do przyjaźni aretologicznej, ale kosztem zredukowania aretē do aretē ludzkiej. Zgodnie z b) związek pomiędzy philia i aretē dotyczy każdego typu przyjaźni, jako że każdy typ przyjaźni pozostaje w związku z przynależną do niej aretē, której praktykowanie skutkuje doskonałym spełnieniem jej funkcji, czyli niezawodnym osiąganiem celu przez przyjaciół.
EN
In the opening remark of Nicomachean Ethics VIII 1 Aristotle notices that the next step would be a discussion of philia, since it is a certain aretē or is associated with aretē (NE VIII 1 1155a 1–2). This article is an attempt to determine how the real object of philia and aretē are related from Aristotle’s point of view. The author performs a study into two sections. The first section is focused on the analysis of aretē and its various types, in particular the human one. The second section is concentrated on the typology of philia, namely friendship and its particular kinds. The author shows that the relation between philia and aretē can be described in two ways: if both philia and aretē play the crucial role in leading a eudaimonic life, then philia is the aretological friendship and aretē-the human one, namely the whole consists of the aretē of character in the full sense and the practical wisdom on condition that the aretological friends equate eudaimonia with life focused on the political or practical activity, or even of the theoretical wisdom, providing that they identify it with the highest form of eudaimonic life, that is, the theoretical one. If, however, philia is to be a term said in many ways (pleonachōs legetai) and aretē is to be understood in a broad sense, that is, as “being good at something”, then philia can signify every kind of friendship, namely the aretological, the hedonistic and the utilitarian one, whereas aretē-qualification or skill that makes these friendships perform their functions well. The first possibility is that the relation between philia and aretē is limited to the aretological friendship at the expense of narrowing the meaning of aretē to the human one. The second possibility is that every kind of friendship is considered as the functional thing and, in consequence, defined by their proper function. From this point of view, all friendships are accompanied by appropriate aretai, namely by qualifications or skills that guarantee the perfect fulfillment of their proper function and, therefore, the achievement of the set goal by two persons in question.
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