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EN
The subject of this paper is an analysis of the provisions of article 4 of the European Convention of Human Rights [European Convention] compared with, in particular, the provisions of article 8 of the International Package of Civil and Political Rights. The prohibition of slavery is then analysed in sensu stricto, including trading in slaves, followed by an analysis of the prohibition of servitude in different contexts as presented in reasons for judicial decisions delivered by the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] in Strasburg. The provisions of Convention No 29 and Convention No 107 of the International Labour Organisation on forced labour and its abolition, since they played an important role in the ECHR judgments, are given most attention. Likewise, excerpts of article 4 clause 3 of the European Convention regarding: prisoners’ work, military service, including alternative military service, extraordinary circumstances and ordinary civil duties are widely discussed. Sadly, slavery, servitude and forced labour do not belong to the past but are still vivid examples of the contemporary world, and international organised crime in particular. Consequently, article 4 continues to remain an important provision interpreted as a contemporary regulation that serves combating the “contemporary forms of slavery”.
PL
Przedmiotem opracowania jest analiza postanowień art. 4 Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Autor rozpatruje je najpierw na tle porównawczym, zestawiając je zwłaszcza z art. 8 Międzynarodowego Paktu Praw Obywatelskich i Politycznych. Następnie analizuje zakaz niewolnictwa sensu stricto, z uwzględnieniem zakazu handlu niewolnikami, by następnie przejść do analizy zakazu poddaństwa w różnorakich kontekstach, w jakich praktyki poddaństwa pojawiły się w orzecznictwie strasburskim. Szczególnie bogate (bo i odnośnego orzecznictwa było więcej) są rozważania na temat zakazu pracy przymusowej lub obowiązkowej, ze wskazaniem na ważną rolę, jaką w orzecznictwie strasburskim odgrywały Konwencje nr 29 i nr 107 MOP dotyczące zniesienia pracy przymusowej. Specjalna uwaga jest poświęcona wyjątkom z art. 4 ust. 3 Konwencji, a mianowicie – kolejno: pracy więźniów, służbie wojskowej (z uwzględnieniem problemu służby zastępczej i ewolucji orzecznictwa w tym zakresie), sytuacjom nadzwyczajnym oraz zwyczajnym obowiązkom obywatelskim. Niestety, problemy niewolnictwa, poddaństwa oraz pracy przymusowej lub obowiązkowej nie należą do „wykopalisk przeszłości”, lecz są problemami nader aktualnymi, wciąż „ożywianymi” przez współczesne praktyki w znacznym stopniu powiązane z międzynarodową przestępczością zorganizowaną. W związku z tym art. 4 zachowuje wciąż swoje niebagatelne znaczenie i jest interpretowany jako odpowiadający dzisiejszym warunkom oraz bardzo istotny dla zwalczania „współczesnych form niewolnictwa”.
EN
Suicide - seen from a legal perspective - has undergone an important evolution, from penalization as a serious crime, to an absolute depenalisation that covered not only acts of successful suicide, but also of attempted suicide. Nevertheless, incitement, aiding and abetting to suicide have not been depenalised. From a human rights perspective, suicide constitutes a serious problem for a State, since within a framework of positive obligations concerning a right to life, a State is responsible for protecting life, which embraces obligation to undertake specific preventive measures, that would avert an act of suicide. The aforementioned obligation is even stronger, when a State controls and supervises a potential victim of a suicide. This situation occurs, when a person is deprived of liberty or serves a draft military service. A State's obligation is fulfilled by creating a legal and institutional framework, that would serve to protect life, especially in the army or in prison, as well as by enforcing specific obligations and duties on persons dealing with potential suicide victims. Victims families have a right to vindication of a claim and to participate in an investigation, to an extent necessary to protect their legitimate interests.
PL
Samobójstwo jako problem prawny przeszło istotną ewolucję historyczną: od uznawania za ciężkie przestępstwo do całkowitej depenalizacji nie tylko aktów skutecznego samobójstwa, ale także nieudanych prób samobójczych. Nie poszła jednak za tym depenalizacja nakłaniania ani pomocnictwa do samobójstwa. Dla państwa z perspektywy praw człowieka samobójstwo stanowi poważny problem, jako że - w ramach zobowiązań pozytywnych z tytułu prawa do życia - państwo jest zobowiązane do ochrony prawa do życia, w tym m.in. do podejmowania konkretnych środków prewencyjnych zapobiegających urzeczywistnieniu się samobójstwa. To zobowiązanie doznaje szczególnego nasilenia tam, gdzie państwo - będąc panem sytuacji - sprawuje nad potencjalną ofiarą samobójstwa pełną kontrolę, m.in. w warunkach służby poborowych czy pozbawienia wolności. Dotyczy to obowiązku ukształtowania generalnych ram prawno-instytucjonalnych służących ochronie życia, zwłaszcza w wojsku czy w więzieniu, jak i konkretnych obowiązków osób odpowiedzialnych za położenie i dobrostan potencjalnych ofiar samobójstwa, w tym ich zwierzchników. Rodziny ofiar mają prawo dochodzenia roszczeń w związku z samobójstwem ich bliskich, korzystając z prawa do partycypacji w odnośnym dochodzeniu w zakresie niezbędnym do ochrony ich prawowitych interesów.
EN
To determine the fate of human rights in extreme situations, the treaties contain a mechanism for derogating from obligations, i.e. derogations from their enforceability in such exceptional situations. The initial and fundamental criterion under which derogation steps are admissible is the existence of an exceptional public emergency that threatens the life of the nation, as referred to in Article 4(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15(1) of the European Charter of Human Rights, and about which Professor Anna Michalska wrote so competently in 1997. Neither the constitutions of modern states nor their practice of introducing states of emergency are helpful in defining this criterion more precisely; most often, they do not use it at all. Unfortunately, it is not to be found in Chapter XI of the Polish Constitution “States of Emergency”, nor in the laws of 2002 regulating these states. In the practice of the treaty monitoring bodies (Human Rights Committee in the ICCPR system; the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights in the ECHR system), we do not find incontestable nor indisputable indications. The concept of the “nation” is referred to society as a whole and is to be associated with its physical survival. In the author’s opinion, this is not the correct approach, as it is and must be about a “living nation”, a nation effectively exercising its rights. The enslavement of a nation, its subjugation, elimination of opportunities for its self-determination – far from its extermination – can unquestionably meet the requirements of the criterion of a threat to the life of the nation. The study of constitutional law (the nation-sovereign) and international law (the principle and right to self-determination of the nation) unequivocally confirms this thesis.
EN
The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights in tax matters has developed in three dimensions. Firstly, it involved Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1 to the Convention with reference to “the payment of taxes”, viewed, notwithstanding the State’s wide margin of appreciation, in the light of the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. Secondly, from the perspective of Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention, tax disputes can be covered by the guarantees of a fair trial where the proceedings and sanctions, for example, concerning tax surcharges, are qualified in their autonomous Convention meaning as a “criminal charge” against the taxpayer. Moreover, despite its traditional case-law, in the last years the Court has seemed to allow the possibility of qualifying tax disputes as concerning “civilrights and obligations” Thirdly, on the basis of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention, the Court has found violations of the prohibition “to be tried or punished again in criminal proceedings” in the context of dual, i.e. tax (administrative) and penal, proceedings. The author critically assesses the Court judgment in the case of A. and B. v. Norway, in which the Court did not find a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7. In the Norwegian case, the distinct administrative and penal proceedings were in fact merged, since the state introduced a system of integrated legal answers to taxpayers’ behavior. According to Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, expressing a dissenting opinion, the Court in this judgment wrongly changed its stance from pro persona to pro auctoritate, possibly forgetting that it is a court of humanrights, and not a pleader of raison d’Etat. Although the Court declared that it considers the Convention “as a whole”, and seeks to ensure the consistency of the Convention system and harmony of its provisions, it might have lost sight of ties existing between them. Taxpayers are also individual humansand have a title to human rights, thus tax disputes are those of a human rights nature. Understandably, the ECHR must persist as a Court of Human Rights.
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