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EN
The problem of personal identity over time boils down to the question of an approprite (constitutive) criterion of numerical identity: what are informative, non-trivial, non-circular necessary and suffi cient conditions that determine whether two (temporally indexed) persons are one and the same continuant person. In the philosophical literature these criteria fall standardly into one of the three families: the psychological approach, the somatic approach and the simple view. In my article I try, fi rst, to demonstrate that the third approach – contrary to widespread opinion – can be compatible with some version of animalism, according to which each human person is identical with a biological organism, and second, to deliver some arguments which can be used in support of the view that it is impossible to formulate appropriate criteria of personal identity.
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