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EN
Seventy-two children between the ages of 3 and 5 took part in an investigation of the relations between the development of understanding of the two core concepts of theory-of-mind - desires and beliefs. Desire understanding was assessed by tasks requiring fulfilled or unfulfilled desires to be recalled and to predict desire-related emotions. Belief understanding was measured using false-belief task in standard and social version. Results showed that 3-year-olds have difficulty with the understanding of unfulfilled desires and false beliefs. In addition, specific links were found between the understanding of unfulfilled desires and false belief performance. These links suggest that the understanding of unfulfilled desires may be some kind of developmental bridge between the understanding of simple 'contentive' and more complex 'indicative' form of mental representations. The implications of these results for theory-of-mind development are discussed.
Psychological Studies
|
2004
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vol. 42
|
issue 2
69-80
EN
Two studies assessed a breadth of older siblings effect - whether it includes better understanding of other than beliefs mental states, and what is the role of pretend play and inhibitory control in the mechanism of the effect. In study 1 with ninety-one children between 3 and 4 years there were used false belief tasks with additional questions investigating understanding of conflicting desires and surprise, and behavioural measures of pretend play. It was found that having older siblings was an independent from pretence source of variance in false beliefs understanding and was not associated with better understanding of other than beliefs mental states. In study 2 with 72 children between 3 and 5 years there were used false and true belief tasks and DCCS as a measure of inhibitory control (IC). Number of older siblings was not an independent from IC source of variance in false beliefs understanding. Both studies indicate that having older siblings is linked with a local but not global facilitation effect in ToM development, and that a pretend play is not a main mechanism involved in this effect.
Psychological Studies
|
2006
|
vol. 44
|
issue 2
55-68
EN
This study was an attempt to examine the relationship between anticipatory looking reactions treated as an index of implicit mental competence and the development of syntax and executive function. In a study with fifty-eight 3- to 5-year-olds there were used eye gaze and verbal measures of false belief understanding, tasks on complement and embedded clause syntax (EmCS), inhibitory control and working memory. Controlling for age and other language and executive measures EmCS accounted for a small but significant amount of variance in looking reactions. When data of children who gave correct verbal answers were discarded there was no an independent of age link between looking reactions and EmCS. The results suggest the separateness of the mechanisms of implicit and explicit mental competence, but some connections between implicit competence and syntax may result from the penetration of an explicit mental competence into looking reactions.
EN
Two studies investigated whether there is a link between understanding of mind and facial expressions recognition. In Study 1 eighty-nine 4-year-olds completed false beliefs tasks, included also questions about desire and surprise, and two tests of facial expressions processing: recognition and matching. False belief understanding was found to share 16.5% of variance with recognition and matching of facial expressions, independently of age and parents education, which suggests that both domains of social cognition could influence each other in 4-year-olds. There was no link between understanding of surprise and recognition of facial expression of surprise. This result contradicts a hypothesis that errors in recognition of surprise are due to the conceptual problems. In Study 2 with fifty 7-year-olds there was found that matching of facial expressions still accounted for some part of variance in second-order false belief tasks but the relation was not reciprocal. Results are discussed in terms of componential view of theory of mind. .
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