This article presents powers of prosecutors of international criminal tribunals during the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings. It focuses on such institutions as power to initiate of proceedings and its limitations, preliminary examination of a case, authorization of investigation, conditions of such authorization and powers of the Prosecutor to act on a territory of states. It underlines the independence of the Prosecutor, which is a fundamental element of his status and is protected equally to independence of judges. It presents the conditions on which the Prosecutor can initiate a case – he not only can initiate criminal procedure proprio motu but also chooses situations and perpetrators that should be brought to justice before international tribunals. He should act on the basis of opportunity principle and take actions only in the most severe situations regarding most serious violations of international criminal law when specific circumstances indicate that they are in the interest of an international organ of justice. The article stresses that in the process of creation of international criminal tribunals not only criminal procedure sui generis was designed but also for the first time detailed powers of the Prosecutor had to be adapted to specificity of their functioning. The creators of international criminal tribunals applied legal instruments from several legal systems choosing solutions that seemed most appropriate for organs of international justice. In the consequence such procedure constitutes an amalgamate of common law institutions and solutions used in continental legal systems.
The article presents the position of the accused in criminal trial as a personal source of evidence and its procedural consequences. This position is one of the main differences between the adversarial and continental models of procedural criminal law which will be presented on the example of legal systems of Poland and Germany, and England. First of all, the scope of the right to silence and its possible limitations will be discussed – when the accused has no wish to become a personal source of evidence at all. Then, if the accused decides to give up this right, a question arises as to the form by which he makes statements in criminal trial. One of the forms of breaking the silence is e.g. confessing (either in trial or outside trial). Finally, the relationship with other elements of the criminal proceedings will be presented, related to the defendant's trial position, which influence the procedural position of the accused. The considerations will be summarized by the attempt to answer a question, in which legal tradition the position of the accused is in fact more favorable and why it is not possible to give a definite answer to such a question.
PL
W artykule przedstawiono problematykę pozycji oskarżonego w procesie jako osobowego źródła dowodowego i procesowe konsekwencje tej pozycji, związane z formą depozycji oraz znaczeniem, jakie im się nadaje. Pozycja oskarżonego stanowi jedną głównych różnic między tradycjami prawa anglosaskiego i kontynentalnego. Analizie zostaną poddane te różnice na przykładzie dwóch systemów prawnych: polskiego i angielskiego. W pierwszej kolejności omówiony zostanie zakres prawa do milczenia oskarżonego i jego ograniczenia w prawie angielskim. Następnie, analizie zostanie poddana forma składania przez niego oświadczeń w procesie. W ramach rozważań prowadzonych w artykule znajdzie się też analiza odmienności między formą i procesowymi konsekwencjami przyznania się do winy. Rozważania zostaną podsumowane analizą powiązań pozycji procesowej oskarżonego z innymi elementami postępowania karnego, które w powiązaniu ze sobą wpływają na to, czy jest to pozycja korzystna.
Celem artykułu jest rozważenie tego, czy dopuszczalne z punktu widzenia prawa karnego polskiego i prawa Unii Europejskiej jest prowadzenie postępowania karnego w sprawie zbrodni popełnionych w czasie Powstania Warszawskiego przed organami polskimi. Już na pierwszy rzut oka pojawiają się liczne problemy związane z historycznym charakterem czynów zarzucanych oskarżonemu: oskarżeni zmarli, a także często ma miejsce res iudicata (przesłanka rzeczy osądzonej). Występują więc przesłanki z artykułu 17 § 1 pkt 5, 6 i 7 k.p.k., które stanowią negatywne przesłanki prowadzenia postępowania i muszą prowadzić do jego umorzenia. W tej konkretnej sprawie ściganie odbywa się na podstawie przepisów ustawy z dnia 18 grudnia 1998 r. o Instytucie Pamięci Narodowej - Komisji Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu, która reguluje tryb postępowania w zakresie ścigania przestępstw popełnionych na osobach narodowości polskiej lub obywatelach polskich innych narodowości w okresie od dnia 8 listopada 1917 r. do dnia 31 lipca 1990 r. w postaci m.in. zbrodni nazistowskich., jako przykład zbrodni, w przypadku której dopuszczalne jest prowadzenie postępowania karnego. Na przykładzie Rzezi Woli, zbrodni przypisywanej H. Reinefarthowi, zostanie wykazane, jakie prawne trudności spotykały śledztwo toczące się w tej sprawie.
This article analyses the admissibility of evidence gathered by the Polish procedural authorities as a result of issuing an European Investigation Order, on the basis of provisions implemented due to the adoption on the 3th of April 2014 of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters. This Directive created a mechanism that allows for transfer of evidence between EU Member States. In this text the question will be answered how to deal with results of investigative measures that have been legally obtained in the executing state but despite acting in accordance with the legality principle by both states, happen to be illegal in the issuing Member State. Another discussed problem is how the rules of admissibility of evidence obtained from the result of issuing an EIO work in Poland – or at least how they should operate. The second discussed issue thus will refer to the current provisions in force in Poland regulating the method of dealing with evidence obtained abroad – that is also with evidence transferred from other Member States. It will be shown that they are unclear and may lead to undesirable results. In addition, suggested changes in Polish law will be proposed.
This article deals with the model for prosecuting Nazi crimes committed in Poland in the light of the model presently used in international criminal law. It tries to answer the question: should the investigation of crimes of international law be handed over to transnational tribunals? Should they be hybrid tribunals involving a national factor, or completely supra-national tribunals like the International Criminal Court? Is it legitimate to transfer jurisdiction over these matters to national courts? The case of unpunished Nazi crimes in Poland may give a partial answer to this question. Certainly, various attempts made after World War II, including procedures brought before Polish courts, have contributed to understanding the function of international criminal law, and finding the answer to the question of the best model for prosecuting crimes of international law. At present, we also have the experience of international criminal tribunals, in particular the ICC, which is an efficient machine for prosecuting crimes of international law. Interesting conclusions can be drawn from its functioning that could improve the work of Institute of National Remembrance (IPN) prosecutors, and shed new light on the considerations regarding the prosecution of Nazi crimes in Poland after World War II.
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