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EN
In the language of science there are some theoretical (abstract) terms like molecule, momentum or space. Some of the empiricists are afraid of using them because they can implicate metaphysics (realism or nominalism). Rudolf Carnap in 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' argues that beyond theoretical terms there is no metaphysics nor ontology because everything is reduced to the linguistic framework, in which he distinguishes internal and external questions we can ask. Internal questions and answers are restricted to the using of the new forms of expressions which are currently needed. External questions are often seen as questions of metaphysics but in fact, says Carnap, they are pragmatic questions concerning linguistic framework, such as: should we accept the term 'momentum' in the scheme of physical language? In this paper the author will analyse Carnap's arguments from the above-mentioned essay and consider whether he correctly solved the problem of the external question. Do really theoretical terms not implicate any ontology? To answer these questions he will confront Carnap's arguments with Willard Orman Van Quine's.
EN
After Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species, a lot of people started to be uncertain whether the proposed theory of evolution is compatible with their religious beliefs. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that in the second part of the 19th century we see quite a big number of scientists choose some radical solutions such as becoming a monist or an atheist. On the other hand, there are people who reject the new biological theory in favour of tradition and some archetypical picture of the world with a human as the crowning achievement of God's creation. In 1871 the Polish doctor of medicine, Romuald Swierzbienski, published the work 'Do humans originate from apes?' in which he strongly criticised the theory of evolution. Two years later, in 1873, he continued his attack but in a more polite and methodologically correct tone in the work 'How much truth is there in Darwin's work <>'? In our paper we will analyze and comment on both works of Romuald Swierzbienski. We will also present a hypothesis that there is a noticeable evolution in his criticism. As in his first publication, he mainly used anthropocentric world-view arguments, whereas in the second he preferred to refer to contemporary knowledge from biology and geology. We could even say that he turned from irrational philosophy to methodological naturalism. However, a particular argument can be found in both works. According to it, if a theory could not explain some facts, it means that it is wrong and therefore the opposite theory is better.
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