Legal philosophy is concentrated on such traditional philosophical problems like ontology, epistemology, logic and ethics. Obviously it lacks the last main philosophical issue — aesthetics. The author tries to fill this gap with so-called pragmatic aesthetics formulated by R. Schusterman. Using the latin terminology he claims that the law should be not only certa, praevia, scripta et stricta, but pulchra as well. On this background the author proposes two graphic models of the legal system: the first, concentrated on the logical structure (e.g. H. Kelsen, H.L.A. Hart), and the second, concentrated on the axiological borders (e.g. G. Radbruch, L.L. Fuller). In the conclusion he presents also some new proposals, like for example three-dimensional vision of the global law formulated by R. Domingo.
Considering the main subject of XXII Congress of the Chairs of Theory and Philosophy of Law the author tries to answer the following question: “Jurisprudence — the political of science or science of the political?”. His answer is clear — we need the latter and not the former. In the article the concepts of „politics”, „political” and „politization” are treated synonymously. The problem is presented on the background of Carl Schmitt’s political philosophy. In the author’s opinion after 1933 Schmitt has balanced between these two attitudes (the political of science or science of the political) because of his methodology (political theology) on the one hand, and of his personal choice (support for Nazi regime) on the other. In the last part of the article are formulated some conclusions — learned from Schmitt’s lesson and concerning the constitutional crisis in Poland.
The problem of the relation between constitution and slavery is still present in contemporary American constitutionalism. The scholars are divided into three main groups: prosecutors, vindicators and historicists. The author considers this complicated question on the example of Thomas Jefferson and his thought. As we know, he was one of the Founding Fathers and the slaves owner at the same time. The main purpose of this article is the explanation of this ambiguity, which seems to be not only personal but first of all constitutional. For starting point the author takes the famous William Lloyd Garrison’s formulation – constitution as „a covenant with death and an agreement with hell”.
In the Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union there is no definition of the rule of law, however, in the author’s opinion, every European lawyer knows the meaning of this phrase. It has a very, very long tradition in European legal culture and is rooted in Roman law and its jurisprudence. The author has used Cicero’s Oratio pro Cluentio to explain the core of the rule of law and its meaning.
The article aims to prove that the contemporary lawyers’ perspective was shaped not only by the Roman jurisprudence but also by the political and legal thought of ancient Greece. According to the author, this applies, in particular, to such notions as democracy, rule of law, and the administration of justice. However, the presented considerations are not historical but paradigmatical in nature. They are related to the current Polish constitutional crisis because we are dealing with a violation of the basic paradigms arising from the centuries-old tradition of European legal culture.
The author tries to describe very strange phenomenon which one can observe in actual polish constitutional practice. He calls it “interpretatio constitutionis hostilis” (constitution-hostile interpretation). The considerations are based on some legislative examples, and the author comes to the conclusion that this unconstitutional strategy is: firstly, hidden, although applied with full conscious and intention; secondly, based on acting in bad faith; thirdly, very dangerous for the legal order.
Celem artykułu jest analiza pojęcia nomos w jego historycznym rozwoju w greckim antyku – od archaicznego okresu czasów Homera aż po szczyt ateńskiej demokracji czasów Demostenesa. Autor stawia tezę, że ta ewolucja od nomos jako synonimu ogólnego pojęcia porządku do nomos jako synonimu prawa pozytywnego odzwierciedla proces stopniowej jurydyzacji polityki. Na tym tle przedstawiono w artykule recepcję omawianego pojęcia we współczesnej filozofii polityki, zwłaszcza w pracach Carla Schmitta i Giorgio Agambena. Autor stawia tutaj drugą główną tezę opracowania – wykorzystanie pojęcia nomos w teologii politycznej Carla Schmitta jest przykładem procesu odwrotnego, dejurydyzacji polityki.
EN
It is a widespread opinion that modern jurisprudence was shaped first of all by the tradition of Roman law. In this article author tries to explain why ancient Greek legal thought should be equally important. As an example he considers the evolution and the different meanings of the concept of nomos. Four issues are presented in this paper. First, nomos in the political philosophy of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben. Secondly, nomos in one of Pindar’s poems. Thirdly, the distinction between physis and nomos made by the sophists. Fourthly, thesmos, nomos and psephisma in the legislative practice of Athenian ekklesia.
The starting point of the author’s considerations is one of Cicero’s forensic speeches in a civil case, Oratio pro Caecina. But the main purpose of this article is to answer the following question: was Cicero a jurist or not? For many years, this problem was controversial for Romanists, historians and theoreticians of rhetoric. The author puts forward two hypotheses – firstly, a historical one, and secondly a modern one. In the light of the former, Cicero was not a jurist, because in court he played the role of a Roman advocatus and Roman iurisconsultus. From the modern perspective the problem is more complicated – he was a jurist in the modern sense, even if he was not a jurist in today’s meaning. The author’s analysis is constructed more from the point of view of legal philosophy than from the history of Roman law.
PL
Punktem wyjścia rozważań autora jest prezentacja jednej z mów Cycerona w sprawie cywilnej, oratio pro Caecina. Na tym tle próbuje on odpowiedzieć na następujące pytanie, od dawna stawiane w nauce prawa rzymskiego: czy Cyceron był prawnikiem? W artykule zaproponowano spojrzenie na ten problem z dwóch perspektyw – historycznej i współczesnej. Zdaniem autora w perspektywie historycznej Cyceron nie był prawnikiem w rzymskim znaczeniu tego pojęcia; natomiast w perspektywie współczesnej powinniśmy go jednak uznać, stosując terminologię anglosaską, za jurist (nawet jeśli nie za lawyer). W artykule analiza prowadzona jest nie z pozycji historii prawa rzymskiego, lecz w ujęciu filozoficzno-prawnym.
Article discusses a dilemma of judge facing a possibility (or necessity) of applying judicial disobedience. From the philosophical as well as theoretical point of view, the most intriguing would be an instance of judicial disobedience when applied to a state of democracy and the rule of law. In order to (re-)construct such an instance, the article traces the reader back to the middle of the 19th Century, when the moral conscience of (at least) some of American judges drove them to searching for the sound justification of judicial disobedience when faced with problem of slavery.
The subject of this paper is a philosophical-legal analysis of the concept of ‘judicial conscience’, recently a popular topic in public discourse. The author proposes a broad understanding of the term, and distinguishes four different sources of this conscience: i) a judge’s worldview, which most often has a religious basis; ii) professionalism; iii) axiological conflicts internal to the legal system; and, iv) awareness of belonging to the judiciary as an independent power (the third estate). The author illustrates his analysis of judicial conscience through the example of US case-law from the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when courts adjudicated on cases involving fugitive slaves. According to the author, it is possible, on this basis, to determine some paradigmatic attitudes available to judges facing axiological conflict. In the conclusion, the author applies his reflections to the present Polish constitutional crisis.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest filozoficzno-prawna analiza pojęcia „sumienie sędziego”, które pojawia się ostatnio dosyć często w dyskursie publicznym. Autor proponuje jego szerokie rozumienie i wyróżnia cztery różne źródła sędziowskiego sumienia: 1) światopogląd, najczęściej o podłożu religijnym; 2) profesjonalizm; 3) konflikty aksjologiczne wewnątrz systemu prawa; 4) świadomość przynależności do odrębnej, trzeciej władzy. Autor pokazuje to na przykładzie orzecznictwa sądów amerykańskich w sprawach niewolniczych z przełomu 18. i 19. wieku. Jego zdaniem można na tej podstawie dokonać pewnych paradygmatycznych ustaleń w zakresie możliwych postaw sędziów stojących w obliczu konfliktu aksjologicznego. W zakończeniu autor przenosi swoje rozważania na grunt obecnego polskiego kryzysu konstytucyjnego.
The philosophy of law concerns such traditional philosophical issues as ontology, epistemology, logic and ethics. It usually fails to include the fifth main philosophical issue – aesthetics. An attempt is made to fill in this gap by pragmatic aesthetics formulated by Richard Schusterman. Using Latin terminology, the author claims that lex (law) ought to be not only certa, praevia, scripta et stricta (settled, prior, written and strict) but also pulchra (beautiful). Three different aspects of the relationship of law and aesthetics have been presented. Finally, an example of an aesthetic assessment of the system of law as an entirety is made based on the analysis of Jurisprudenz, a painting by Gustav Klimt.
PL
Filozofia prawa dotyczy takich tradycyjnych kwestii filozoficznych, jak ontologia, epistemologia, logika i etyka. Zwykle jednak nie uwzględnia ostatniego z głównych zagadnień filozoficznych ‒ estetyki. Autor próbuje wypełnić tę lukę tzw. estetyką pragmatyczną, sformułowaną przez Richarda Schustermana. Stosując terminologię łacińską, twierdzi, że lex (prawo) powinna być nie tylko certa, praevia, scripta et stricta, ale również pulchra (pewne, uprzednie, pisemne, ścisłe, ale również piękne). W artykule przedstawiono też trzy różne perspektywy związków prawa z estetyką. W podsumowaniu autor próbuje dokonać przykładowo estetycznej oceny systemu prawa jako całości, posiłkując się analizą obrazu Gustava Klimta Jurisprudenz.
The main purpose of this paper is the analysis of the notion “judicial disobedience”. The author describes two aspects (individual and institutional) and compare them with civil disobedience. The problem is presented in a paradigmatic manner upon the example of case law of American courts relating to slavery in the period of half of the century preceding the outbreak of the Civil War. Based on this, the author constructs a typology assuming four possible opinions of an adjudicating judge based on provisions of law, which are contrary to the judge’s conscience and morality. In this paper the problem is described upon the example of Justice Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1830 to 1860. However special attention is paid to his judgment in case Commonwealth v. Aves., but his another verdicts have been mentioned as well.
PL
Głównym celem artykułu jest analiza pojęcia „nieposłuszeństwo sędziowskie”. Autor opisuje dwa aspekty problemu (indywidualny i instytucjonalny) i porównuje je z nieposłuszeństwem obywatelskim. Zagadnienie jest zaprezentowane w sposób paradygmatyczny na przykładzie orzecznictwa sądów amerykańskich w sprawach niewolnictwa w okresie poprzedzającym wybuch wojny secesyjnej. W oparciu o to autor konstruuje typologię czterech możliwych postaw sędziów orzekających na podstawie ustawy sprzecznej z ich sędziowskim sumieniem i systemem moralnym. W artykule zaprezentowano ten problem na przykładzie sędziego Lemuela Shawa, przewodniczącego Sądu Najwyższego stanu Massachusetts w latach 1830-1860. Szczególną uwagę poświęcono wprawdzie jego wyrokowi w sprawie Commonwealth v. Aves, ale wspomniane są także inne interesujące orzeczenia.
The purpose of this review article is to evaluate the four commentaries on the instruments of international protection of human rights, which has appeared recently in the Polish literature of the subject. At the outset, the author provides the characteristics of the commentaries as a form of scientific statements in genere, and then tries to reconstruct the attributes of a good commentary in specie. To this aim, he applies the typology of scholar lawyers proposed by the Hungarian theorist of law and constitutionalist András Jakab. The main part of the article is the evaluation of the four comments: two of them concern the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, edited by Marek A. Nowicki and Leszek Garlicki, one to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, edited by Roman Wieruszewski and one to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, edited by Andrzej Wróbel. Despite the differences in terms of form, content and methodology, but they all deserve a very high rating.
The protection of cultural property at the time of an armed conflict comprises an extremely essential problem. International law foresees detailed guidelines concerning this issue in its Convention on the protection of cultural property in the case of an armed conflict, the Executive rules to this convention and the Protocol on the protection of cultural property in case of an armed conflict, signed at The Hague on 14 May 1954. These documents list the instruments and legal institutions protecting historical monuments during this particularly dangerous time. From the practical viewpoint, particular importance is attached primarily to a detailed definition of the object of protection. The instruments of protection include the specially noteworthy special protection, the International Register of Cultural Property under Special Protection, as well as the storage and transport of cultural property. Apart from the above mentioned detailed rules, which have not as yet been accepted by all countries, cultural property is protected according to assorted general principles. International law indubitably exerts direct impact on the contents of domestic law. Nonetheless, importance should be attached not only to law, but also to suitable social policies which ought to focus universal awareness on the necessity of preserving material cultural heritage for successive generations.