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PL
Autor artykułu dowodzi, że żyjemy w epoce inflacji dzienników. Techniki antycznego i chrześcijańskiego sposobu nadawania życiu formy są dziś martwe. Dawne zasady nadawania życiu formy zostały przetworzone przez nową kulturę łączności „nowych mediów”. Ta teza jest egzemplifikowana historycznie poprzez przywołanie przykładu François Rabelais’go, Marcela Prousta oraz Georges’a Pereca. Na przekór tej tezie autor rekonstruuje dwie wielkie próby nadania sobie formy poprzez zapis: "Dzienniki" Witolda Gombrowicza oraz "Dzienniki" Sławomira Mrożka. Te dwie próby żywią się wspólnym przeświadczeniem: literatura i życie spełniają się w tylko w dziennikach. "Dzienniki" Franza Kafki umożliwiają autorowi lekturę "Dzienników" Gombrowicza, a "Dzienniki" Thomasa Manna pozwalają mu przemyśleć dzienniki Mrożka. Autor pracy stara się zrozumieć relację łączącą życie, pisanie i formę życia. Kluczowy dla autora jest trop etymologiczny: termin „dziennik” wywodzi się od łacińskiego wyrazu „diarium”, oznaczającego codzienne porcje pokarmu rozdawane żołnierzom. W tym sensie dziennik umożliwiałby życie, nie odwrotnie.
EN
The author of the article proves that we are now living in the era of diary’s inflation. Techniques of ancient and Christian modes of giving form to life are now dead. Old methods of giving form to life have been transformed by new culture unity of new media. This thesis is historically supported by recalling the examples of François Rabelais, Marcel Proust, and Georges Perec. Opposing this view, the author of the paper reconstructs two great attempts of transforming life into a text, namely Witold Gombrowicz’s “Diaries” and Sławomir Mrożek’s "Diaries", as the two works are joined by a common conviction that literature and life come true only in a diary. Franz Kafka’s "Diaries" offer the author a way of reading Gombrowicz’s “Diaries”, while Thomas Mann’s "Diaries" are helpful in reflecting on Sławomr Mrożek’s ones. In his paper, the author intends to understand the relationship between life, writing, and life form. The key etymological trope for the author is the word “diarium” from which the word “diary” is derived, and which means everyday food portions given to soldiers. In this sense, life is conditioned by a diary, not vice versa.
EN
In my text, I ask—investigating mainly the works of Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Kafka— if humanity empowered by kinship or even contamination with other species would be a sick society, frail and ill-selected, or whether it would rather be a society which is active and audacious, devoid of the traces of resentment towards other living beings. I analyze the mono-individual species (the term was formulated by Lévi-Strauss) on the basis of examples which are clinical (Freud’s Hans, Sándor Ferenczi’s little Arpad), literary (Kafka’s Gregor Samsa), and also those borrowed from mass culture (Spider- Man and Batman) in order to illustrate the course of the process of domestication of the animal as well as the dedomestication of the human and their consequences for delineating an uncertain boundary between a human and an animal in the contemporary world.
EN
I would like to expound the reasons why we have decided to discuss in one issue the subject of animality in culture, ethics, philosophy, art and literature. Below I outline the cognitive interests, intellectual motivations, ethical reasons and practical effects that substantiate this issue. The main axis of this Dialogue and Universalism issue is the recognition of a yet another turn in the humanities. After the linguistic turn (30s to 70s) and the pictorial turn (70s to 90s), what follows next is what we only tentatively refer to as the anima l turn. Our main task here is to determine what precisely animal turn is and what its further development might be. First of all we challenge the most important and most difficult question: animal policy. The presence or rather the absence of animals in politics, political and economic abuse of animals, and their widespread fetishization are a rather obvious part of our biopolitical reality. However, Nicole Shukin pervasively notices in her Animal Capital1 that while the theorists of biopower, Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, have interrogated the increasingly total subsumption of the social and biological life of the anthropos to market logics; little attention has been given to what Shukin calls “animal capital.” Indeed, as Jacques Derrida remarks, the power to reduce humans to the bare life of their species’ body arguably presupposes the prior power to suspend other species in a state of exception within which they can be noncriminally put to death.2 For this reason, it is not enough to theorize biopower in relation to human life alone; the reproductive lives and labors of other species also become a matter of biopolitical calculation. Peter Sloterdijk writes that today life may depend only on itself. However, we have to ask: what is the life which depends only on itself? Is there a form of the biophilia? What is a critical project related to this life? Is it just a satirical act as suggested by Sloterdijk? I hope the section The Animal Ethics and Philosophy provides a basis for genuine discussions. I have been long conscious of a need of a new philosophy of nature in which nature is not an externality subjugated and tamed by man, but is an equal partner in debates, so to speak, endowed with the gift of speech. If we are privileged to hear it, are we also capable of providing it with the ways to be heard aloud? The section The Human-Animal Relationship goes in this direction, that is, it explores the conditions of co-existence of humans and animals, animals and angels, and angels and monsters alike. The main question that organizes our work in this field is whether discourse ethics should now include entities that initially seemed mute and were excluded from discussions. We need to establish a new ethic. By saying that I do not mean we only need to expand the concept of moral subject to include animals, or that we need to establish a legal basis for protecting animal rights. Even if the former and the latter are of practical importance and of political interest that what really awaits here is the revision of the project of ethics as such and the task of answering the question of non-anthropocentric ethics. We would like to consider the possibility of establishing a new ethic of life that would strive not so much to protect life, which would probably result in a new biopolitical regime, as it would strive to think over principles of co-existence and establish what is really common to all of the living. Andrew Linzey in his book Animal Theology instigated a large debate with one anxious question:3 what in fact is theology if it is developed only thanks to a moral neglect of a group of creatures constituting the vast majority in the world of living organisms? Indeed. The question, however, is whether the modern animal rights movement needs theology at all? And if so: what sort of theology is in demand? What is the place of animals in the hierarchy of God’s creation? The question is not limited to: whether the animals or the animal rights movement needs theology, but what theology needs animals? I hope to see the section Animals, Religion and Theology address these difficult and important issues and outline possible answers. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari wrote ecstatically: “We think and write for animals themselves. We become animal so that the animal also becomes something else. The agony of a rat or the slaughter of a calf remains present in thought not through pity but as the zone of exchange between man and animal in which something of one passes into the other." But what does it exactly mean to “become animal so that the animal also becomes something else”? What does the difference mean: b e i n g a r a t an d i d en t i f y i n g wi t h a r a t ? I believe the above questions shall accompany us when discussing the section on visual arts Animals in Art and Culture. Since in the vast majority we are the representatives of the humanities, not natural science, we would like to consider the presence of animals in literature and philosophy, from Flaubert after Gombrowicz and from Thomas Aquinas to the Jean-Paul Sartre, to paraphrase the title of Mirosław Loba’s paper featured in this issue. The presence of animals in literature and philosophy is permanent, indelible and inescapable. There are animals of Nietzsche—a donkey, a camel, a lion. There are animals of Kafka—a mole, a worm, a mouse, and a butterfly. Perhaps every writer and every philosopher brings to existence their own animals. Kafka-Gnostic discovered by Harold Bloom joins Kafka-Taoist discovered by Elias Canetti. Kafka-mole is thus complemented with the figure of Kafka- butterfly. However, how should we understand the presence of animals in literature? Are they just metaphors of human characters, or do they reveal something more profound, a direction of human desires, or, in particular, a fantasy of transgressing humanity? We hope the section Animals in Literature will provide a basis for effective discussions. We raise no claims to completeness nor we intend to fully explore the issues at hand; we only claim that animality as such has been overlooked far too long and can no longer escape our thinking. This volume is to an extent a result of the conference of 11–13 October 2012 at the Faculty of “Artes Liberales” at the University of Warsaw. I would like to extend my sincere appreciation to its esteemed dean, Professor Jerzy Axer.
EN
This text constitutes an intellectual exercise of sorts whereby the author is expected to assume a certain position on the issue of utopia and, consequently, adopts a new way to see the concept of “utopia”. Instead of offering a historical account of the concept, the author has decided to articulate the principal theses underlying it, which so far have often been veiled in unnecessary erudition and “over-burdened” with excessive details about the genealogy of the concept. The author proposes eight theses concerning utopia and falsifies them successively. However, the task of the article is not purely destructive and polemical, for every falsification makes it possible to formulate a positive thesis on utopia as an instrument of thought. Therefore, the article is not a purely analytical or sophistic exercise, nor is it intended as an empty intellectual game. The study bears the title of “Eight and a half theses on utopia”, mainly because the author regards the last thesis as unfinished and conflicted within.
PL
Artykuł stanowi swoiste ćwiczenie intelektualne, w ramach którego autor stawia przed sobą zadanie ustosunkowania się do zagadnienia utopii i w rezultacie przyjmuje pewien sposób rozumienia pojęcia „utopii”. Autor podjął decyzję, by nie przedstawiać zarysu historii pojęcia utopii, w zamian za to sformułować główne tezy dotyczące utopii, które dotychczasowy stan badań przesłaniał erudycyjnością oraz zbyt dużym ładunkiem wiadomości na temat genealogii konceptu. Autor stawia osiem tez na temat utopii, które następnie dezawuuje. Jednakże zadanie, jakiego się podejmuje nie jest czysto destruktywnej i polemicznej natury, bowiem każda falsyfikacja pozwala autorowi sformułować tezę pozytywną dotycząca utopii jako narzędzia myślowego. Zatem artykuł nie jest czysto analitycznym lub sofistycznym ćwiczeniem, ani też nie jest pustą zabawą intelektualną. Studium zatytułowane jest „Osiem i pół tezy na temat utopii” głównie z tego względu, że ostatnia teza wysunięta przez autora wydaje mu się niedokończona oraz sprzeczna wewnętrznie.
PL
W tekście autor zastanawia się nad możliwością zaklasyfikowania twórczości Hanny Ograbisz-Krawiec. Autor testuje hipotezę na temat przynależności tej sztuki do wariantu sztuki ziemi, tj. gatunku land art. Autor zastanawia się następnie nad cechami indywidualnymi, a nie gatunkowymi twórczości artystki. Autor odpowiada, że indywidualny jest w niej obrys pewnego wariantu „materialnej duchowości” oraz obrys otchłani świata. Czym jest otchłań, czym jest jej obrys i czym jest „materialna duchowość”? – to pytania, na które autor stara się odpowiedzieć w tekście.
EN
The author of this text ponders on the possibility of classifying the artworks of Hanna Ograbisz-Krawiec, and in doing so tests a hypothesis about their affiliation to a variant known as the land art genre. Next, he considers the individual features, and not the genre ones, of the artist’s oeuvre. In response to those inquiries S. Wróbel writes that the individual feature of the art in question is an individual outline of a sui generis variant of “material spirituality” and of the abyss of the world. What is this abyss, its outline, and “material spirituality” – these are the questions, which the author of the text attempts to resolve.
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