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1

Marksowski program przekraczania filozofii a Hegel

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Jasiński B.

Nowa Krytyka

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2013

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issue 30/31

263-274

EN

The content of this dissertation is an examination of the Marx theory understood not as philosophy, but as special way of describing reality in which it is not important only to interpret the world, but to change it. Such a position cannot be treated as a mere philosophy, because philosophy has always described the world from the observer point of view, while Marxism wants to be a member of the reality that is being known. And that is why it draw a completely new methodological perspective, in which the thing which seeks to know something become at once the thing that is being known. The autor refers to his theoretical propositions laid out in the book "Theses on ethosophy", where a similar perspective is being created.

2

Sztuka zamiast filozofii

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Jasiński B.

Sztuka i Dokumentacja

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2012

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issue 6

97-107

EN

The aim of this text is to show the cognitive function of the art later referred to as conceptual. Conceptualism was particularly predisposed to express abstract messages which included philosophical ones. The basic question I would like to pose in this text is: can a conceptual art toolbox express in its own way that which had been formerly expressed by philosophy? How, with the usage of means suggested by conceptual art, may one build a general image of the world – comparable to that which philosophy had previously given? Perhaps a full answer to the above question leads us into the areas of art which ceased to fill the boundaries of conceptualism, or post-conceptualism and heads straightforward to action, which Grotowski called an ‘active culture’ — that is a place where art is not sufficient anymore.

3

Martin Heidegger – Filozof Bytu w Podróży po Sztukę

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Jasiński B.

Sztuka i Dokumentacja

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2021

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issue 24

33-43

EN

The aim of the dissertation is the theoretical analysis of Martin Heidegger`s philosophical work after the famous turn to radically-perceived philosophy of being (the so called "Kehre"). The author presents a completely new paradigm of doing philosophy, which Heidegger himself began with his publication. It is a paradigm outside the traditional Cartesian subject-object divisions. However, it was not continued in the tradition of modern philosophy, as it went beyond commonly understood rationalism. Another current of philosophical tradition to which my ethosophy relates is the development of modern transcendentalism, marked by such names as Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Husserl. Descartes, as we know, posed the overriding question of modern philosophy: the relation between thought and being. By this he set the modern version of the traditional subject-object dualism and substantiated it in his system. Contemporary transcendentalism best accommodated this dichotomy, breaking it down by building up the subject sphere. This is the way Kant followed and Husserl took to its end-so it would appear-in his transcendental idealism. The essence of this philosophical program was such a buildup of the subject sphere so as to see through-as though from outside-this entire subject-object dualism. Yet this point of view of transcendental idealism by no means fully eliminates this dualism but, on the contrary, in a way cements it further. Its negation is purely declarative. Within the limits of this theoretical perspective, such an observational position is constructed which as its counter-element encompasses both the subject and the object, and more specifically the relation which links them. By the same token, this original dualism reemerges, only on a different qualitative plane, which on the one hand includes this transcendental point, and on the other has this relation linking the studied and the studying spheres. Obviously, it is possible to eliminate this level again by constructing a new, much more general, point of observation, transcendental to the earlier. This procedure may proceed ad infinitum, wit¬hout really eliminating this original dualism. In reality, such was the course of this current in modern transcendental philosophy-from Descartes, through Hegel all the way to Husserl. There is yet another answer to the central problem that Descartes posed. This is an attempt to break up this subject-object dualism from within by expanding the object sphere. The best known theoretical solutions within this current of modern philosophy are the proposals that Marx and Heidegger advanced. While the transcendental idealism of the type Husserl proposed built up the external point of view of the traditional subject-object division of philosophy, an internal point of view of this division marks the current of transcenden¬talism in which the high-watermarks were the names of Marx and Heidegger and which, in contrast to the former, could qualify as realistic. This comes about by up-valuing the object sphere. The solution Husserl proposed was, as indicated earlier, illusory. The solution Marx and Heidegger reached is real, as it reveals the rules behind the constitution of such a dual manner of thinking about the world. Both of these philosophers show this dualism as illusory. Ethosophy expands on this point of view.

4

Idea demokracji w filozofii społecznej Karla R. Poppera – racjonalistyczny mit nowoczesnej Europy

100%

Jasiński B.

Sztuka i Dokumentacja

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2017

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issue 16

7-27

EN

The article presents a sketch of Karl Popper’s philosophical opinions. Popper belongs to those philosophers who came to strictly philosophical questions from problems concerned with the natural sciences. This development of their thought has particular consequences for their philosophical style. On the one band – as one can note in Popper – their philosophy is one which is low on poetic turns of phrase and high on logical rigor. On the other hand, their thought is characterized by a greater dose of certainly, of an apodictic tendency even, than is that of those philosophers who, educated in the traditions of the humanities, are more burdened by the weight of tradition. Such an attitude has perhaps two consequences: it leads either to the trivial repetition of other people’s insights or to a certain unquestionable originality. The author maintains that, in the case of Popper, we are dealing with the second eventuality. In the article he presents chosen elements illustrative of the originality of Popper’s thought. In Popper philosophy the rational is always contradicted by the irrational. And the ‘despair of reason’, as he states, always leads to limitation of freedom and closed society. So the alternative is based on dramatic choice: ‘reason or violence’ or/and ‘reason or revolution’. The reason for Popper is - in fact - the same as humanities. Historicism, the way of thinking in historical categories, is exempt from thinking because it is based on firm rules and thus its result is totalitarianism. Here is the focal point of Popper’s thinking - his a priori established faith in reason implies a certain type of humanism; the one who believes in the unlimited possibilities of man whose chief weapon becomes reason. We believe in reason – that is a dogma. And reason enables criticism (critical rationalism), that is a falsification of (any) theory. That’s why the social science has an inevitable conjectural character. Popper’s methodological individualism that is based on belief in his own reason is a dogma as well. The only way out to deprive reason of its irrationality is to place it in the horizontal and not the vertical perspective, on the level of practical life, in between individual men. After the Holocaust there is nothing ‘above’ or ‘beyond’. Our decisions are rooted in already reason-guided life, and so are the political institutions – not in a meta-level rationalism.

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4 Jasiński B.

Marksowski program przekraczania filozofii a Hegel

Sztuka zamiast filozofii

Martin Heidegger – Filozof Bytu w Podróży po Sztukę

Idea demokracji w filozofii społecznej Karla R. Poppera – racjonalistyczny mit nowoczesnej Europy