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1

REVÍZIA DEFINÍCIÍ POJMOV DOSTATOČNÁ A NUTNÁ PODMIENKA

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Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2012
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vol. 19
|
issue 1
16 – 37
EN
Analysing the process of keeping promise we identify its sequence structure and its phase sequences in time. This allows us to arrive at the time order principle forming according to which obligation performance cannot precede in time its sufficient or necessary conditions performance. We further observe that a given promise must always be taken as an element of a certain system of promises. As a result we review definitions of the terms sufficient condition and necessary condition as no more allowing their mutual defining, or symmetry (conversion). We try to discover the compliance rules concerning the condition – the conditioned vector, the course of events vector and the time vector. We conclude that it indicates an incorrect use if, provided the condition – the conditioned vector complies with the course of events vector, the negative time difference in the descriptive use of sentences involving either the if-then connective or the only if connective is obtained. Only when using sentences for abductee explanation with a dominating epistemic vector the negative difference of time does not indicate erroneous use; however, this is possible only for the term of sufficient condition. We further suggest reviewed definition generalization involving the terms of sufficient condition and necessary condition containing always a parameter element denoting a given modality type, or a particular system of rules, laws, etc. Such definition satisfies Brennan’s requirement of a “general formal scheme” where the notion of sufficient condition and necessary condition symmetry (conversion) does not apply.
2

METÓDA AKO PROCEDÚRA

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2016
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vol. 71
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issue 8
629 – 643
EN
In this article the author’s suggestion is to apply the semantic concept of procedure also to the explication of the concept of method in general: A method is a procedure consisting of sub-procedures. Applying methods can lead not only to achieving knowledge, but also to creating pieces of work such as plans, projects programs etc. Thus, we get on to the theme of praxeology as a rational theory of action. The stimuli of action are directives which instead of status quo or its transformation have a direct objective, namely action. The role of method as a procedure in integrating the elementary implementing steps of the latter is underlined, i.e. sub-procedures or instructions. Thus the author casts doubt upon conceiving of method as merely a sequence of steps. In conclusion he offers the definitions of analytical and empirical methods.
3

SÚ POJMY “DOSTATOČNÁ PODMIENKA A NUTNÁ PODMIENKA” PRE EMPIRICKÚ OBLASŤ SYMETRICKÉ?

100%
Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
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vol. 18
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issue 3
331 – 350
EN
The Expression sufficient condition and necessary condition are frequently used in various areas in sciences (like mathematics, logic, philosophy, natural sciences and social sciences) as well as in everyday usage; therefore, they might be taken as expressing well defined notions which should not lead to any serious misunderstandings when used. According to the widely accepted definitions of both concepts, the concept of sufficient condition and that of necessary condition imply their symmetry (conversion): if one thing poses a sufficient condition to another thing, the latter is a necessary condition for the former; however, this symmetry is hardly intuitive and it is refused by many scholars. Given the analyses of practical examples and a symmetry concept defence test, one may conclude that this view is unfounded. As a result, the definitions of the two notions are not determined enough and so is the question whether there is just a single pair of the notions or whether there are more of them.
4

O “BEZ”

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Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 1
24 – 43
EN
The paper deals with the word “without” and its role in those kinds of collocations in which it has a meaning-carrying function. It is assumed that the meaning of “without” in the kinds of collocations under scrutiny is context independent in that it can be explicated by a single scheme: For every ξ1, ξ2, …, ξn holds, that Π(ξ1, ξ2, …, ξn) if not Θ(ξ1, ξ2, …, ξn) where Π, Θ are propositions or propositional functions (predicates) and ξ1, ξ2, …, ξn are relevant variables, whose range is determined by that following after the word “without”. The scheme varies with the variable type to which “without” is applied purely as a certain kind of operator. The concatenations “without + expression” are, typically, equivalent to more prolix “without”-free collocations; thus “without” is a suitable device for text comprehension.
5

LOGIKA VERZUS JAZYKOVEDA O VETNÝCH SPOJKÁCH

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Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2015
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vol. 22
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issue 3
395 – 424
EN
The author proposes bridging disparate explications of sentential connectives (operators). Logicians take sentential operators to denote truth functions and distinguish 16 such binary operators. On the other hand, linguists recognize much more sentential operators and even for the same truth function, distinguish several connectives with different properties. For example, the conjunction “and” can in some uses have an adversative or conditional or restrictive feature, and sometimes has a temporal or causal meaning. The author favours logic-semantic tools over pragmatic ones and proposes distinguishing operators as truth-functions from complex constructions of truth-functions. The same truth function can be constructed in different ways, which enables one to explain the different properties of a single connective discussed by linguists. The author proposes two conditional connectives – namely one for the necessary conditional relations and another for the sufficient conditional relation – the negation and the logical conjunction as the basic operators. Using these simple connectives, he defines constructions of other sentential operators and demonstrates their various properties.
6
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Tichého dielo – zdroj ďalších výskumov

100%
Gahér F.
Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 6
849-868
EN
The author endeavours to show that three chosen problems – the problem of individuals, of anaphora and of logic of imperatives – lend themselves to be being treated by transparent intensional logic (TIL), which can act as a successful explanatory grounding. In the first part of the article, the development of discussion about individuals is described and it is stated that despite the thorough treatment of this problematic and the advancing of convincing explication of many problems, some parts of the question may not have yet been fully engaged with. By contrast, the “story” of anaphora is basically finished and demonstrates a very successful application of TIL to the problematic which Tichý himself rather neglected. In the final part, focusing on logical prescriptions, the author argues for the view that the full exploitation of Tichý’s system with regard to the analysis and explication of imperatives remains to be undertaken. The development of research by Tichý’s followers here described on the three problems, the actual state of their treatment and other perspectives all indicate the fertile and yet to be tapped potential of the system which Tichý originated.
7

INTERPRETÁCIA V PRÁVE II

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
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issue 10
789 – 799
EN
The article is a continuation of the author’s contribution Interpretation in Law I (Filozofia 2015/8) with the special attention paid to methods of interpretation in law: textualist, intentionalist, and teleological ones. It explains the cooperation of the law’s purpose and the method of idealizing generalization in defining the propositions relevant for teleological arguments. Particular, so called “logical methods” of interpreting law are included: the method a contrario, the method per analogiam, as well as two kinds of the a fortiori argument (argument with even stronger reason): a minori ad maius and a maiori ad minus.
8

PREČO LEN (NUTNÉ) PRAVDY AKO PREDPOKLADY DEDUKTÍVNYCH ÚSUDKOV?

63%
Gahér F., Bielik L.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
75 – 97
EN
The aim of the paper is to examine Tichý’s understanding of the term “assumption”. We show that Tichý distinguishes two approaches to inference: the one-dimensional view that treats inferences as a sequences of logical rules or axioms as well as hypotheses and their logical consequences; and the two-dimensional view specifying inference as a derivation of one entailment from (the set of) another entailment(s). It is claimed that Tichý is right in his critique of Meinong’s concept of assumption as ‘assertion without conviction’. Nevertheless, Tichý – in addition to his logical concept of assumption – uses, though unreflectively, also the epistemic concept of assumption. Henceforth, we claim that accepting Tichý’s rejection of the epistemic hypothetical assumptions we couldn’t use logic as an instrument for empirical knowledge enhancement. We believe, to the contrary, that the epistemic assumptions may become a basis for derivations and knowledge enhancement, even though they do not represent necessary truths.
9

VYUŽITIE POJMU ZHODA V HYPERINTENZIONÁLNEJ DEDUKCII

63%
Bielik L., Gahér F.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
98 – 111
EN
The paper deals with the usefulness of Pavel Tichý’s concept of match between two (or more) constructions for the deduction and inference considerations. Tichý’s preference of the two-dimensional view on inference instead of the one-dimensional view is criticized. The reasons for the implementation of the match concept are elucidated. The logical expressiveness of the match concept is demonstrated through its implementation to the Natural Deduction System explicated in the hyper-intensional framework of Transparent Intensional Logic.
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