Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 6

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Sejm control of secret service and its limitations resulting from laws related to jurisdiction. An outline of the problem against normative conditioning

100%
Bożek M.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
|
2013
|
vol. 20
EN
The activity of secret service, because of its importance for the basic public interests and a high level of secrecy in operational actions, must be under constant surveillance of political authorities.Therefore, a parliamentary control of secret service is a profound element of systemic solutions. It is one of the standards of modern democratic states, especially the states based on a parliamentary system of ruling. The parliamentary control of secret service is an example of exercising control over the Council of Ministers and governmental institutions. Each act on a particular secret service states that the activity of their chiefs is under control of the Sejm. But none of these acts says what kind of control it is supposed to be. They do not define the scope of powers to control entitled to the Commission on Secret Service, either. As a result of such a legal loophole its effectiveness is questionable. Especially, imprecise legal regulations on access to secret information raise concern. This article presents a proposal for legal solutions, which may, in the author’s opinion, bring positive changes in actual state of affairs.
PL
Artykuł nie zawiera abstraktu w języku polskim
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Fighting crimes as the statutory task of Internal Security Office. Present state and the de lege ferenda demands

100%
Bożek M.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
|
2015
|
vol. 24
|
issue 1
EN
Special services to fight crimes conduct operational-detecting activities. However, none of legal acts states a complete list of operational powers of secret services. In connection with the above, the officers often take operational actions which are not regulated by legal provisions. These are activities taking the shape of measures, methods or forms, which are not regulated in acts but in classified orders issued by the chiefs of particular secret services.In that situation the list of operational powers is open, which may cause some significant problems and rise constitutional concerns at a stage of application of the provisions of law. The problem is that the State is allowed to restrict freedom and human rights only under an act. Under no circumstances such a basis can be secret orders issued by the chiefs of secret services. The change of the actual state of affairs is possible by passing of an act governing operational-detecting activities in comprehensive way.The purpose of this article is to bring closer problems which may face both the officers performing operational activities and state authorities determining legitimacy of these activities. Another aim is an attempt to identify the nature of statutory operational powers (operational tap, controlled transaction and supervised shipment) in such a manner as to raise concerns as minimal as possible.
PL
W świetle ustawy o ABW oraz AW zwalczanie przez Agencję przestępczości polega na rozpoznawaniu, zapobieganiu i wykrywaniu przestępstw oraz ściganiu ich sprawców. O tym, które z przestępstw są (a raczej powinny być) przedmiotem zainteresowania Agencji, decydują w pierwszej kolejności przepisy ustawy z dnia 24 maja 2002 r. o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu. W akcie tym do przestępstw tego rodzaju zalicza się kilka kategorii czynów zabronionych, m.in. przestępstwa godzące w bezpieczeństwo państwa oraz podstawy ekonomiczne państwa. W ustawie nie wyjaśnia się przy tym, o jakie dokładnie przestępstwa stypizowane i penalizowane w przepisach karnych chodzi. Innymi słowy, w ustawie brakuje stosownych odesłań do konkretnych przepisów karnych, w których ustawodawca opisuje dane typy czynów zabronionych, a które można by traktować w kategoriach przestępstw godzących w bezpieczeństwo państwa lub podstawy ekonomiczne państwa.W tej sytuacji katalog takich przestępstw – których zwalczanie należy do zadań ustawowych Agencji – jest katalogiem bliżej nieokreślonym (otwartym). Co za tym idzie, interpretacja przepisów ustawy o Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego oraz Agencji Wywiadu – w kontekście ustalenia normatywnego znaczenia zadania zwalczania przez ABW przestępstw – stanowi istotny problem badawczy. W niniejszym artykule autor przybliża problemy interpretacyjne, z jakimi mogą zetknąć się przedstawiciele zarówno doktryny, jak i praktyki. Celem artykułu jest również próba ustalenia znaczenia pojęciowego wskazanych powyżej nieostrych terminów w taki sposób, aby budziły one jak najmniejsze wątpliwości interpretacyjne.
3
Content available remote

Konstytucyjne podstawy partycypacji społecznej i formy jej realizacji w samorządzie terytorialnym

100%
Bożek M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2012
|
issue 5(112)
89-112
EN
The article provides a review of constitutional grounds and forms of local democracy in Poland. The author points out the impact of the constitutional principles upon the shape of legislation concerning public participation in local decision-making. The most important role in this field is played by the principle of democratic state ruled by law (Article 2), the principle of supreme power of the nation and of representation (Article 4), the principle of subsidiarity (preamble of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 16), the principle of decentralization of public power (Article 15), the principle of local governance (Article 16) and the principle of unitary state (Article 3). The author gives particular importance to the principle of participatory local governance (Article 16 para. 2 of the Constitution). He also claims that one could (and should) argue that local government participation in the exercise of public power is a precondition for the fulfilment of the democratic nature of the state. You only need to look at the constitutional provisions as a mechanism for the functioning of local democracy. The mechanism by which the residents of communes, counties and provinces have an equal right to participate in the management of public affairs, both through the election of local self-government bodies, and through direct decision-making (public participation). In the author’s view, this however requires a departure from the perception of local governance just as the effect of the administration building on the principle of decentralisation. In that area the author pointed out significant shortcomings that can be found on the basis of ordinary legislation (local enactments) and statutes of local government entities. It is particularly disappointing that the parliament, which is responsible for specification of constitutional norms, confines itself only to defining local governance as local democracy. But as concerns the activity of local government "lawmakers”, it is possible to discern a trend which can be described as "sceptical caution”. Local authorities are sensitive about the scope of their powers and, therefore, they are not willing to share them with citizens. According to the author, this negative trend can only be changed by the activity of the parliament (the Sejm and Senate) by way of "top-down” amendments of local enactments.
4
Content available remote

Status prawnoustrojowy Szefa Agencji Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego. Zarys problemu na tle rozwiązań konstytucyjnych i ustawowych

100%
Bożek M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2014
|
issue 3(122)
77-106
XX
The main objective of this article is to systematize the knowledge of the place occupied, and the role played, in the structure of government administration by the head of the Internal Security Agency. The author examines legal solutions allowing to characterize the legal status of the head of the Internal Security Agency as a body performing tasks arising from the functions of the State and as the entity in charge of a part of government administration capable to perform these tasks. According to the author, this objective requires presentation of the constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the position of Head of the Internal Security Agency and characterization of powers which he/she may use in order to implement his/her tasks. The article provides a survey of the constitutional solutions that determine the status of the Head of the Internal Security Agency as central government administration body. In this context, the author shows the relations between the Head of the Internal Security Agency and the Prime Minister, to whom he/she is subordinate and who oversees the activities of the Internal Security Agency. He also provides an analysis of the principles of organization and management of the substantive work of the Agency. From this analysis it clearly follows that the Head of the Agency has to play at least some of the key roles in the “governmental” system of the State security. On the one hand, it accounts for an important aspect of national security, which is the “internal security” and “protection of the constitutional order”. On the other hand, the head of the Internal Security Agency has the authority to initiate certain specifi c activities of the Agency in fulfi llment of its tasks. His/her scope of competences include also assessment of performance of the Agency’s functionaries in the context of their offi cial operations. Moreover, he/she is responsible for implementation of important duties in rendering information to constitutional organs of the executive and to parliament.
5
Content available remote

Kontrola parlamentarna służb specjalnych w Polsce

100%
Bożek M.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2012
|
issue 1(108)
9-23
EN
The exercise by the intelligence and security services of their role in protecting the fundamental interests of the State, while maintaining a high degree of confidentiality of their operational activities, requires continuous scrutiny from the political authorities, in particular from parliament performing its representative and oversight functions. This is the starting point of all deliberations on the relationship between parliament and the secret services, both in Poland and all over the so-called democratic world. Another question is the state’s system of government. Parliamentary scrutiny of the government is an immutable feature of the parliamentary system of government. If we count special services among the government administration bodies, which is the most practicable solution (also in Poland), the parliament must have a legally guaranteed opportunity to examine and evaluate their activities. Therefore, parliamentary scrutiny of special services is a consequence of the control exercised by parliament over the government and its subordinate agencies. The extent of practical application of these general principles is determined by way of ordinary statutes. In Poland, this matter is regulated by legislative acts governing the functioning of secret services (the so-called competence acts). The basic purpose of this article is to provide an analysis of these acts. From this analysis a general thesis is derived that, under the existing legal order, proper parliamentary scrutiny of secret services in Poland is not feasible. This is because the provisions of the competence acts prevent parliament from gaining access to classified information showing the activity of secret services. Instead of repeating in the competence acts the idea of subjecting the secret services to parliamentary (Sejm) scrutiny, it is much more important to define precisely the relationship between the Sejm Special Services Committee and the heads of those services. Both the catalogue of the obligations of the heads of the agencies to the Committee, and the issue of accessibility of information gathered by secret services should be included, as soon as possible, in the competence acts. A major, but not the only, problem – identified after examining the competence acts – is the lack of sufficient knowledge about the classified aspects of the activity of secret services. Without this knowledge, the Committee and, thus, Parliament, cannot carry out its scrutiny function. The illusory nature of parliamentary scrutiny is also the result of the fact that heads of services pretend to be politically neutral and conceal their party affiliation, but their real position within the ruling hierarchy is similar to that of members of government. It is not without reason that, even on ceremonial occasions or in official letters they are called ‘ministers’. However, in no way this translates into normative solutions concerning their position under constitutional law. Still the only attempt at changing this situation - taken in 2002 - failed. At that time, the Act on the Internal Security Agency (ABW) and the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW), was found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal, to the extent that the heads of the secret services were granted the rank of secretaries of state, (Tribunal judgment of 20 April 2004, Reference No. K 45/02). There was lack of system thinking. However, instead of appointing a new category of secretaries of state, it was enough to enter the positions of heads of ABW and AW into the directory of government positions (in Article 38 of the Act on the Council of Ministers). This proposal is worthy of consideration, and there is one important reason for this. It provides a systemic solution of the problem of political neutrality and party affiliation of heads of these services, at the same time making it possible for Parliament to exercise actual assessment of the activity of secret services and to adjust their activity with the use of a vote of no confidence.
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Operational Control pursuant to the Act on State Protection Service

63%
Walczuk K., Bożek M.
Cybersecurity and Law
|
2022
|
vol. 8
|
issue 2
123-145
EN
Operational control is one of the most important powers of the state police services, including, since 2018, the State Protection Service (Służba Ochrony Państwa – SOP). The analysis of the title issue presented in the article leads to the conclusion that the shape of the operational control, which is a novum in the security service, which is the SOP, does not differ from the solutions used in regulating the operational powers of other Polish services, both in terms of the principles and procedure of applying control operational, and the (technical) ways of using this power in practice.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.