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1

INDEXICKÉ VÝRAZY A KONTEXTOVÁ CITLIVOSŤ

100%
Zouhar M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 1
206 – 222
EN
According to H. Cappelen and E. Lepore, all context-sensitive expressions belong to the so-called Basic Set comprising indexicals and contextuals. This claim is supposed to be justified by certain tests. The paper deals with one of them, namely the test based on inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports. It is claimed that, contrary to appearances, it is not capable to qualify all indexical expressions as context-sensitive. A new version of the test proposed in the present paper removes this drawback. It leads to the consequence, however, that there are context-sensitive expressions that do not belong to the original Basic Set.
2

SÉMANTICKY RELEVANTNÉ PRAGMATICKÉ PROCESY (1): MINIMÁLNY INDEXIKALIZMUS A SATURÁCIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 3
181 – 193
EN
This is the first part of the paper in which it is claimed that there is exactly one semantically relevant pragmatic process, namely saturation. Saturation ascribes content to an expression (or another suitable syntactic unit) with respect to the context of its use. Saturation is usually discerned from so-called free enrichment which is supposed to be another semantically relevant pragmatic process. However, given its explanatory purposes, it is demonstrated that free enrichment is superfluous; for everything explained in terms of free enrichment can be explained fully in terms of saturation. Minimal indexicalism is a theory design to do so.
3

RELATIVISM ABOUT TRUTH AND PERSPECTIVE-NEUTRAL PROPOSITION

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 10
849 – 858
EN
According to relativism about truth, there are certain kinds of sentences such that the propositions expressed by their utterances cannot be correctly determined as true or false relative to possible worlds only. In particular, the truth values of propositions about taste (i.e., those expressed by the utterances of sentences about taste) are supposed to be determined relative to possible world and perspective couples. What is important is that the proposition expressed involves no reference to perspective; as a result, the perspective that is to be used in the truth value assignment is not identified by the proposition expressed. Notwithstanding its considerable appeal in various respects, relativism about truth faces certain fundamental problems raised in this paper. It is claimed, firstly, that relativism about truth can hardly comply with our understanding of the predicates of taste in a satisfactory manner. Secondly, relativism about truth does not explain how it is possible that the propositions expressed, despite involving no reference to perspective whatsoever, are to be evaluated as true or false relative to some perspective or other. Thirdly, it is left unexplained how the right kind of perspective is to be selected provided there is no reference to perspective in the proposition expressed.
4

PRAVDIVOSTNÝ RELATIVIZMUS A BEZCHYBNÉ NEZHODY

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
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vol. 68
|
issue 7
549 – 561
EN
The paper deals with the so-called faultless disagreement which arises when two speakers believe in contradictory propositions, though neither of them makes any fault. This phenomenon is said to arise with respect to propositions about taste and similar propositions. The faultless disagreement is often used to support various versions of truth-conditional relativism. The main aim of the paper is to argue that what appears to be a faultless disagreement is by no means one. For an air of disagreement between speakers disappears once we (i) make it clear what notion of contradiction is invoked and (ii) explicitly adopt a relativistic notion of truth that is at most implicitly assumed in the relevant literature.
5

RIGIDNÁ DESIGNÁCIA A STABILNOSŤ VZŤAHU POMENOVANIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
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issue 10
817 - 830
EN
Proper names are standardly claimed to be rigid designators i.e. to refer to the same objects with respect to all possible worlds. Apparently, this view is incompatible with the assumption that statements such as “The object o need not be named α” or “The object o might be named β” (where it is true that α is the proper name of o) are true. The reason is that the naming relation is merely contingent. As a result, one should make room for the possible worlds with respect to which the naming relation does not hold. The aim of the present paper is to show that this line of argument fails because it ignores certain vital distinctions making the above mentioned statements ambiguous. The problem is eliminated once linguistic expressions are strictly distinguished from semi-expressions and the real world is distinguished from the actual world (and other possible worlds).
6

SÉMANTICKY RELEVANTNÉ PRAGMATICKÉ PROCESY (2): TESTY A METODOLOGICKÉ ASPEKTY

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 4
296 – 308
EN
This is the second part of the paper in which it is claimed that there is exactly one semantically relevant pragmatic process, namely saturation. The author analyses Recanati’s tests for free enrichment as well as Stanley’s test for saturation. It is claimed that all these tests lead to unacceptable generalizations. On the other hand, it is also claimed that minimal indexicalism avoids such generalizations because it requires a more flexible theory of language. Finally, the author outlines some methodological reasons preferring minimal indexicalism to another explanation which embraces free enrichment.
7

EPISTEMICKÝ KONTEXTUALIZMUS A JEHO MOTIVÁCIA

100%
Zouhar M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 2
171 – 186
EN
According to Keith DeRose, the best argument for epistemic contextualism is supplied by communication intuitions ordinary speakers have when evaluating utterances of sentences of the form “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p”. It is claimed that utterances of “S knows that p” and “S does not know that p” can both be true with respect to the same S and p because the speakers of the utterances employ different epistemic standards. The aim of the paper is to show that one can accept this claim as true while denying epistemic contextualism. A handful of possible contenders to epistemic contextualism are given. Thus, the alleged best argument for contextualism has to be supplemented by other arguments to show that epistemic contextualism should be given preference to the other approaches.
8

NEARTIKULOVANÉ ZLOŽKY SÉMANTICKÉHO OBSAHU A SYNTAKTICKÁ ELIPSA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 8
725 – 745
EN
The paper addresses the problem which consists in that the semantic content of an utterance is often much richer than the content fixed by the semantic conventions and compositionality. The semantic content of an utterance is, therefore, supposed to involve so-called inarticulate constituents, over and above those articulated at the linguistic level. It is often claimed that this problem undermines traditional conceptions of semantics. The paper shows that every inarticulate constituent has to be determined at the syntactic level. Consequently, there are no inarticulate constituents tout courts. This claim is resulting from a careful specification of the notions used to show that there are inarticulate constituents (the notion of sentence, the notion of expression, the notion of using as opposed to that of saying, etc.). Given these specifications, it is possible to develop a theory of syntactic ellipsis as a viable solution to the above mentioned problem.
9

PREDIKÁTY VKUSU A ICH SÉMANTIKA

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
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vol. 67
|
issue 7
518 – 529
EN
The paper deals with the so-called predicates of taste. There seems to be the following conflict concerning such predicates: Let “…P…” be a sentence involving a predicate of taste, P. It may happen that one speaker, A, utters “…P…” and another one, B, utters “It is not the case that …P…” without contradicting each other. On the other hand, it may also happen that if A utters “…P…” and B utters “It is not the case that …P…” they do contradict each other. The purported conflict is solved within a theory called minimal indexicalism. It is claimed that the conflict disappears when we admit that, in the first scenario, A and B, though using the same words, express different propositions and that, in the second scenario, A and B adopt different criteria for evaluating the same proposition.
10

INDEXIKALIZMUS, SÉMANTICKÝ MINIMALIZMUS A PRAVDIVOSTNÝ OBSAH

100%
Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
|
vol. 67
|
issue 9
705 – 717
EN
It is sometimes claimed that the semantic (i.e., truth-conditional) content of an utterance consists of the semantic contents of its constituting expressions and their mode of composition, i.e., all constituents of the semantic content correspond to some linguistic item in the sentence uttered or other. This is claimed in particular by the proponents of the so-called semantic minimalism. The paper aims to show that indexicalism, which is often supposed to be a rival to semantic minimalism, is in fact a version of it. Indexicalism is willing to recognize, over and above explicit linguistic items, also the implicit ones. It is argued in the paper that semantic minimalism is capable to accommodate this idea without much ado.
11

MODEL METÓDY (4): APLIKÁCIA A KLASIFIKÁCIA

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 9
737 – 751
EN
The present article is the final part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. Building on the results of the previous part in which the model has been proposed, we start with two detailed case studies that are used to illustrate it. In particular, we deal with the method of explication and the sampling method. Next, we introduce the notion of a variant of method and that of the essential core of method. Since our model is extensional, it leads to certain drawbacks that are typical of all extensional models. These notions are used to cope with some of those shortcomings. Finally, certain kinds of method are distinguished.
12

MODEL METÓDY (1): METÓDA A PROBLÉM

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 2
105 – 118
EN
The present article is the first part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. The article both gives an informal presentation of the model and introduces conceptual tools required for a more rigorous presentation. To begin with, the character of goals and their connection to method is elucidated. Secondly, we describe instructions and some of their relations such as that of independence or (immediate) succession. Finally, since methods are often used in problem solving activities, we show what problems are and introduce certain related notions. Broadly speaking, scientific methods are conceived of as means of transforming cognitive problems into their solutions.
13

MODEL METÓDY (3): INŠTRUKCIA A METÓDA

51%
Bielik L., Kosterec M., Zouhar M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2014
|
vol. 69
|
issue 8
637 – 652
EN
The present article is the third part of a longer paper in which we outline a model of (scientific) method as a system of instructions aimed at a certain kind of (cognitively interesting) goal. Building on the results of the previous part concerning the notions of instruction and its occurrence, the present article specifies the ways of chaining the occurrences. The occurrences of instructions constitute linear chains if involving only the occurrences of categorical or simple hypothetical instructions; a chain is nonlinear provided there is at least one complex hypothetical instruction in it. Every chain of occurrences can be represented as a sequence of postulate and derivate transitions. The method is represented as an oriented graph consisting of the chains of occurrences of instructions. We specify various formal and informal constraints that are to be met by a graph if it is to be taken as a representation of a method. Finally, we describe a link between the model of method proposed in this part and our intuitive specification of method as a kind of problem solving activity given in the first part of our paper.
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