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Bernard Suits, Konik Polny. Gry, życie i utopia.

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Gomułka J.
ARGUMENT: Biannual Philosophical Journal
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2017
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vol. 7
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issue 2
387-391
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Mathematics in the Tractatus. Formal Series, the Status of Equations, and the Metaphysical Subject

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Gomułka J.
Filozofia Nauki
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2016
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vol. 24
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issue 2
77-93
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Wittgensteinian Philosophy of Religion as A Kind of Apophatic Theology

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Gomułka J.
Studia Religiologica
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2012
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vol. 45
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issue 3
165–172
EN
In my article I present a conceptual model of classification of philosophical and theological conceptions of religion within Western philosophy and the Christian religious tradition. The model has four independent dimensions: the factual, the metaphysical, the ethical and the apophatic. The first and the second dimensions are cognitive, while the third and the fourth are non-cognitive. The fourth dimension should not be identified with the old tradition of apophatic theology because, according to the model, the latter is a mixture of two (or even more) dimensions. The second part of my paper is devoted to the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion developed by the members of the so-called Swansea School. My thesis is that, despite of their self-characterisation as philosophers, they present an extreme version of apophatic theology because their view on religion is, in the light of my conceptual model, one-dimensional.
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Meaning before Subjectivity: The Primäre Sprache of the Tractatus

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Gomułka J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2019
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vol. 47
79-102
EN
I defend an interpretation of the Tractatus based on the following three theses: 1) The Wittgenstein’s work offers a double-layered vision of language, similar to the vision developed during his brief phenomenological period. 2) The so-called Tractarian ontology is actually a purely formal construction, entailed by the structure of what we shall refer to as the inner layer of language. 3) It should be recognized that the metaphysical residuum within the early Wittgenstein’s thought is a certain minimal form of transcendentalism, according to which language – or strictly speaking its ore – performs the function of the transcendental subject for itself. A crucial element of my position is the conclusion that, according to the Tractarian conception of language, the meaning of propositions is not only independent of empirical subjects, but also the condition of their possibility. This amounts to a resolute adaptation of Frege’s principled anti-psychologism on Wittgenstein’s part.
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Wittgenstein i zagadka Anzelma

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Gomułka J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2013
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issue nr 23
71 - 98
EN
The paper is devoted to the problem of the two paradoxes: the paradox of absolute value in Wittgenstein’s Lecture on Ethics and the paradox of Anselm’s Name of God from the Proslogion. I try to present semantic determinants of the paradoxes as well as similarities of their structures. However, the main part of the article focuses on the solution of Anselm’s paradox given by Cora Diamond, the prominent Wittgensteinian scholar in her paper Riddles and Anselm’s Riddle. Diamond develops extensive comparison of the concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived and a series of peculiar riddles – she calls the Anselm’s concept the great riddle, since, as in other riddles presented, we cannot deal with it in a usual way. The author shows that what enables us to resolve, say, the riddle of Sphinx, is our obtaining a new way of understanding the words which compose the riddle itself, for the old way will not lead us to the proper answer. However, when it comes to the great riddle we know that we cannot obtain any way of understanding which will enable us to conceive it. This does not mean that the riddle cannot make any sense for us. We can believe that there is a solution (in fact, we have the solution – it has been given to us in the Revelation – but we cannot understand it) so we can treat the great riddle as an euqation which we lack proof but we know there is one. As Diamond calls it, we have the promissory meaning of the riddle. In my opinion the idea of the promissory meaning is an interesting solution of Anselm’s paradox, but I notice that the idea itself is conditioned by religious faith or by something I call the empathic atheism (in short: an attitude which lets atheists take the believers’ point of view).
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Podmiot jako wewnętrzny biegun symbolizmu. Antymentalistyczna wykładnia "Traktatu logiczno-filozoficznego"

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Gomułka J.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
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2016
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vol. 35
69-86
EN
The purpose of this paper is to offer a radical anti-mentalistic interpretation of Wittgensteinʼs Tractatus. Contrary to mentalistic approaches postulating that thetask of projection must be performed by a subject (transcendental or psychological), the author claims – after Rhees, Diamond and McGinn – that the projection itselfis an intrinsic relation within the symbol. The main point of the paper is the thesis that the transcendenal subjectivity – or, as Wittgenstein calls it, the metaphysical subject – is the inner pole of the symbol, and since the meaning of the symbol isitʼs other inner pole (as anti-realist interpretations point out), the whole intentionalrelation of symbolizing is intrinsic to the symbolism.
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Metafizyka Karola Rarnowskiego – rozumienie poszukujące wiary I nadziei

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Gomułka J.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2013
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vol. 41
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issue 3
43-53
EN
The article concerns the philosophy of Karol Tarnowski. I depict his perspective as metaphysical in its goals but phenomenological and hermeneutical in its starting point and method. Tarnowski begins with an experience called “eschatological awareness”, particularly vivid in recent times, marked by a feeling of uncertainty about the sense of life. It includes a sense of the fundamental inadequacy of the factual world that is grounded in a much less obvious metaphysical longing. Tarnowski's analyses of metaphysical longing are deeply rooted in both Plato and Levinas. However, his thought is closer to the views of the former, since he does not accept the latter's claim that the longing is structurally unsatisfiable. He believes that longing without any hope of satisfaction is absurd, desperate, and irrational. The only way to avoid despair is to maintain hope and faith in God as the source of being and the real and attainable aim of our metaphysical longing. There is, however, no rational necessity of choosing this particular hermeneutics of our existential situation, so the metaphysics of (satisfiable) longing remains conditioned by faith and hope.
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Okres fenomenologiczny w myśli Ludwiga Wittgensteina

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Gomułka J.
Semina Scientiarum
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2016
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vol. 15
9
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Wittgenstein a problem reguł

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Gomułka J., Sajdek Z.
Racjonalia. Z punktu widzenia humanistyki
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2015
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vol. 5
PL
The problem of rules and the private language argument are among the most renowned and disputable themes of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. Presumably today’s best known interpretation of the themes was presented in Saul Kripke’s famous and often commented book Wittgenstein on Rules and the Private Language, published in 1982. The interpretation, nicknamed “Kripkenstein”, became the target of numerous attacks of authors convinced that it did justice neither to Wittgenstein nor to the real way our language worked.This article begins with the examination of Wittgenstein’s problem of identification of action which may be counted as justified by the rule, that is, the problem of criteria of correctness. This is Kripke’s starting point in his binding the problem of rules with the private language argument. He believes that Wittgenstein did not question the mere possibility of such a language but the possibility of any language at all. Further, we survey the rejected solutions to the problem of criteria: the mentalistic and the dispositional. This leads us toKripke’s sceptical solution: there are no reasons of actions which occur before these actions. There are certain trained ways of doing things which “tell” us what to do in typical situations but they are not criteria of correctness. Such criteria may only be public and therefore social.In conclusion it’s argued that Kripkenstein’s view is really Wittgenstein’s view: contrary to the popular opinion Kripke did not put forward a new solution, he just gave us a different way of presenting it.
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Konferencja: "Chrześcijaństwo w popkulturze", Wrocław, 10–12 grudnia 2015

63%
Sajdek Z., Gomułka J.
Racjonalia. Z punktu widzenia humanistyki
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2015
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vol. 5
11
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Człowiek jako wytwór siebie samego. Lem, transhumanizm i dwie koncepcje autentyczności

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Gomułka J., Klimas M., Palm J.
Semina Scientiarum
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2018
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vol. 17
EN
Stanisław Lem, a philosopher and futurologist, in his many works devoted much attention to the condition of human and the relation between human and technology. He coined the term ‘autoevolution’ in the course of forecasting unlimited technological augmentation of human abilities. Nowadays, the term may be associated with the conceptions presented by transhumanism, a 20th-century-born philosophical movement which advocates radical transformation of Homo sapiens by means of the achievements of scientific and technological progress. Lem’s attitude towards such a transformation of human is complicated yet ultimately critical due to the fact that it poses a threat to human culture as such. The phenomenon of autoevolution undermines existing values and raises a question of authenticity of a future posthuman. We examine dependence between technology and culture, present Lem’s conception of autoevolution and his philosophy of culture, then we sketch a post-metaphysical dispute about authenticity, and finally show that Lem’s thought ­belongs to one of the arguing sides.
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