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EN
The paper contains critical commentary on the Supreme Court decision of 30 March 2016 (I KZP 23/15). The author proves that determining the generic identity of crimes with the method in concreto, i.e. through comparing legal interests violated or endangered as a result of concrete offensive deeds, should take place in certain cases, where we have to do with the crimes protecting two or more legal interests in an alternative or mixed way. In the remaining situations, the assessment of the objective similarity of crimes should be performed in abstracto, i.e. through comparing legal interests protected in particular types of crimes. Results of this method, important for the generic identity of crimes, will be identical with the method in concreto, but the former is more conducive to the judgment of the case without undue delay.
PL
W glosie krytycznej wobec postanowienia SN z dnia 30 marca 2016 r. (I KZP 23/15) wykazano, że ustalanie tożsamości rodzajowej przestępstw metodą in concreto, a więc przez porównanie dóbr prawnych, które zostały naruszone lub zagrożone w wyniku konkretnych czynów przestępnych, powinno mieć miejsce w pewnych wypadkach, gdy mamy do czynienia z przestępstwami chroniącymi dwa lub więcej dobra prawne w sposób alternatywny lub mieszany. W pozostałych sytuacjach oceny tożsamości rodzajowej przestępstw należy dokonywać in abstracto, czyli przez porównanie dóbr prawnych chronionych w danych typach przestępstw. Rezultaty tej metody, istotne dla badania tożsamości rodzajowej przestępstw, będą bowiem identyczne, jak metody in concreto, jednakże ta pierwsza bardziej sprzyja rozpoznaniu sprawy bez zbędnej zwłoki.
EN
The paper contains critical commentary on the Constitutional Tribunal decision of 28 January 2020 (K 22/16). The author proves that Article 108 § 2 of the Penal Code of 1969 is still in force. Therefore, the compliance of this article with the Polish Constitution should be examined by the Constitutional Tribunal.
PL
W tekście zawarto krytyczny komentarz do postanowienia Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z dnia 28 stycznia 2020 r. (K 22/16). Autor wykazuje, że art. 108 § 2 Kodeksu karnego z 1969 r. nadal obowiązuje i w związku z tym jego konstytucyjność powinna zostać poddana merytorycznej kontroli Trybunału Konstytucyjnego.
PL
The Act of 11 March 2016 amending the Code of Criminal Procedure and some other acts (Official Journal of Laws, item 437 as amended) introduced to the system of law Article 168b of the Code of Criminal Procedure and changed Article 237a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These rules regulate the institution of the so-called ex post facto consent. The following paper analyzes Article 168b and Article 237a of the Code of Criminal Procedure in the light of standards stemming from the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. This analysis first of all revealed that there are serious doubts as to the compatibility of Article 168b and Article 237a of the Code of Criminal Procedure with Article 47, Article 49, Article 51 (2) in conjunction with Article 31 (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
EN
The article is devoted to a specific category of offenders i.e. juveniles. Firstly, the legal definition of the juvenile, provided under Art. 115 § 10 of the Criminal Code, is analyzed, making a distinction between the notion of the juvenile and the notion of the minor. Then the grounds for the special treatment of juvenile offenders are examined. A special attention is paid to the presumption of lesser degree of juvenile’s guilt and their susceptibility to be affected, which constitutes a good prospect for their education (reformation, reclamation). Finally, the criteria on the basis of which it is established whether an offender is a juvenile offender or not, are analyzed. A special attention is given to the criterion which states that a juvenile is an offender who has not reached the age of 24 years at the time of the trial in the first instance.
EN
The purpose of this study is to present empirical research on judicial practice in the field of applying a criminal measure, which is to make a judgment public. This presentation is limited to criminal law in the strict sense. This is due to the fact that in the judgments collected for examination, this criminal measure was imposed only for common crimes. The analysis covered 150 final and invalid judgments of first instance courts (district and regional courts), in which the decision was made public. These judgments were obtained from the Judicial Portal of Common Courts operated by the Ministry of Justice.
PL
Niniejsze opracowanie ma na celu zaprezentowanie badań empirycznych, przeprowadzonych nad sądową praktyką orzeczniczą w zakresie stosowania środka karnego, jakim jest podanie wyroku do publicznej wiadomości. Przy czym prezentacja ta ograniczona jest do prawa karnego sensu stricto. Wynika to z tego, że w zgromadzonych do badań wyrokach wymierzano ów środek karny tylko za przestępstwa powszechne. Analizą objęto 150 prawomocnych i nieprawomocnych wyroków sądów pierwszej instancji (sądów rejonowych i sądów okręgowych), w których orzeczono podanie wyroku do publicznej wiadomości.Wyroki te pozyskano z prowadzonego przez Ministerstwo Sprawiedliwości Portalu Orzeczeń Sądów Powszechnych.
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Amnestia i jej konstytucyjne uwarunkowania

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The article establishes the meaning of the concept of amnesty and provides characteristics of the act of amnesty. The author proves that, despite the fact that the Constitution lacks the provision relating explicitly to the possibility of adoption of the amnesty law by the parliament. Article 10 in conjunction with Article 173 and Article 175 para. 1 of the Constitution are no obstacle in this respect. He also points to, inter alia, the doubts as to whether amnesty may be extended to include disciplinary penalties, and demonstrates the inadmissibility of the inclusion in the amnesty law of regulation involving the conversion of legally imposed penalties on another, more lenient, punishment. Moreover, the author claims that the interest of the victim is not — in principle — an obstacle to grant amnesty. However, amnesty should not interfere in civil-law interests of the victim that are included in the fi nal judgment.
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