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Indywidualne uzgadnianie właściwości towaru w przypadku sprzedaży konsumenckiej

100%
Koszowski M.
Przegląd Prawa i Administracji
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2013
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vol. 92
87 - 106
EN
The Polish Consumer Sale Act distinguishes instances in which arrangements between parties as to the quality of aconsumer good are made from the instances in which such arrangements do not occur. Depending on each of these two situations, there are envisaged different presumptions of the conformity of a good with the contract. This division can be, however, very misleading insofar as it suggests that, in the instances in which individual agreements on the quality of a good occur, the presumption provided for the instances in which such agreements are not present does not work. Conversely, if they are only at stake, the premises of that presumption must always be fulfilled so that one can presume that a given good conforms to the contract. The only exception is here the actual or presumed knowledge of the non-conformity of a given good with the contract on the part of the buyer. According to the provisions of the Polish Consumer Sale Act, as a result of individual arrange-ments, we presume the state of the conformity with the contract if a good delivered to the buyer: a) complies with thedescription of this good given by the seller, b) posseses the qualities of samples or models of this good which have been shown to the buyer, and c) fits for any particular purpose about which the consumer has notified the seller within the act of concluding acontract upon which he/she has bought this good. Moreover, quality of consumer goods must meet standards on which parties have expressly agreed, especially by the adoption of special contractual clauses in that matter. Namely, except parties do decide otherwise, only sucha good can be deemed to be in conformity with the contract. The same remark concerns agreements made per facta concludentia, i.e. agree-ments that we assume to be reached due to indicative behaviors of the parties involved.
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Dwa modele wykładni prounijnej

100%
Koszowski M.
Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs
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2012
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issue 3
95-110
EN
The article addresses the issue of the interpretation of national law in conformity with the law of the European Union. Specifically, the aim of the article is to elucidate how, in specific instances, this type of interpretation proceeds, i.e. to reveal the mode according to which a national court and official should interpret national provisions in order to assure that they conform to the requirements of EU law. Thus, two theoretical models of conforming interpretation have been distinguished. The first, which is deemed to be typical of Polish scholars, is based on the concept of a final norm (a norm devoted to the facts of a pending case), or, actually, two norms: one stemming from EU law and the second from national laws. The former takes precedence over the latter, becoming the basis for a decision in the case sub judice, inasmuch as this does not lead to excessive interference of EU law in the national legal system. The second model has been proposed by the Author, who called it ‘the model of the harmonisation of contexts’ or of a ‘single sack’. Here, the construction of national laws in conformity with EU law is done without the participation of any norms, whether general or individual. A national court (official) takes into account factors which influence the application of the national law in specific instances and, at the same time, factors which influence the application of relevant provisions of EU laws – as it would happen in the ‘single sack’ – so far as they do not interfere in the national legal order too much. The first model, at least in theory, is able to provide the EU law with the maximum efficacy and unity. However, national courts and officials may find it difficult to use it in practice. The second model is far more convenient from the perspective of judicial application at the national level, but it does not guarantee full conformity of the law of the Member States with EU law, even in case when that conformity is possible in terms of the limits set for conforming interpretation.
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Rozumowanie per analogiam w prawie precedensowym: dwa ujęcia analogii

100%
Koszowski M.
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio G (Ius)
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2014
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vol. 61
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issue 2
EN
Apart for the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, the article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named “factual model” and the second “rational model”. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that the judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions) or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model in turn is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, which are the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs here some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of this model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to provide us with just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by person of a great legal knowledge and experience. Two other possible accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law, i.e. principle-based model and proportional model, have been rebutted. The reason is: a lack of analogical pattern of thinking involved and serious difficulties in its legal application respectively.
PL
W artykule nie zamieszczono abstraktu
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Why is Analogy in the Empirical Science and Everyday Life Different from Analogy in Law?

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Koszowski M.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
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2016
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vol. 25
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issue 2
EN
The article elucidates differences between analogy in law and the empirical science and everyday matters such as: a) the lack of possibility of verification of its conclusions on empirical grounds resulting in the necessity of its performing either heuristic and probative functions or rejecting both of them, b) being of a prescriptive nature, c) having an obligatory character, d) entailing rather no need for complex underling doctrines or theories, e) causing more serious practical consequences, f) having base points that are easily recognizable, g) serving as a means of extending authority, h) being a subject of training and education, i) receiving extraordinary attention among scholars, often combined with the real adoration – if not worship – on their part.The author is convinced that – by highlighting these differences – he will have demonstrated the uniqueness of legal analogy. However, simultaneously, he is far from contending that he knows how legal analogy really proceeds and how the judgment of similarity within it is precisely done. Instead, he assumes that if exact knowledge in these respects remains unattainable for human beings, it is all the better for legal philosophy and those who are devoted to it.
PL
W artykule zostały omówione różnice, jakie zachodzą pomiędzy rozumowaniem per analogiam w prawie oraz w naukach przyrodniczych i życiu codziennym. W efekcie w stosunku do analogii stosowanej w prawie zwrócono w nim uwagę na: a) brak możliwości empirycznej weryfikacji wniosków stawianych za jej pomocą, skutkujący bądź koniecznością zakceptowania pełnienia przez nią zarówno funkcji heurystycznej, jak i dowodowej, bądź odmówieniem jej możliwości pełnienia którejkolwiek z tych funkcji, b) względny brak potrzeby uzasadniania (wyjaśniania) takich wniosków za pomocą jakichś rozbudowanych teorii (doktryn), c) jej obligarotryjny (w sensie konieczności sięgania do niej) oraz normatywny (preskryptywny) charakter, d) poważniejsze konsekwencje, jakie wiążą się z korzystaniem z niej w praktyce, e) łatwiej identyfikowalną podstawę dla przeprowadzanych w jej zakresie porównań, f) służenie jako środek do rozciągania tego, co posiada „autorytet”, g) bycie przedmiotem profesjonalnego nauczania, h) szczególne zainteresowanie się nią ze strony ludzi nauki, połączone często z jej uwielbieniem, jeśli nie wręcz kultem.Autor przejawia nadzieję, iż przez wyszczególnienie wyżej wymienionych różnic wykazał jednocześnie unikalny charakter prawniczej analogii na tle analogii występującej w naukach empirycznych i życiu codziennym. W treści artykułu nie stawia on jednak tezy, iż wiadome jest, jak dokładnie przebiega rozumowanie z takiej analogii, tudzież w jaki sposób dochodzi do określania w jej ramach zaistnienia istotnego podobieństwa pomiędzy porównywanymi stanami (sprawami, sytuacjami). Niejako w zamian twierdzi on, iż jeśli pełna wiedza w tym zakresie pozostanie dla ludzi nieosiągalna, to tym lepiej dla filozofii prawa i tych, którzy oddają się jej uprawianiu.
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Analogical Reasoning in Precedential Law: the Rule, Competition, Seeking and Reasons for the Employment of Analogy

100%
Koszowski M.
Studia Iuridica Lublinensia
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2015
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vol. 24
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issue 4
EN
The article addresses some of the specific issues that concern reasoning by analogy in the context of precedential law. It specifically touches on such questions as the necessity of the mediation of a general rule (norm) in an analogical pattern of inference, ways of resolving conflicts between competing analogies, the process of searching for potential analogies as well as the reasons for applying judicial precedents in concrete instances by recourse to analogy. The latter is done against the background of the merits and demerits of the so-called rule-based model of judicial precedent and its core notion: ratio decidendi. All the aforementioned issues have been analysed from the perspective of two basic approaches to analogical reasoning in precedential law – i.e. the factual and rational model of legal analogy, which have been described in the previous article. The analyses take into account the stances and opinions of leading past and contemporary logicians, philosophers and legal theorists mainly, but not exclusively, from Anglo-Saxon countries. 
PL
W artykule zostały przedstawione bardziej szczegółowe – aniżeli same możliwe jego modele/ujęcia – zagadnienia, jakie wiążą się z rozumowaniem per analogiam w prawie precedensowym. Należą do nich w szczególności takie kwestie, jak: a) konieczność pośrednictwa we wnioskowaniu z podobieństwa generalno-abstrakcyjnej reguły (normy), b) zjawisko określane mianem „konkurencji” („współzawodnictwa”) analogii oraz c) propozycje dotyczące mierzenia siły (mocy) poszczególnych wniosków postawionych na podstawie rozumowania a simile. Ponadto został tu poruszony problem tego, w jaki sposób „poszukuje się” precedensów nadających się do zastosowania per analogiam w danym przypadku. Podjęta została również próba uzasadnienia, dlaczego prawo precedensowe warto stosować właśnie drogą analogii, a nie za pośrednictwem ogólnych (generalno-abstrakcyjnych) reguł występujących w tym prawie pod nazwą rationes decidendi – wraz z nakreśleniem wad i zalet każdej z tych dwóch opcji.
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Odpowiedzialność sprzedawcy za jakość towaru konsumpcyjnego według założeń i projektu ustawy o prawach konsumenta

100%
Koszowski M.
Kwartalnik Prawa Prywatnego
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2014
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vol. 23
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issue 1
159-180
EN
In this article, the Author criticizes the propositions of changes which are planned to be made in the Polish consumer sale law, demonstrating that almost all of these propositions are ill-founded or badly-designed. According to him, the reason is twofold. First, the proffered solutions do not fit the very reality in which consumer sale takes place in Poland (and not only here): especially the basic need to maintain positive relations among the consumers and sellers as well as between the sellers and their direct and indirect suppliers seems to be – by the drafters – utterly disregarded. Second, the propositions are very often based upon fallacious assumptions or the misunderstanding of working of a legal institution they have wanted to reform. The more significant concern, however, lies in the fact that full of defects though the planned changes are, almost none of these defects has been discerned and pointed out by the consulted organizations and state agencies whose mission is to take care of the consumers’ and entrepreneurs’ rights and interests. In consequence, one is tempted to ask who, if not such organizations and agencies, is to see to the needs of the market and its participants having been properly secured in the Polish consumer law.
7
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Why Legal Reasoning has to be Unique

100%
Koszowski M.
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
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2017
|
vol. 7
325-342
EN
This article addresses the issue of the uniqueness of legal reasoning and, specifically, the author advances the thesis that what makes legal reasoning different from the reasoning  employed in demonstrative and empirical sciences and matters of everyday life is not the actual form (scheme) of this reasoning but the legal milieu. Thus, he tries to demonstrate that some features of law – such as its normative and prescriptive nature, difficulties with the verification of its content on empirical grounds, its limitations stemming from the physical world and dependence on humans and their minds, as well as the ‘unspecialized’ character of law agents and the extraordinary role of authority – influence legal reasoning as well. At the same time these features also allow this reasoning to be unique, despite its adoption of forms of inference that are present elsewhere.
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Legal analogy as an alternative to the deductive model of legal reasoning

100%
Koszowski M.
Adam Mickiewicz University Law Review
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2016
|
vol. 6
13-25
EN
This article demonstrates the inadequacy of legal deduction as a method that guarantees the certainty and predictability of law and its outcomes in concrete instances. Inter alia, the Author brings our attention to the far smaller role that the deductive pattern of inference plays in legal thought than one may suppose, since it is rather only a schematic illustration of the decisions that were previously made by recourse to the mental operations of a non-logical nature. In return, he proffers legal analogy as an alternative, by which he understands a mode of thinking which helps the reasoner to take into account a mass of different factors that are traditionally deemed to be relevant for legal thought and decision-making.
9
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Multiple Functions of Analogical Reasoning in Science and Everyday Life

100%
Koszowski M.
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2017
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vol. 197
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issue 1
3-20
EN
This article addresses the functions analogical reasoning may have in science and everyday life. The focus ranges from the heuristic and probative value of this kind of reasoning to its illustrative and didactic utility, not excluding the opinion-forming, choice-facilitating, argumentative and justice-dispensing aspects of the inferences based upon similarity discernible between the instances being compared. In this context, the Author reveals disagreements between the standpoints of several scholars and singles out their most interesting stances and statements. In addition, the question of making the generalizations and understanding of notions (terms) presented in ordinary language as well as the problem of conceptualization have been touched upon. The relation of analogy to metaphor and its occurrence in humor, literature and poetics have also been addressed.
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Rozumowanie per analogiam w prawie precedensowym: dwa ujęcia analogii

100%
Koszowski M.
Roczniki Nauk Prawnych
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2015
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vol. 25
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issue 1
7-41
EN
Apart for the concise presentation of the rule-based model of binding judicial precedent, this article describes two basic accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law. The first account has been named: the factual model and the second: the rational model. This terminology was adopted due to the fact that judgment of similarity within the factual model is deemed to be a direct result of the very facts of the cases being compared, or of the unfathomed mystical workings of human intuition (emotions) or the outcome desired for the case at hand. The rational model, in turn, is based upon the notion of precedential reasons and casual facts, which are the facts that are relevant in the light of such reasons. Dependence upon these two notions makes the rational model more predictable and explicable. In certain circumstances, however, analogy to proceeds needs therein some additional factors which do not stem from the gist of that model. The factual model, unpredictable though it may seem to be, is faster and apt to provide us with just, or socially desirable, conclusions, especially when utilized by a person of a great legal knowledge and experience. Two other possible accounts of analogical reasoning in precedential law, i.e. the principle-based model and the proportional model, have been rebutted. The reason is: lack of analogical pattern of thinking involved and serious difficulties in its forensic application respectively.
PL
Oprócz zwięzłego przedstawienia modelu precedensu z reguł w artykule zostały opisane dwa podstawowe ujęcia (modele, koncepcje) rozumowania per analogiam w prawie precedensowym. Pierwsze z nich zostało nazwane faktualnym, a drugie racjonalnym. Terminologia ta jest podyktowana tym, że w ramach modelu faktualnego do ustalenia istotnego podobieństwa między porównywanymi stanami faktycznymi dochodzi za pośrednictwem, nie do końca dostępnej dla ludzkiego poznania, intuicji tudzież emocji albo rezultatu, jaki – z jakichś innych przyczyn – pożądany jest w danym przypadku. Natomiast zgodnie z założeniami modelu racjonalnego podobieństwo to jest stwierdzane poprzez odwołanie się do pojęcia „precedensowych racji” oraz „faktów sprawczych” sprawy precedensowej i odpowiedników tych faktów w sprawie, której skutki prawne chcemy poprzez sięgnięcie do rozumowania z analogii dopiero określić. W efekcie sposób stawiania ostatecznych konkluzji jest w tym ujęciu prawniczej analogii bardziej przejrzysty i przewidywalny. Drugie natomiast, faktualne ujęcie takiej analogii, poza tym, że pozostaje bardziej tajemnicze („mistyczne”), zdaje się w większym stopniu umożliwiać sędziom wydawanie sprawiedliwych, w ich mniemaniu lub w mniemaniu społeczeństwa, rozstrzygnięć, zwłaszcza gdy ten, kto stawia wnioski per analogiam, jest osobą odznaczającą się dużą wiedzą prawniczą i doświadczeniem życiowym. Oprócz modelu faktualnego i racjonalnego w artykule została przedstawiona również koncepcja, która sprowadza rozumowanie z analogii do proporcji (A:B jest jak C:D), oraz takie ujęcie wnioskowania a simile, w którym o wystąpieniu istotnego podobieństwa przesądza nie podobieństwo między faktami porównywanych spraw, lecz sama możliwość objęcia tych faktów jakaś ogólną zasadą (regułą).
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O norweskiej doktrynie precedensu

75%
Koszowski M.
Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne
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2012
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vol. 64
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issue 2
391-404
12
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Domniemanie czy definicja zgodności towaru z umową

32%
Koszowski M.
Ius Novum
|
2012
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vol. 6
|
issue 2
86-96
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