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1

HOW TO SAVE NATURALISM FROM PLANTINGA?

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Novotny D. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2007
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vol. 14
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issue 1
32048
EN
The author argues that Plantinga's Proper Function and Evolutionary arguments fail against liberal naturalism defined in a broad sense as the view that 'here aren't any supernatural beings'. The former argument can be interpreted in at least three ways: deductively, inductively and theistically. None of these, however, is successful. The latter argument suffers from several deficiencies of which two major ones are: (1) The unlikelihood of the reliability of our cognitive faculties, given (liberal) naturalism and (varieties of) evolutionism, is not shown. (2) Agnosticism with respect to the likelihood of our cognitive reliability is insufficient to establish the self-defeating character of naturalistic evolutionism, unless it is also shown that the belief in this reliability lacks an independent warrant. The last condition has been neglected by Plantinga.
2

PROPER NAMES IN REFERENCE: BEYOND SEARLE AND KRIPKE

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Novotny D. D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2005
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vol. 12
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issue 3
241-259
EN
Two basic answers have been given to the question whether proper names have meaning, the 'negative' by Mill and later developed by Kripke and the 'affirmative' by Frege and later developed by Searle. My aim is to integrate the two apparently irreconcilable theories by distinguishing the two aspects of the issue. I claim that, roughly speaking, whereas Kripke's 'No Sense View' provides a good answer to the question, 'How are proper names linked to their re-ferents?', Searle's 'Sense View' provides a good account of the issue 'What do we do when we use a proper name?'. Furthermore, I claim that the speakers attend to the referent of the proper name 'both' in virtue of Kripkean chain of communication 'and' in virtue of Searlian occasion-relative sense. Ordinarily, the chain of communication and the Searlian sense yield the same result, i.e. lead to the same referent. In cases of conflict, which are very rare, my intuition sides with the former against the latter. It would seem, therefore, that the only necessary and sufficient condition for a successful reference with a proper name is the existence of the Kripkean chain which links it with its referent.
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