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Asian and African Studies
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2020
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vol. 29
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issue 1
42 – 60
EN
Tribal grievances in Iraq had mostly been triggered by glaring injustice connected with the land and irrigation rights of particular tribes. However, some of the issues related to the grievances of the Shīca as a whole. The sheikhs also drew up a petition asking the king to dismiss the Prime Minister cAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī and to dissolve parliament. When this produced no result, direct action followed. In January 1935 unrest erupted in the mid-Euphrates region. It was at this point that Ḥikmat Sulaymān, an opponent of the prime minister and a leading member of the Patriotic Brotherhood Party, urged his old friend General Bakr Ṣidqī (commanding officer of the southern region) to refuse to suppress the tribal unrest. Faced by this and by dissent within his cabinet, cAlī Jawdat al-Ayyūbī resigned. His successor Jamīl al-Midfacī was then confronted by a growing tribal rebellion in the Dīwānīya region, led by two powerful tribal shaykhs, cAbdalwāḥid al-Ḥājj Sikkar and Shaclān al-cAṭīya, which had been in close touch with Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, leader of the Patriotic Brotherhood Party. When Ṭāhā al-Hāshimī, the chief of staff of the Iraqi army and brother of Yāsīn, refused to crush the revolt, Jamīl al-Midfacī’s suspicions of a plot were confirmed and he too resigned. Yāsīn al-Hāshimī, portrayed as the only man who could save the situation (because he had largely instigated it), was then asked by the king to form a government in March 1935, having effectively carried out a coup d’état against his rivals.
Asian and African Studies
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2018
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vol. 27
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issue 2
216 – 232
EN
One of the landmarks in the history of modern Iraq is the coup or revolution of 17 ̶ 30 July 1968. At that time several political forces in Iraq were dissatisfied with the regime’s policy, as they felt that President cAbdarraḥmān cĀrif was a weak leader who had allowed things to drift way wards. The unfulfilled promises to establish a democratic and humane political system angered many Iraqis. A group of bacthist officers led by Brigadier Aḥmad Éasan al-Bakr (who had been Prime Minister of Iraq in the years 1963 ̶ 1964) decided to topple the regime. They returned to power by accomplishing two coups, one on the 17th July and the other on the 30th July 1968. In both instances, they prevailed by stratagem rather than through force. In the first instance they deposed the president by allying themselves with his closest aides. In the second the bacthists got rid of their inconvenient temporary allies. The victorious Socialist Party of Arab Resurrection (Ḥizb al-bacth al-arabī al-ishtirākī), commonly the Bacth Party, created a Revolutionary Command Council under the chairmanship of Aḥmad Éasan al-Bakr. The RCC assumed unlimited power in the country. Ṣaddām Ḥusayn at-Tikrītī became its Vice Chairman.
Asian and African Studies
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2017
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vol. 26
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issue 1
22 – 40
EN
Britain was granted a mandate over Iraq to help it advance to readiness for full independence in the San Remo Conference (April 1920) after World War I. In June 1920, an armed revolt against British rule broke out and quickly spread through the mid-Euphrates regions. The heavily armed and surprisingly determined tribes scored a number of early and significant successes. The crushing of the revolt involved besides the cost of lives the expenditure of huge amounts from the British Treasury. Winston Churchill, in taking charge of the Near and Middle East affairs, called a conference to Cairo on March 1921. The questions considered by the conference included the immediate reduction of British expenditure in Iraq with the consequent revision of policy involving 1. future relationship of Iraq to Great Britain; 2. the person of the future ruler of Iraq; 3. the nature and composition of the defence forces of the new state which was to assume an increasing share of its own defence.
Asian and African Studies
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2021
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vol. 30
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issue 2
387 - 404
EN
One of the landmarks in the history of modern Iraq is the coup or revolution of 17–30 July 1968. The unfulfilled promises to establish a democratic and humane political system angered many Iraqis. A group of bacthist officers led by Brigadier Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr (who had been prime minister of Iraq in the years 1963–1964) decided to topple the regime. They returned to power by accomplishing two coups, one on 17 July and the other on 30 July 1968. In both instances, they prevailed by stratagem rather than through force.1 The victorious Socialist Party of Arab Resurrection (Ḥizb al-bacth al-arabī al-ishtirākī), commonly known as the Bacth Party, created a Revolutionary Command Council under the chairmanship of Aḥmad Ḥasan al-Bakr. The RCC assumed unlimited power in the country and Ṣaddām Ḥusayn at-Tikrītī became its Vice Chairman.
EN
The significance of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty in 1930 stemmed from the fact that it provided for the termination of a mandate - the first such example followed in the Near and Middle East only in Transjordan sixteen years later - and established a new pattern of Anglo-Arab relations. If Britain was prepared to surrender its mandate by 1930, it should arrive at this position reluctantly only after the painful experience of persistent agitation among nationalists in the trust territory and a wide segment of the public in England. The instrument itself assured a preferential status of the United Kingdom in Iraq. For the duration of the alliance Britain was allowed to retain two air bases and to make use of all Iraqi facilities for the transit of British armed forces (land, naval and air). Under the accompanying notes British ambassadors in Baghdad were to enjoy 'precedence in relation to the diplomatic representatives of other Powers', and the Iraqi government undertook to request a British advisory military mission and normally to engage in consultation with Whitehall, 'British subjects when in need of the services of foreign officials'. The twenty-five year treaty, which became operative on Iraq's admission to membership in the League of Nations on 3 October 1932, proved vital to the United Kingdom in the Near and Middle East campaigns of World War II.
Asian and African Studies
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 2
240 - 260
EN
By the mid-1930s, several officers of the Iraqi army had become actively interested in politics and found that the army's reputation for suppressing the Assyrian rebellion was a political asset. The most influential officers were true nationalists, that is, pan-Arabists, who inspired many of the junior officers. They looked to the examples of neighbouring Turkey and Iran, where military dictatorships were flourishing. Under the leadership of General Bakr Iidqi the army took over the government in the fall of 1936, and opened a period of military meddling in politics. During December 1938 General Nuri as-Said, a staunch partisan of close ties with Great Britain seized power. While professing democratic principles, he and his followers did not hesitate to use identical repressive measures to their predecessors. Nuri as-Said used the outbreak of the war as an excuse for imposing emergency legislation upon the country and abandoning all pretence of democracy.
Asian and African Studies
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2012
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vol. 21
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issue 2
199 – 219
EN
Faced with strong nationalist agitation, the British government did not ask the League of Nations for the formal assignment of a mandate, but instead it decided to exercise its control by means of a treaty with Iraq. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was concluded in October 1922. Together with four important subsidiary agreements, it confirmed British control of Iraq by giving Britain the right to (1) appoint advisers to the Iraqi government (2) assist the Iraqi army (3) protect foreigners (4) advice Iraq on fiscal matters, and (5) advice Iraq on matters of foreign relations. The treaty also provided for an open-door policy to be implemented by Britain, foresaw British financial assistance to Iraq, and guaranteed the non-alienation of Iraqi territory by Britain. It was to operate for twenty years, but by a protocol signed in 1923 its period was reduced to four years. In its really vital provisions, the treaty did not much differ from the draft mandate that had come up for consideration before the League of Nations in September 1921, but had never been formally adopted. Iraq´s king Faysal I accepted the treaty with pragmatic calculation and weathered the subsequent political outcry, fully intending to continue to press for the independence the country demanded.
EN
In Iraq political life during the mandate came to revolve around a tripartite balance of power. One part consisted of the king, a foreign monarch (from al-Eijaz) dependent on the British for his position but anxious to develop a more permanent power base among the local politicians. Another part comprised the British, always fearful of a rebellious parliament and anxious to see their supporters in office as prime ministers and ministers of the interior. To this end they continued to insist on substantial tribal representation in parliament. Between these two elements was a shifting group of Arab sunni politicians, some more anti-British than the others, but all willing to assume office. Some were strong and capable personalities. Indeed, one feature of the period was political pluralism and sometimes intense competition for power at the top. Unused to political parties, the politicians formed parliamentary blocs, based mainly on personal ties and shifting political alliances. Few had roots in any large constituencies outside the halls of parliament, except for their links with tribal leaders. The failure to build broadly based political institutions or to reach out the groups beyond their personal or familial circles was a critical weakness of the nationalist movement. It allowed for manipulation by the British and the monarchy and it prevented any one group from establishing sufficient power to move the country along in a particular direction. The politicians focused almost exclusively on the treaty, and failed to develop programmes on the social issues, although economic issues came to be more important in the early 1930s.
Vojenská história
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2023
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vol. 27
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issue 4
67 - 88
EN
The article deals with the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973. Since the Western and Israeli perspectives on this issue have already been treated in a number of works, the focus of this article lies mainly on Arab sources. Arab sources undoubtedly provide a different view and perspective on this part of Middle Eastern history. The actions of the two main Arab actors, Ḥāfiẓ al-Asad and Anwar as-Sādāt, were key determinants of the effectiveness of the Arab coalition during the period. It was also the baseline for the positions of other leaders in the region. The war destroyed many myths. It proved that the Arabs could cooperate and that they could keep their intentions a secret. It showed that Arab soldiers could fight bravely and well when properly trained and motivated and that they could handle the most advanced weapons.
EN
In the valley of the Tigris-Euphrates, at the end of World War I, the British occupied Basra, Baghdad and Mosul, which had been the seats of three separate Ottoman provinces. There was great uncertainty over the future. When the news from San Remo arrived, a rebellion burst out. For four months in 1920, war raged in Iraq, with resistance forces encouraged by the Shiite mujtahids and led by tribal shaykhs in control of the Euphrates region, as well as attacks in some areas north and east of Baghdad. The large cities and the Kurdish areas for the most part did not play a role in the fighting. The British selected Faysal, ex-king of Syria, as king of Iraq. After a referendum was held, Faysal was enthroned on 23 August 1921. The British provided Faysal, a king without a kingdom, to Iraq, a kingdom without a king. In 1922 the first Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed giving the British military and economic control over Iraq. British advisers were accepted in all offices. The treaty meant subjection and colonization and justified the objections by the nationalists.
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