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EN
The present forms of communication, whether via picture or sound, assume various forms. Every new form of such communication poses a new challenge, not only for technicians and computer scientists, who analyze issues regarding the direct servicing of such messages on a continuous basis, but also for lawyers. Narrowcasting is among the new forms of transmitting audiovisual messages. This phenomenon was mentioned in the doctrine of J. Barta and R. Markiewicz. T. Goban-Klas and P. Sienkiewicz were right when they observed that the new ways of delivering information take the form of a so-called narrowcasting, i.e. communication which is only targeted at selected recipients and involves segmentation of the audience. The authors stressed the difference which occurs between a speech delivered to numerous listeners and impersonal mass communication (the difference is erased by applying the single notion of allocution). The new medium has provided an opportunity to overcome the quasi-monopoly of the mass media in the field of indirect social communication. On the other hand, the higher level of addressability of the new media (i.e. narrowcasting as opposed to broadcasting, or collectiveness as opposed to dispersion) poses new dilemmas for the communicators.
EN
The Act of February 4, 1994 on Copyright and Related Rights, which regulates issues related to the protection of copyrights, belongs to the private law system (its provi- sions protect the private interest). However, the Act includes both administrative and criminal law provisions aimed at protecting the public interest. The literature rightly points out that the systemic division into public and private law is becoming increasingly less pronounced, due to the permeation of legal domains belonging to both systems. An example of such interpenetration are the provisions of copyright law. This statement is significant for the considerations made in this article due to the statutory method of penalising certain behaviour contained in the provisions of the Copyright and Related Rights Act. Criminal law provisions, systemically related to public law and protecting the public interest, contain references to the provisions of the Copyright and Related Rights Act regulating the scope of copyright protection, i.e. private law norms. In the context of the requirements that should be met by criminal law, such a reference raises doubts, which are particularly highlighted in Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act. This issue is impor- tant because the Constitutional Tribunal in its judgment of 17 February 2015, Ref. K 15/13 recognised this provision as constitutional. Therefore, he concluded that the principle of the specificity of a criminal act does not preclude the legislator from using terms that are imprecise or vague if their designations can be determined. At the same time, the Constitutional Tribunal has not presented any arguments indicating that in this case the determination of the designates of Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act does not cause any difficulties. The author of this article attempts to determine the extent of criminal liability in the event of a violation of author’s moral rights (Article 115 section 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act), at the same time indicating the difficulties that are associated with the unambiguous determination of behaviour which Art. 115 para. 3 of the Copyright and Related Rights Act penalises.
EN
The aim of the analysis carried out in this article was to indicate the scope of liability for violation of personal interests of a human being by a person who places a hyperlink on the Internet which include a material violating personal interests of another person. In addition, the analysis was made in which situations, referring to the action under the counter-law, this person will evade responsibility. During the analysis, the authors focused their attention on the issue of violation of personal interests in the form of honor, although making the disclosure, a specific user may also infringe other personal rights, including those mentioned in art. 23 Civil Code. In the considerations, it has been taken into account that the violation of honor can take the form of verbal as well as non-verbal communication, but it can also occur through the inclusion of a specific content using the functionality of social networking sites. A distinction has also been made between the materials being made, bearing in mind the subject from which the particular material originates, as well as the entity that makes it available. This issue is not without significance for the eventual possibility of evading the liability by a person who shares hyperlink.
PL
Celem analizy przeprowadzonej w niniejszym artykule było wskazanie zakresu odpowiedzialności za naruszenie dóbr osobistych osoby, która w Internecie umieszcza hiperlink do materiału naruszającego dobra osobiste innej osoby. Ponadto analizie poddano, w jakich sytuacjach, powołując się na działanie w ramach kontratypu, osoba ta będzie mogła uchylić się od odpowiedzialności. W toku analizy autorzy skupili uwagę na problematyce naruszenia dobra osobistego w postaci czci, choć dokonując udostępnienia, określony użytkownik może naruszyć także inne dobra osobiste, w tym wymienione w art. 23 k.c. W rozważaniach uwzględniono, iż naruszenie czci może przybrać zarówno postać przekazu werbalnego, jak i niewerbalnego, ale także może nastąpić przez zamieszczenie określonej treści z wykorzystaniem funkcjonalności serwisów społecznościowych. Dokonano także rozróżnienia udostępnianych materiałów, mając na uwadze podmiot, od którego określony materiał pochodzi, jak i podmiot, który go udostępnia. Kwestia ta nie pozostaje bowiem bez znaczenia dla ewentualnej możliwości uchylenia się od odpowiedzialności przez podmiot udostępniający materiał.
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