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JE POPPEROVA FALZIFIKOVATEĽNOSŤ KRITÉRIOM DEMARKÁCIE?

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 8
644 – 655
EN
The paper highlights Popper’s falsifiability as the demarcation criterion neither of science nor of empirical science, but of empirical content. The difference is of utmost importance for several reasons. First, it shows that the most widespread criticisms of Popper’s criterion are misguided. Second, it sheds new light on the relations between being empirical and being scientific. Third, it explains what still remains typical of empiricism after it has been purged from the three dogmas as described by Quine and Davidson. The paper elaborates on all the three points.
2

EPISTEMICKÁ POŽIADAVKA VEDECKÉHO REALIZMU VO SVELTE DUHEM-QUINOVEJ TÉZY

100%
Taliga M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue suppl. 1
178 – 195
EN
According to epistemic requirement of scientific realism the truths – or near truths – about objects posited by scientific theories should be knowable. However, the optimistic view that a scientific theoretical system can be shown to be true is blocked by the familiar Hume’s arguments against induction. The paper shall not deal with them primarily but only marginally in order to compare Hume’s conclusions with the Duhem-Quine thesis. For the common reading of this thesis is that it shows the powerlessness of negative instances to disprove scientific theories, just as Hume’s critical arguments against induction have shown the powerlessness of positive instances to prove scientific theories. The paper aims to expose erroneous aspects of the analogy and to explain what the errors imply for the epistemic requirement of scientific realism, even if it is weakened from knowability of truths to knowability of near truths.
3

PROBLÉM DEMARKÁCIE A TRI DOGMY EMPIRIZMU

100%
Taliga M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 8
610 – 619
EN
The problem of demarcation may take on many forms. A philosopher may ask what is a typical of “true knowledge”, or whether science provides it, and if it does, what the reasons are. Thus he faces a demanding task of specifying the particularity of science as such because he has to find necessary as well as sufficient conditions of distinguishing between science and non-science. Add the urge to distinguish between meaningful and meaningless language expressions, and you get the ambition typical for the 20th century logical empiricism. The primary aim of the paper is to sum up a critical rationalist’s criticisms of demarcation criteria proposed by logical empiricism. The secondary aim is to link the criticisms, which are roughly known in our country, with the better known opinions of W. V. Quine and D. Davidson on three dogmas of empiricism.
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