Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 13

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

The conceivability argument and the intuition of dualism

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2010
|
issue 24
90-106
PL
Argument Kripkego przeciwko teorii identyczności nie jest, według Davida Papineau, oparty na założeniu, że wyobrażalność zombi implikuje możliwość i nie prowadzi do wniosku, że materializm jest fałszywy, a raczej do wniosku, że wszyscy mamy intuicyjne poczucie, że materializm jest fałszywy. Pozostawiając otwartą kwestię tego, czy interpretacja argumentu Kripkego zaoferowana przez Papineau jest słuszna, w niniejszej pracy dowodzę, że założenie o istnieniu intuicji dualizmu podważa tezę, że wyobrażalność zombi implikuje możliwość.
EN
Kripke’s antimaterialist argument, under David Papineau’s new interpretation, is not based on assuming that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility and does not lead to the conclusion that materialism is false but rather to the conclusion that we are all in the grip of the intuitive feeling that materialism is false. Leaving it open whether or not Papineau’s interpretation of Kripke’s argument is correct, I argue here that by appealing to the intuition of dualism we can see that the conceivability of zombies is not a reliable guide to possibility.
2
Content available remote

W kwestii związku pomiędzy filozofią umysłu a naukami empirycznymi

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2005
|
issue 3
193-197
PL
Głos w debacie: Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?
EN
A voice in the debate: What the mind is and how it exists?
3
Content available remote

Brian Loar on Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2007
|
issue 11
10-39
EN
Brian Loar argues that we can account for the conceptual independence of coextensive terms purely psychologically, by appealing to conceptual rather than semantic differences between concepts, and that this leaves room for assuming that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds despite the fact that both sorts of concepts refer directly (by having the same reference-fixers and referents). I argue that Loar does not remove the mystery of the coextensiveness of those concepts because he does not offer any explanation of why they should be coextensive. Secondly, I argue that even if we grant that phenomenal and physical concepts can be coextensive on a posteriori grounds, we are committed to holding that there are two different and essential modes of presentation of phenomenal properties, the physical and the phenomenal, and that this precludes us from seeing phenomenal properties as essentially physical in an unrelativized sense.
4
Content available remote

Physicalism and the Explanatory Gap

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2005
|
issue 6
49-69
EN
The source of the intuition of the explanatory gap has never been well understood. It has not been clear why there should be some troublesome explanatory gap given that we have all the empirical evidence for the truth of psychophysical identity. I argue that there is a very natural intuition which explains why the explanatory gap is real and I defend my account against physicalists who deny that the explanatory gap has any significance. On my account, our inability to explain consciousness in physical terms shows that psychophysical identity, even if justified, is not fully intelligible.
5
Content available remote

The two-dimensional argument against materialism and its semantic premise

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2011
|
issue 29
80-92
EN
David Chalmers argues that zombies are possible because they are ideally conceivable and that therefore consciousness does not supervene on the physical. In this paper I discuss the most influential criticism of the conceivability-possibility principle in the current literature. According to that criticism, the conceivability-possibility principle is unjustified because it depends on a certain unjustified assumption concerning the semantic conditions under which necessary statements can be true a posteriori, namely that a posteriority is due to contingency at the reference-fixing level, so that a necessary statement can be true a posteriori only if at least one of the concepts flanking the identity sign refers contingently.
6
Content available remote

Conceivability, Possibility, and A Posteriori Necessity: on Chalmers’s Argument for Dualism

100%
Polcyn K.
Diametros
|
2006
|
issue 7
37-55
EN
Chalmers claims that the conceivability of zombies implies their possibility and he supports this claim by arguing that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility since no such gap can be generated by necessary a posteriori truths. I will argue that while Chalmers is right to the extent that there is no gap between conceivability and possibility within the standard Kripkean model of a posteriori necessity, his general conclusion is not justified. This is because there might be a posteriori necessity understood in some non-Kripkean way and Chalmers has not shown that no such alternative understanding of a posteriori necessity is available.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

The Conceivability Argument and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2005
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3
85-94
PL
According to the conceivability argument, physicalism is false since it is conceivable and hence possible that the physical truth do not entail the phenomenal truth. The influential way of responding to the conceivability argument is to claim that our conceivability intuitions can be accounted for in purely psychological terms, by appealing to some cognitive and functional differences between phenomenal and physical concepts, and that therefore what is conceivable does not entail what is possible. On this account, the entailment from the physical to the phenomenal that physicalism is committed to can be necessary and a posteriori. I argue that this way of responding to the conceivability argument cannot work. The conceivability argument depends on an assumption which implies that the psychophysical entailment cannot be necessary and a posteriori and appealing to the differences between phenomenal and physical concepts has no force against that assumption.
8
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Split Brains

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2011
|
vol. 19
|
issue 3
5-11
PL
Brain bisection raises the intriguing question about how many minds the split-brain patients have. Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit, who have brought this question into consideration, come to similar conclusions in response to it. They both argue that the question has no answer, that there simply isn’t any countable number of minds that the split-brain patients have. In addition, Parfit argues that the split-brain cases can be adequately described only if we adopt a certain particular view about the metaphysical nature of a person. The goal of this paper is to clarify both of those views and, in particular, to explain why Parfit’s preference for one model of personhood does not determine how many persons survive brain bisection.
9
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Can Perceptual Experiences Justify Beliefs?

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2011
|
vol. 19
|
issue 2
19-28
PL
The question whether perceptual experiences justify perceptual beliefs is ambiguous. One problem is the well familiar skeptical one. How can perceptual experiences justify beliefs if those experiences may systematically deceive us? Our experiences might be just as they are and yet the world might be radically different. But there is also another problem about the justification of perceptual beliefs which arises independently of the above skeptical worry. This other problem has to do with our understanding of the very notion of justification. It seems natural to think that justification can exist only in so far as what is justified is inferentially linked to the justifier. The question, then, is whether perceptual experiences can serve as an inferential basis for perceptual beliefs. The content of experiences does not seem to be the same sort of content that is possessed by beliefs. So the nature of the relation be- tween experiences and beliefs is far from obvious. In this paper I survey various attempts of justifying the view that there is an inferential relation between experiences and beliefs so that the latter can be justified by the former and I argue that none of those attempts is satisfactory. I also suggest that the problem which those attempts address may be illusory. Even though it seems true that experiences and beliefs possess different kinds of contents, there may be no logical gap between those contents that needs to be bridged by some philosophical reflection.
10
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Objects, Their Parts, and Essences

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2012
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
5-11
PL
According to some philosophical views, parts of objects (either three-dimen¬sional or four-dimensional) and whole objects are distinct entities. This raises the question of how to identify objects and their parts across possible worlds. By the principle of the necessity of diversity, the distinctness of objects and their parts must be preserved across possible worlds and this, paradoxically, seems to imply that in other possible worlds objects cannot be temporally or spatially different from what they actually are. For example, it seems that if Descartes and his temporal part are two distinct objects, Descartes could not have lived any shorter than he actually did. I argue that we can avoid this paradoxical conclusion once we realize that no temporal part of Descartes can be identified in other possible worlds with an independently existing person. In general, the view I defend is that parts of objects are not identical with independently existing objects across possible worlds.
11
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Conceivability, Possibility and Rationality

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Nauki
|
2013
|
vol. 21
|
issue 2
69-73
PL
Chalmers argues that ideal conceivability (conceivability on ideal rational reflection) entails possibility and on this basis assumes that zombies are possible and, therefore, that materialism is false. I argue that the paradigm cases of conceivability intuitions that Chalmers takes to be reliable guides to possibility are not only conceptually coherent, even on ideal rational reflection, but in addition have some rational explanation. The conceivability of zombies, however, has no rational explanation. So it is not ad hoc to deny that the conceivability of zombies entails possibility.
12
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Spór o naturę świadomości

100%
Polcyn K.
Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna
|
2013
|
vol. 2
|
issue 1
200-212
EN
Although phenomenal consciousness resists explanation in physical terms, it remains an open question whether or not consciousness is an intrinsically physical phenomenon since it remains an open question whether or not conscious states are identical with physical states. This question is one of the key issues of debate in contemporary philosophy of mind. Here I survey some of the key arguments designed to show that conscious states are not physical states. I argue that materialists have no satisfactory response to those arguments.
13
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Materializm Typu-B i Treść Pojęć Fenomenalnych (Type-B Materialism and the Content of Phenomenal Concepts)

100%
Polcyn K.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2019
|
vol. 46
25-39
EN
According to type-B materialism, the corresponding phenomenal and physical concepts are distinct concepts of the same properties. This view is very controversial because of the fact that phenomenal concepts, along with physical concepts, refer non contingently. I discuss three main arguments to the effect that phenomenal concepts cannot refer to physical properties non contingently. I argue that the most challenging is the modal argument. According to this argument, the idea that phenomenal concepts refer to physical properties non contingently is unacceptable, because it leads to the unacceptable view that psychophysical identity statements are both true a posteriori and primarily necessary. I argue that we do not have a satisfactory response to that argument.
PL
Zgodnie z materializmem typu-B, odpowiadające sobie pojęcia fenomenalne i pojecia fizykalne są różnymi pojęciami tych samych włsaności. Pogląd ten jest kontrowersyjny z uwagi na to, że pojęcia fenomenalne odnoszą się nieprzygodnie. W niniejszej pracy omawiam trzy argumenty na rzecz tezy, że pojecia fenomenalne nie mogą odnosić się nieprzygodnie do własności fizycznych. Argumentuję, że najpoważniejszy jest argument modalny. Według tego argumentu, pojęcia fenomenalne nie mogą odnosić się nieprzygodnie do własności fizycznych, gdyż zdania stwierdzające zachodzenie identyczności psychofizycznej nie mogą być jednocześnie prawdziwe a posteriori i konieczne prymarnie. Jak pokazuję, nie mamy zadowalającej odpowiedzi na ten argument.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.