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COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Obliczeniowe teorie swiadomosci)

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Milkowski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2010

issue 11

133-154

In this paper, I review the motivations for having a computational theory of consciousness to see if they turn out to be no longer plausible in the light of recent criticisms. These criticisms focus on the alleged inability of computational theories to deal with qualia, or qualities of experience (or objects of experience in some accounts), and with so-called symbol grounding. Yet it seems that computationalism remains the best game in town when one wants to explain and predict the dynamics of information processing of cognitive systems. Conscious information processing does not seem to be explainable better within any other framework; computationalism regarding consciousness can only be discarded by supposing that consciousness is epiphenomenal in information processing. I will argue that recent theories of consciousness that are to deal with the so called hard problem of consciousness remain in their core computational if they do not subscribe to epiphenomenalism. For example, the quantum theory as proposed by Stuart Hameroff remains openly computational; the same goes for pan(proto) psychist speculation of David Chalmers. The qualitative character of information processing that Chalmers takes to explain the existence of subjective experience piggy-backs, so to say, on the very fact that there is information processing that is best explained in a computationalist framework. I also briefly show that other alternative accounts of consciousness (such as direct theories of consciousness) that were supposed to oppose computational and functionalist conceptions are not only compatible with them but require them to begin with. In short, to discard credentials of computationalism in consciousness research one would have to show that it's possible to explain conscious information-processing mechanisms sufficiently in a non-computational way. And this has not been done by any of the critics of computational accounts. This all doesn't suggest, though, that computational explanation is sufficient for building a complete theory of consciousness; it seems however to be necessary.

ON SO-CALLED COMPUTER METAPHOR (O tzw. metaforze komputerowej)

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Milkowski M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

2009

issue 9

163-185

In many sciences, including cognitive science and biology, it is assumed that certain physical systems process information and effectively realize computation. For example, it is being claimed that DNA is being decoded in a manner that is best described as computational or that brains are analog computers. The skeptics, however, propose that the notion of computation is purely in the eye of the observer and computational properties cannot be hold to be objective. In this paper, the author discussws the criteria for realistic ascription of computational properties to physical systems. Computational ascriptions are treated as a kind of abstract mathematical ascriptions, and he shows in what sense these ascriptions are not merely conventional but refer to natural kinds. Along with general criteria that apply to other abstract properties being ascribed in sciences, such as explanatory and predictive value and implementation of functional properties vs. instantiation, he discusses specific problems of computational descriptions. The proposed criteria cover both analog and digital computation as kinds of information processing. As a result, the claims in biology about the nature of DNA information decoding turn out to be empirical and falsifiable, and not decidable a priori in a philosopher's armchair.

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2 Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

1 2010

1 2009

2 Milkowski M.

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COMPUTATIONAL THEORIES OF CONSCIOUSNESS (Obliczeniowe teorie swiadomosci)

ON SO-CALLED COMPUTER METAPHOR (O tzw. metaforze komputerowej)