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W.V.O. Quine on Truth and Analyticity

100%
Cieslinski C.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
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2008
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vol. 17
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issue 4(68)
233-247
EN
The critique of the concept of analyticity undertaken by Quine in 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' met with various objections. In particular, he was criticized for certain alleged inconsistency. He was ready to accept an intra-linguistic definition of truth as truth-in-L for any established language L, but at the same time he required that the general notion of analyticity were conceived inter-linguistically and unrelativized to any language in question. The author attempts to defend Quine against this attack. He assumes that definitions are instruments introduced with a view to a purpose they should serve. It is essential therefore to find out what purpose was to be served by the introduction of the concept of analyticity by those authors who used it. The author tries to answer this question and focuses on the problem whether an intra-linguistic definition of analyticity serves the required function. Then he goes on to inquire if the inter-linguistic definition of truth serves its function. He argues in the end that the negative answer to the former question and the positive answer the latter are right and save Quine from the objections.
2

DEFLATIONISM AND CONSERVATIVENESS

100%
Cieslinski C.
Edukacja Filozoficzna
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2007
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issue 44
95-111
EN
We discuss here the so-called 'deflationary conception of truth'. After sketching the basic ideas of the deflationists, we concentrate on the issue of conservativeness, presented in the literature as an important requirement for deflationary truth theories. It's the deflationist's intuition that truth is in some sense 'innocent' or 'metaphysically neutral'. The truth predicate is just a 'logical device' permitting us to formulate (and perhaps to prove) useful generalizations, but it doesn't by itself add any new content to our non - semantical base theory. Conservativeness comes as a handy explication of these intuitions: the deflationist should adopt a theory of truth which is conservative over its base theory. In the paper we try to assess the merits and demerits of conservative truth theories.
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