In his conception of the semantics of proper names, Russell combines, in his typical fashion, philosophy of language and epistemology. The resulting theory is fairly complex and difficult to reconstruct. The paper does not purport to give an exhaustive reconstruction of Russell’s theory, but only to answer the central question: in which cases do ordinary proper names abbreviate definite descriptions? The primary aim of the paper is to show that the “orthodox” interpretation, according to which all ordinary proper names abbreviate descriptions, is correct. The secondary aim is to demonstrate the falsity of an alternative interpretation, according to which there are two kinds of meaning of proper names: private and public.
The paper presents a reconstruction of Hume’s complex argument that takes determinism as a prerequisite for moral evaluation of actions and for the attribution of moral and criminal responsibility for an act. The paper falls into three sections. The first outlines Hume’s “doctrine of necessity”, i. e., his deterministic theory of action, and shows how determinism can be reconciled with the possibility of free action. The second section focuses on Hume’s view of moral judgement and explains how determinism and the denial of free will can be reconciled with the notion of moral responsibility for an act. The last section, devoted to Hume’s ideas about just punishment, canvasses Hume’s hybrid conception of the different purposes of punishment.