Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Lustration as a Struggle for a New Rules of Politics and a Legitimacy Enhancement in the New Democracies

100%
Wolek A.
Studia Polityczne (Political Studies)
|
2004
|
issue 15
147-201
EN
Lustration in Poland and in the Czech Republic is often interpreted exclusively as a dealing with the memories of the past issues (Vergangenheitbewaeltigung) or a transitory (backward-looking) justice instance. This approach makes unintelligible the endurance of lustration in already consolidated democracies of Central Europe. The article suggests that it is easier to understand it as an instrument of the change of politics rules. Lustration is an attempt to change informal communist rules of secrecy and 'nomenklatura' privileges, which survived the fall of communism. As such lustration aims to overcome a legitimacy crisis inescapable in the situation of evolutionary political regime change. The article defines first the concept of informal rule of politics in order to prove that its endurance makes new democracies of Central Europe a peculiar mix of old and new rules, which is the source of legitimacy vulnerability. Against this theoretical background instances of politics of lustration and decommunization are analyzed (nationalization of communist party property, communist crimes prosecution, lustration proper). The conclusion is that the effectiveness of lustration as a legitimacy enhancement tool is limited. It works only in these fields of politics, where new rules have already prevailed; where a substantial change of rules is needed, lustration fails. Demonstrating the weakness of new democracies to execute laws changing informal rules of communism, lustration makes the legitimacy crisis even more open.
2
Content available remote

THE ENDURANCE OF THE INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS AS A BENCHMARK FOR THE 1997 CONSTITUTION ASSESSMENT

100%
Wolek A.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2007
|
issue 4(81)
275-291
EN
The article focuses on the discrepancies between the rules of the 1997 Polish Constitution and political practice. The main thesis is that the divergence is a result of the enduring effect of informal rules or institutions which emerged in the early period of Polish transition. The informal institutions are defined, following O'Donnell and Lauth, as stable rules that are created, communicated and executed outside formally sanctioned channels. This means that they are viable rules (i.e. they are perceived as a binding standard of behaviour) only due to dispersed, societally (non-state) administered sanctions. In order to clarify how informal institutions may dominate constitutional rules four institutions are examined: the Presidency and its inherent conflict with the Government, a degenerated form of the constructive no-confidence vote that stabilizes but weakens Polish governments, futile attempts to install a professional, non-partisan civil service, and a radical undermining of the non-majoritarian logics of the National Broadcasting Council operation. The conclusion is that a continuous domination of informal institutions may be proved despite a wide consensus among legal scholars arguing a new post-1997 era of stable constitutional rules as opposed to insecure patchwork constitution of the early 1990's. This has important consequences for Polish constitutionalism as its promise of stability and security of legal frame of reference is constantly challenged by the strength of informal institutions.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.