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1

From restricting regulation to incentive regulation. Transport regulation in the European Union and Hungary

100%
Major I.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2004
|
vol. 51
|
issue 6
501-529
EN
The article analyses the efficiency problems of transport systems in the EU and Hungary and how they relate to regulation of the sector. The low efficiency and distorted structure of transport in the EU countries and Hungary is one of the main sources of economic loss at the turn of the millennium. The paper shows, based on incentive theory, that the economic efficiency of transport can be markedly improved by means of incentive-giving regulation.
2

International slowdown in the info-communications sector. Stock-market bubble or 'regulatory fault'

63%
Fulop P., Major I.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2004
|
vol. 51
|
issue 11
1001-1028
EN
The article addresses the question of why the spectacular growth in the info-communications sector - including telecommunications - slowed at the turn of the millennium. The authors dispute the widespread opinion that the slowdown and stagnation were brought on by the price fall in information stocks, arguing that the decline can be attributed mainly to regulatory problems in the sector. Simple market-structure models are used to show how the process of market liberalization in the sector led to a curb on investment in information companies, especially telecom firms, in Hungary and on an international scale.
3

Stimulatory regulation in public services. The connection price of network services

63%
Kiss K. M., Major I.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2007
|
vol. 54
|
issue 2
101-124
EN
The study deals with regulation of connection pricing of network services. Regulation of network sharing is one of the main problems in the regulation of public services. The model for regulating the connection price presented here outlines stimulatory regulation deriving from the information problems. It presents a market model of corporate decisions about network sharing, based on which the examination begins with the regulatory scope in a case of full information. Then comes stimulatory regulation for handling the problem of negative selection and moral risk. Finally comes a comparison from the welfare point of view of the results of an unregulated market, cost-based regulation that ignores information problems, and the stimulatory regulation presented by the authors.
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