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EN
The titular accents were associated with the striving of the British government, aimed at reducing the threat facing its global interests and posed by a number of aggressive states, including the German Reich. An agreement with the latter was envisaged as an effective countermeasure that would guarantee the preservation of peace and thus gain time for additional armament. Poland ascribed essential significance to the evolution of the British policy, which took into consideration the possibility of offsetting German complaints about the Versailles Treaty resolutions; the chief problem in Polish-German relations was the uncertain situation of the Free City of Gdansk. The incidents occurring therein produced fears that Germany could demand changes of the City's statute, which would, in turn, imperil Polish interests. This question became drastically conspicuous during the talks held by Lord Halifax and the Chancellor of the Reich at Berchtesgaden. It became apparent that signing an agreement would involve abandoning the Versailles Treaty and recognising Germany as a great power. When the Chancellor avoided discussing the proposed return of the colonies, the British guest drew attention to other potentially controversial questions, mentioning first Gdansk, and then Austria and Czechoslovakia. At the same time, he stressed that the British government was concerned not so much with the maintenance of the status quo in this region as with avoiding further troubles by means of agreements that would entail the good will and consent of the interested parties. Although the Chancellor ultimately did not broach the question of Gdansk, the course of Lord Halifax's visit proved relevant for Poland. When the British shared details of the visit with the French side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs voiced the opinion that it would be best if Poland and Germany could solve this problem on their own; only if this plan failed would the French and British governments be compelled to step in. The Polish government was not informed about the outcome of the Halifax visit either by London or by Paris. Meanwhile, reflections about the international situation pursued in London led to the conclusion that if Germany were to require prestigious success the easiest solution would be to proclaim the unity of Gdansk and the Reich.
EN
On 16 July 1937, in connection with the intensified efforts made in London by the Polish government intent on securing the inclusion of Poland into international negotiations pertaining to the Western Pact, the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs received from the Foreign Office the text of an appendix to a successive British memorandum containing the principles on which the future pact should be based. In response, on 27 August 1937 the Polish government presented to the British cabinet a memorandum which officially formulated a stand proposed to the British upon many previous occasions, namely, that the Pact should not omit the question of Polish security. The suggestion also contained a motion about supplementing the negotiated two-partite Pact by means of a third, French-German-Polish component. Emphasis was placed on the fact that a pact referring to Polish interests, but negotiated without the participation of Poland, could not be accepted by the latter. The Foreign Office, however, decided that if the Polish government wanted to obtain a guarantee that the German eastern frontier would be taken into account in the same fashion as the Polish western frontier, then His Majesty's government would not participate in any sort of a pact concerning Eastern Europe. At the same time, the British expressed the conviction that the Polish government would regard a Polish-French treaty as a sufficient guarantee, and entirely omitted the Polish-German context. The hopes which the Polish side linked with the appendix proved to be unfounded..
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