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PL
Contrary to a widespread thesis about the non-cognitive character of religious beliefs, I argue that it is beneficial to highlight and not marginalize the place of religion in the epistemic sphere. At least some religious beliefs (especially theism) can be qualified as true or false. Holding them as true is usually based on the evidence which is not widely accepted. This, however, does not entail that these beliefs are not true. If they are true, then holding them to be true should be seen as rational, despite of the fact, that the supporting evidence does not seem to be strong in the light of current epistemic standards of justification. It does not mean, however, that such beliefs can be hold with the highest assertion if they evoke serious doubts. Changes in religious doctrines and religious pluralism do not constitute a sufficient reason for excluding religion from the epistemic sphere, as a similar situation concerns many academic disciplines, such as philosophy, or psychology.
EN
The article Epistemological and ethical foundations of 'new atheism' starts from the thesis that the present rise of atheism, agnosticism, and anti-religious sentiments in Poland cannot be explained exclusively by the processes that occur within our country. It is also fed by the so called 'new atheism' - a movement of international character that was formed in the first decade of the 21st century by R. Dawkins, Ch. Hitchens, D. Dennett, and S. Harris. Presentation of theoretical foundations of 'new atheism' is preceded by listing its main theses, its genesis, and its aims. Then two epistemological claims of 'new atheists' are analyzed: evidentialism and scientism as well as their claim that religions justify morally unacceptable behavior and that sciences alone can justify morally acceptable deeds. Despite its strongly anti-religious character 'new atheism' stimulates new apologetics which can strengthen religion. If, however, this apologetics is to be effective, theological knowledge should be enriched by good philosophical training, especially in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and logic.
PL
Na początku stawiam tezę, że widocznej od kilku lat  ofensywy ateizmu i agnostycyzmu oraz narastania sentymentów antyreligijnych w Polsce nie da się wyjaśnić wyłącznie procesami zachodzącymi w naszym kraju. Rodzimi ateiści korzystają bowiem z metod i argumentów opracowanych w obrębie tzw. nowego ateizmu - nurtu o charakterze międzynarodowym, który ukształtował się w pierwszej dekadzie XXI wieku. Jego przywódcami są „czterej jeźdźcy ateizmu”: R. Dawkins, Ch. Hitchens, D. Dennett i S. Harris, których książki tłumaczone są na wiele języków i  wydawane w ogromnych nakładach.  Po przedstawieniu  głównych tez, genezy i celów tego nurtu omówione są jego wybrane założenia: ewidencjalizm i scjentyzm oraz przekonanie, że religie dostarczają uzasadnienia dla  działań niemoralnych a dla uzasadnienia działań moralnie słusznych wystarczy sama nauka. ‘Nowy ateizm’ stanowi zagrożenie dla religii, ale także stymuluje pojawienie się sprawnych apologetów. Ich skuteczność zależna jest jednak nie tylko od dobrego wykształcenie teologicznego, ale także filozoficznego, które uwzględnić powinno zwłaszcza wiedzę z zakresu współczesnej epistemologii, filozofii nauki i filozofii religii.
EN
The article was inspired by the tenth anniversary of the death of Archbishop Życiński and the article containing polemic with his panentheism published by Wojtysiak. Wojtysiak claims that the essence of theism is the thesis about the existential self sufficiency of God and the resulting asymmetry of his causal relationship with the world, which consists in the fact that God can exert causal influence on the world, but the world cannot influence God in this way. Since Życiński contradicts this thesis, according to Wojtysiak, his panentheism is not theism at all. I do not agree with this judgment, and what Wojtysiak calls ‘theism’ I call ‘classical theism’. Both panentheism and classical theism constitute legitimate versions of theism. Ishow that the classical theism in the version proposed by Wojtysiak is entangled in serious difficulties. One of them is that on cosmological level it harmonizes best with occasionalism, that is, with full theological determinism. Another one is connected with the thesis t that God is impassible, which deprives him of the possibility of ful filling these pro-religious functions, which are crucial for Christianity, such as God’s experiential involvement in the history of the world. I propose that the recogni tion of divine passibility be the minimum condition for any panentheism or position similar to it. Meeting this condition does not require the rejection of the thesis about the classically understood divine immutability, omnipotence or the creation of the world ex nihilo, but it is conducive to the revision of these notions. I point out that revisions proposed by Życiński in his version of panentheism were incomparably smaller than those proposed by Whitehead or especially Hartshorne, but still they cannot be treated as a minor supplement to classical theism. They constitute ver sion of panentheism or neoclassical theism, which is a much better philosophical basis for Christianity.
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88%
Diametros
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2005
|
issue 6
169-172
PL
Głos w debacie: Naturalizm i epistemologia
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