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EN
In this paper the author offers a critical survey of the following five extreme and exotic metaphysical doctrines about persistence: mereological universalism, mereological nihilism, organicism, eliminativism and mereologoical essentialism. The paper clarifies these theories and discusses the main arguments in favour of them as well as against them. His focus will be put particularly upon mereological essentialism, because of its range and explanatory value. The text closes with some metatheoretical considerations about the nature of metaphysical inquiry. The considerations in question could be interpreted as a defense of traditionally conceived metaphysics against scientism, empiricism and common sense.
EN
The point of departure of critical analysis offered in this paper is the definition of a thing, as formulated by Zdzislaw Augustynek: a thing is a non-empty set of point events, which is temporally and spatially extended, temporally continuous and causally connected. The author presents and discusses several objections to this conception of a thing. Entering in a polemic with point eventism he shows that the concept is unacceptable in its original version and must be re-formulated.
EN
The consideration presented in the paper are an attempt to revitalise the Chisholmian categorisations of objects 'via entia per se' and 'entia successiva'. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some more important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defense of the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way to preserve a relevance of the above categorisation is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects 'qua occurrents' or only to objects 'qua continuats' or only to persons.
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