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JOHN R. SEARLE AND ONTOLOGY OF LAW (John R. Searle i ontologia prawa)

100%
Pietrzykowski T.
Studia Prawnicze
|
2009
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issue 1-2(179-180)
7-41
EN
The essay is devoted to a theory of social ontology being developed by one of the leading contemporary analytic philosophers. It is based on results achieved by cognitive science (of which Searle was one of co-founders) as well as his own earlier inquiries into language, speech acts and mind. This kind of project, the aim of which is to clarify a logical structure and mechanisms of constructing social reality, applying ideas of intentionality, status functions, constitutive rules and institutions unifies many various theories, findings and intuitions put forward in many fields of research including legal sciences. It enables us to identify and better understand not only common structure behind law and other social phenomena but also their relation to our conception of physical world as described by natural science. It seems that John Searle's works contribute much to create a new paradigm of exploration and analysis of social world highly relevant for legal thinking. Furthermore, it sheds new light on many controversial problems and concepts of legal science. Despite the fact that the theory of social world as proposed by Searle is still at relatively early stage of development, its importance for understanding legal reality can hardly be overestimated.
2
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W poszukiwaniu Świętego Graala. Andrzej Grabowski o prawniczym pojęciu obowiązywaniu prawa

100%
Pietrzykowski T.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2010
|
vol. 1(1)
64-77
3
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Kant, Korsgaard i podmiotowość moralna zwierząt

100%
Pietrzykowski T.
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej
|
2015
|
vol. 2(11)
106-119
PL
Przedmiotem moich rozważań są poglądy Christine Korsgaard – jednej z najwybitniejszych współczesnych znawczyń i kontynuatorek kantyzmu – na temat moralnego statusu zwierząt. Jak wiadomo, Kantowską tradycję etyczną uznaje się za mniej przychylną idei praw zwierząt niż konkurencyjną tradycję utylitaryzmu. Ch. Korsgaard dokonuje jednak rewizji podstaw etyki kantyzmu i dochodzi do wniosku, że ich najlepsze odczytanie implikuje (wbrew poglądom samego Kanta), że nie tylko ludzie, ale i odczuwające zwierzęta zasługują, by być traktowane jako cele same w sobie. Jej interpretacja i rozwinięcie etyki kantyzmu ma za cel połączenie współczesnego naturalizmu filozoficznego i aktualnej wiedzy naukowej na naturę istot żywych. Korsgaard proponuje przekonujący, wyczerpujący obraz naturalistycznej aksjologii i jej etycznych implikacji. Tym niemniej, przedstawiam dwa ważne zastrzeżenia, które jej poglądy zdają się powodować: dotyczące natury ludzkich i zwierzęcych jaźni oraz relacji między uprawnieniami moralnymi i jurydycznymi. Artykuł opiera się na poglądach przedstawionych przez Ch. Korsgaard w trakcie trzydniowego wykładu i seminarium poświęconego dyskusji jej poglądów na status praw zwierząt z perspektywy etyki Kantowskiej, jakie zorganizowano w Oxfordzie w 2014 r., a także na wielu jej pracach dotyczących tej tematyki.
EN
The paper discusses the views of Christine Korsgaard – one of leading modern Kantian moral philosophers – on the proper status of sentient animals. Famously, Kantian moral theory is considered as much less favorable to the idea of animal rights than the competing utilitarian tradition. Ch. Korsgaard however reexamines the foundations of Kantian ethics and comes to the conclusion that their best reading implies (contrary to Kant’s own beliefs) that not only humans but also sentient animals deserve to be treated as ends in themselves. Her interpretation and development of Kantian ethics aims to reconcile it with modern philosophical naturalism and contemporary scientific knowledge on the nature of living creatures. Ch. Korsgaard proposes convincing comprehensive picture of naturalistic axiology and its ethical implications. Nonetheless, I raise two important objections that her views seem to give rise to – concerning the nature of human and non-human subjective selves as well as relation between moral and legal rights. The paper is based mainly on the opinions presented by Ch. Korsgaard during the 3-days seminar held in Oxford (2014) devoted to discussion of her views on the status and rights of animals from the perspective of Kantian ethics as well as on her numerous writings related to the subject.
4
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Zwierzęta jako nieosobowe podmioty prawa

63%
Elżanowski A., Pietrzykowski T.
Forum Prawnicze
|
2013
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issue 1 (15)
18-27
EN
The current body of knowledge about the subjectivity (cognition and value-laden experience) of some non-human vertebrates makes the juristic dichotomy between commodities and persons untenable. While the great apes may (with some limitations) be treated as persons, most vertebrates are non-personal agents that lack the awareness of their own agency, which does not necessarily diminish the intrinsic value of their lives. Unfortunately, the ongoing efforts to raise the status and thus improve the treatment of all sentient animals are hindered by the lack of realistic conceptual framework for translating the current knowledge of their subjectivity and ensuing individual interests into politics and legislation. Referring to Western philosophers of law (H. Kelsen, A. Ross, N. MacCormick, L. Petrażycki) we therefore propose to grant vertebrates (and possibly some other animals if their subjectivity is recognized by science) legal rights that are appropriate for non-personal subjects even if the scope of such rights has to be very limited in comparison to the rights of human beings.
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